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AHSTRACT
A contcmpomry issue of concern to both external umli!ors and linancial stall:mcnt
users is fnmd-dctcction by auditors. 'l11c ability of uuditors to detect muterial
irrcguhrritics, including fraud, should be enhanced to emtble them to apply "reasonuble
skill and care" in carrying out the audit. Such proficiency in fraud detection is needed if
the profession is to avoid costly litigation, ever-increasing indemnity insurance and
erosion of the profession's credibility. The thesis maintains that such enlmnccment can
be achieved if auditors both utilise knowledge about the aetiology of fraud in
psychology, sociology and criminology as well

a~

by synthesising a broad range of

approaches to fraud detection.

The multidisciplinary discussion of the aetic;logy of fraud enabled the development of a
three-component model. The model's three components are: rationalisations (R),
opportunity (0) an~ a crime-prone motivated person (P~ hence the acronym ROP.
Next, a close examination of relevant auditing guidelines and a number of fraud
detection models that have been proposed were used to develop an eclectic fraud
detection model {with the ROP model as one of its components).

iii

The applienhility of the lUll' model was dctcrrnincd in a study of SO major fi-aud

m~cs

investigated and prosecuted hy the Mt1jm Fraud <troup (MFO) <>fthc Victori11 police.
The study identified a numhcr nf inter-relationships hetwecn ofJCncc, offender and
victim characteristics. The findings obtained also confirmed the upplicabl!ity of the
model in the field <md yielded a two-level aiminaf profile of serious fi-aud of!Cmlcrs
which includes a new taxunomy of such of!Cnders. lhe taxonomy consists of twelve
specific typologies. In addition, the MFG study findings cast doubt (I) on Gottli"cdson
and Hirschi's (1990) assertion in their General Theory of Crime that white-collar
offenders are not significantly different from common offenders and (2) on a biiSic
premise of Loebbeekc et al.'s ( 1989) fraud risk-assessment model that all three
components oftheir model need to be present for fraud to occur.

The experience of auditors with deteeting six different types of material irregularities,
including management frnud, employl;!e fraud and error, was investigated in a postal
survey of I 08 auditors. The findings provide support for the applicability of the eclectic
fraud detection model. The survey also found that: it is rare for even experienced
auditors to encounter material irregularities; that different types of irregularity (e.g.,
management fraud) occur more

frequ~ntly

in some industries (manufacturing and

construction) than in others; the irregularity is likely to take one fonn (e.g., window
dressing and misappropriation of funds) rather than another; and management review
and tests of controls are more likely to alert an auditor to the existence of management
fraud. In support of earlier research findings, data analysis revealed tlmt the lack of ru1
effective internal control system and the absence of a code of corporate conduct arc
statistically significant correlates of an irregularity having a material impact on the

.i v

financial accounts of a company. In contrast to claims by l.ochlmckc ct al. ( I!JK\J), thu
survey lindings show thatli'nud risk-assessment utilising rud

llag~

alone is not cfkctivc

nnd the presence of only two (and not nllthrec) of their model's components need to he
present for management fraud to occur.

Both the ROP model and the eclectic fraud detection model were further refined in the
light of the findings from the two empirical studies. Without ignoring limitations of the
two surveys, the work reported in the present thesis sheds new light on the aetiology of
fraud, shows that neither audit experience nor red flags alone is sufficient to improve
'

auditors' fraud detection performance and provide another dimension to fraud riskassessment l11e new knowledge should be added to the auditor's rumoury to enhance
the audit effectiveness and efficiency and to reduce the fraud detection component of
the expectation gap.
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INTRODLJC'I'ION

CHAPTER SUMMARY
ll1is chapter discusses auditors'

rcsponsibilitie~

for fraud detection and provides a

motivation for the studies reported in this thesis.

1.0

BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH

The Australian Accounting Research Foundation AUS 210 (AARF) (!995a,
para.OS(a)), defines fraud "as any act which involves the use of deception to obtain an
illegal advantage", i.e., the misappropriation of assets or intentional misstatements in
the accounts by management, employees or third parties. Fraud may involve:
manipulation, faJsification or alteration of records or documents; suppression or
omission of the effects of transactions from records or documents; and/or recording,d

"·.;,

transactions without substance; or misapplication of accounting policies (AUS 210,
para.07). The key concept is deception intended to financially benefit the deceiver in
one way or anothcr

1
•

1
Acts that result In 11 materially misstated financial report arc ofplll1iculnr interest to auditors. Fmucl for or
against a company can take the fonn ofrmudulcnt finnnciol reporting, also known ns mro~agemcnt fr~ud (i.e.,
'Intentional misstatcmcnts or omissions of ammmts or disclosures in financial stntcmentl") nnd
misappropriation of assets or employee fraud, also known as dcfnlcation (i.e., "then of an entity's n.<sol<"). The
!emlS "fmud' (including management and employee fmud) and 'irregularity" nn: 11scd in1en:hangenbly.

'
Auditors have responsibilities for detecting und reporting Jfaud. Amliting Stamlards
and rulings hy the courts provide guidance on this matter. As li1r a.~ common law is
concerned. a close examination of the relevant judicial pronouncements in Austmlia
1

and the U.K. shows that it has been a mixed blessing for the auditing profession (sec

Godse![. 1990 for a discussion). Over the years, it has clarified the auditor's
responsibilities in carrying out an audit; it lms cast doubt on the auditor's abilit/ to

safeguard the investors' interests by ensuring that fraud and error are detected, and has
defended the auditor who is deceived by management~. The relevant common law also
demonstrates that while auditors do not have a legal duty to detect fraud per se they
5

have a legal duty to audit with due care and skill and that includes considering the
possibility of fraud\ "if there is anything calculated to excite suspicion he should
probe it to the bottom'' 1, and reporting suspicions about fraud to the appropriate entit{
It should be noted that "what is reasonable skill, care and caution niust depend on the

circumstances of each case" 9•

1 Until22 years ngo, d=vc:lopmcnts in tbe common law in Australia used to follow English precedent. Tod•y,
even though deci~ions by courts In England and Wales are not binding on Australian courts, tbcy arc
coruidercd relevant and are cited with approval.
3
U Chclsmford in Spa~kman v, Evans (1868), 3 L.R. 171: Coleridge, U inArnoldv. Armitage 1885, 1 TLR

670.
~ Lopes, LJ in Re Kingston Callan Mill Ltd {No.2) [1896)2 Ch. 279, nt29Q.
5
Lindley, U in lie London and G"eneral DanA (No.2} (1895}, 2 Ch. 677, at 682·683; i ":'CS, LJ in Re.
Kings/an Callan Miff Ltd (No.2) 2 Ch. 279, at 284.
U Denning in Famento (Stirling Area} Lldv. Se/sdan Fou/1/a/n l'eiJ Co 1./d [195811 All E.R. 11; Moffit, J
in l'ac!fic AcccptaiJCC v, Forsyth & Oihers(l910) 92 W.N. (N.S.W.) 29.

6

7

Lopes, LJ in Re Kings/an Callan Mill l.ld {No. 2) [1896] 2 Ch. 289; Alvcr.;tonc, LJ in Re City &]uimble
Fire Assuram:c Company [1925] Ch. 406.
! Pidgeon J in W.A. Chip and Pulp Ply Ltdv. Arthur Yaung& Co (1987) 5 A.C.L.C. at 1004.
9
Lopes LJ in /le KitJgslol! Cellon Mil/at. 2M8.

1

Both locally

10

and intcrnntiunully

11

,

the Accounting l'roiCssion

lmd

govcrmw:uts have

invested heavily in the issue of the cost of lfaud and li"aud detection by uudiwr~. The
auditing profession in Austrnliu, U.K., U.S., together with the lnternutional Fcdcrution

of Accountants, state in their auditing standanls" that the responsibility filr the
prevention and detection of irregularities rests with management and that auditors
should plan and conduct the audit so as to have a reasonable expectation of detecting

fraud and other irregularities. It is explained further that while the auditor docs have a
legal and professional duty to exercise reasonable skill and care in planning and

conducting the audit, the auditor does not have a similar responsibility to detect
irregularities that do not have a material financial impact11 .

The ability of the external auditor to detect material irregularities, including fraud, is
coming under increasing scrutiny and auditors are under considerable pressure to
accept responsibility for detecting material fraud. A number of surveys have
documented that audit beneficiaries want an e:<panded role for auditors as society's
corporate watchdog and that this view contrasts with that of auditors themselves
(Humphrey Moizer and Turley, 1992, 1993; Monroe and Woodliff, 1994; Porter,

°For Australia sec: the two Senate Commissions investigating the auditor's duties (Royal Commission of

1

Inquiry into lhc Activities of the N0g1111 H1111d Group, 198.5; McCusker Report, 1990) 1111d one working party
commissioned by the ASCPAilCAA which reported in 1994 (But sec Monroe and WoodliiT, 1994, for a
critique). Tile two accounting bodies in Ausrmlia esL1blished a Fimu-.cing Reporting and Audit E~pectntion
Gap Taskforce to report on the working party's recommendations. The report wa1 issued in 1996.
11 For ~\e U.S. see: Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (CAR), (Cohen Commission), AICPA, 1978):
National Commi~sion on Fraudulent Financial Reporting [Treadway Commission) (AICPA, 1987): Public
Oversight Board Report (1993): For Crumdn sec the Macdonald Commi.;sion report (CICA, 1988). For tho
U.K. sec: ICAEW (198S)nr.J Cadbury (1992) but see, nlso, Humphrey ct a\. (1992) for a discussion.
t2 AUS 210, AARf (1955a, parn.9); Auditing Practices Board SAS 110 (APB), (1995, pam.!O): SAS R2.
AI CPA (1997, parn.2); and International Federation of Accountants ISA 240, IFAC (1995, parn.5).
13 Austmllnn auditing standards do not define wlwtls m~ant by reasonable care und skill. Howcl"or, Judge
Rogers in AWA v. Da11ids. t/a Dclo!rte, Has kim & Sells & Or.; (1992) 10 ACLC 933 determined what is
reasonable by ruking auditors in n similar tier fimr to the defendant to int~fjlrcl or outline what tlroy would
have done under the same circumstances.

,,
191UI, 1993). The muliting proiCssion has hccn trying to reconcile! the public's
expectation of umlitors with the potcntiul to safeguard the interest of investors with the

fact that an audit cannot guarantee

th:~t

if there is a material irregularity such a~ lfuud it

will necessarily be dc!l:ctcd .1 00% of the time (Chandler, Edwards and Andersen,
1993). At the same time, the profession has endeavoured to minimise

il~

lcgalliahility

and costly litigation when failing to detect fraud or error.

Accounting firms and auditors~' are facing a litigation crisis with ouL~tanding claims

running into billions of dollars and as much again in settled claims 11 • In such litigation,
what is alleged against auditors is that they have breached their duty of care to their

client and/or a third party in carrying out the audit and, consequently, failed to detect
fraud that had been instrumental in causing significant financial loss if not the
complete collapse of a corporation. Another financial impact is the fact that
professional indemnity insurance is becoming "increasingly expensive and almost
16

unacceptably high" (Gill and Cosserat, 1996:97).

14

The auditor ofRothwel!s, Louis Clll1cr was personally chnrged and convicted with conspiracy to dcf,mld
the public by "deceitfully concealing and f~lscly ponrnying Rothwells' financinl position in three nnmml
reports, plus half-yearly consolid~tcd st~tcment5 in 1988" {Sykes, 1996: I: nnd "Rothwclls omccrs", 1996:5).
He was sentenced to 4 yean;' and 3 months' imprisonment and was eligible for parole in 17 months
('Rothwells fraud pair", 1996:3). Caner lodged an nppcnl ag~inst the conviction, which was refused.
ll The level of litigation against nuditors was one of the issues giving cause for concern in the United
Kingdom's Auditing Prncticcs Board discussion p~pcr(APB, 1992).
16
A submission of the Nntional Joint Limitation of Liability Task Force of the Institute of Ch:rrtcrcd
Accountanl5 in Australia and the Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants to the Inquiry into the
Lnw of Joint nnd Severn! Liability, cstnblishcd by the Federal Attomcy-Gcncml and the NSW J\llomcy-

I

According to fraud victimisation studies, it appears that the cost nf fhmd is very high
and indeed it seems to be on the increase (Ernst and Young, 1996 and KJ>MG, I!J1J6,
l995a). A company fraud victimisation survey by Deakin University (!IJ'J4) sampled
1,500 medium m1d large corporations in Victoria. Of the 628 (42%) husincss entities
that responded to the questionnaire, 71% reported fraud within their organisation and
the cost of fraud was estimated at $941 million. In addition to the cost incurred by the
victims, the cost of fraud includes the financial costs arising out of litigation against

auditors who fail to detect fraud as well as damage to the accounting profession's

credibility.

The prevention and detection of fraud is expected to continue to be an important issue.
Criminologists such as Grabosky and Smith (1996) have argued that Australia is in the
midst of profound social, economic and technological change, and that this brings with
it increasing opportunities for fraud. The same authors have also argued that new
fonns of fraud may be expected in many areas of industry, commerce and public
administration as a result of the g!obalisation of fmancial markets and improved
technology. A recent survey by the Audit Faculty of the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) has found that most accountants expect

fraud to increase substantially dwing the next five years. This is attributed to a lower
standard of personal ethics, increased pressure on individuals to perfonn, the impact of
down-sizing and increased reliance on computers and their sophistication ("Fraud
Fears", 1997: 13).

General {1994:3), has quoted the figure of$611,000 per prutner per nonum for the [then] Big Six finns.

,,
A study of rmud commission ;unlthc auditor's ability to c.Jetcct Jraud is wummtcd I(Jr
several rcustms. First, there

c;«ist.~

an expectation gup as far as the role of auditors in

fmud detection is concerned. The courts have statctlthat auditors can be held negligent
if they have breached their duty of care to their client by not applying "reasonable care
and skill" in carrying out the audit. However, the auditing profession with

iL~

mandatory auditing standards indicates that the auditor is not responsible for detecting
material irregularities and ''has distanced itself from these responsibilities" (Monroe
and WoodlitY, 1994;49). A better understanding of how and why fraud is committed

and who is likely to commit fnud should improve the fraud detection abilities of

auditors, thus enabling them to better meet their Jegai and professional responsibilities
and the expectations of financial report users.

Second, by its very nature, fraud is a complex subject and difficult to detect.

A~1ditors

are not very good at detecting fraud as they rarely encounter fruud and they arc not
usually experts at fraud detection 11 • 'Ibis is partly because there is a void in the
auditing literature as there appears to be no comprehensive model of the aetiology of
commercial fraud and its detection by auditors. Although Cressey (1986), Loebbeckc,
Einning and Willingham (1989) and Albrecht, Wemz and Williams (1995) have
presented models of why people commit fraud, their models can be criticised for not
doing so within a psychological, sociological or criminological framework, and for not

11 Auditing Standard SAS 82, AICPA (!997, para. 7) ncknowlcdgc tbnt fraud, particularly when conccn!cd
through falsified documentation, is difficult for auditors tn dclect since auditors arc not trained nor arc they
"experts in such authentication". lt can also he argued thul if nuditors rely on experience alone to become
experts at identifying irreguhrri!lc:s, then they me unlikely to become experts in due course owing to the fact
tbnt lm:guhuities are infrequent (Ashton, 1991; Locbbe<.:kc, ct at., 1989). Support for the argumcnltllnt
auditors arc not experts at fraud detection is found in Ashton's {1991) literature review which shows
convincingly thot audit cxp•ri•nce alone eannot make nuditors fr:111d-dctection cxpcru. However, KI'MG has
developed a dntn base of error frequencies for a population of intemntionnl audits (Ashton, 1991 ).

7

dealing adcquntcly with

th~

notion of traits tlml render someone to he crime-prone. In

other words, the existing models mah: nn al\cmptto account lOr individual difkrcnccs
as far as the aetiology of li"aud is concerned by considering the individual offcntkr's
personality tmits which predispose him/her to commit fraud under particular

circumstances. In addition, the three models have also failed to conceptualize the
opportunity to commit !Taud so as to include the broader socioeconomic context in
which fraud takes place and to locate it within a theoretical fmmework such as
Clarke's (1980) situational approach to criminal behaviour. Clarke's approach stresses

the importance of opportunity, both in understanding the aetiology of crime and crime

prevention.

This thesis argues that because management and employee fraud is by its very nature
complex and difficult to detect, auditors' fraud-detection abilities need to be enhanced
to enable them to apply "reasonable care and skill" in carrying out an audit. Such
enhancement can come about by utilising knowledge about the aetiology of fraud in
such disciplines as psychology, sociology and criminology, and by synthesising
different approaches to fraud detection. A close examination of a broad range of
explanations put forward by psychologists, sociologists, and criminologists as to why
people commit fraud allows the identification of a numbl!r of correlates of fraud and
enables the construction of a descriptive model of the aetiology of fraud. A better
understanding of why fraud occurs and the type of individual likely to commit fraud
should enable auditors to be better at detecting fraud,

Finally, research into ti"aud is S\:arcc. Very li1tlc is known about the typl.:S or crimes
commiucd, the chamctcristics of those who commit such crimes and uuditors'
experiences with detecting fraud. Auditors' thmd detection abilities can also he
enhanced by carrying out empirical research into fi'aud detection so that auditors letllll
through tl1e experiences of others.

The research undertaken in this thesis is intended to encapsulate in a model available
knowledge about the aetiology of fraud and fraud-detection by auditors. Research has
been noticeably deficient in both of these areas. At a theoretical level, the critical
evaluation of available perspectives and empirical findings relevant to both the issues
mentioned is used to construct a descriptive aetiological model of fraud (ROP model)
and an eclectic fraud detection model. The model of fraud developed in this thesis
incorporates and expands on idr:as in the models presented by Cressey (1986),
Loebbecke et al. (1989) and Albrecht et al. (1995) by incorporating research findings
from the auditing, psychology, sociology and criminology literatures. The probability
of fraud oCGurring is modeled as a function of the opportunity (0) to commit the
crime, one or more motivated crime-prone persons {P) being in a position to .::ommit
the crime, and the use of rationalisations {R) or justifications to enable the
individual(s) concerned to commit the crime by overcoming any inhibitions imposed
by one's conscience or perceptions of the risks involved. Thus, the ROP model
includes the notions of rationalisations, crime-prone persons and situational factors
which are found in the psychology, sociology and criminology literatures. The fraud
detection model developed in this thesis incorporates the ROP model into its design.

'I

'l11c applic!lhility nf each nmdclwa:> c.~mnincd cmpiricully in two separate studies. In

the lirst study, pn:dictinns pcr:incnt to the aetiology of l:~ud generally, and li-~ud

otli:ndcrs' chnmctt.Tistic:-~ ~·pcdlk11lly, were examined in a"'study of 50 serious fi"aUtl
cases prosecuted by the Major Fmud Group (MFG) of the Victoria Police. This study
provides a parlin! test of the ROP model, incbding demographic, modus operandi and

criminal jll'lticc characteristics of the offenders surveyed. The study furnishes a twocomponent profile of the major fraud offender.

The second study which involved a survey of auditors who had experience in detecting
irregularities, including fraud, yielded findings about fraud detection and tested the

applicability of the fraud detection model. Findings pertaining to the notion of crimeprone individuals, company fraud-victimisation proneness and fraud-detection by
auditors are reported and discussed.

Both studies as well as the two models developed are original and enable comparisons
to be made between Australian and U.S. auditors as far as fraud detection is concerned.

By providing knowledge that can be used in practice to improve auditors' frauddetection ability, this thesis reduces to some extent the fraud-detection component of

the expectation gap.

:.~

Ill

2,U

OUTLINE OF TilE TIII~SIS

In view of the noticcnblc lack of knowledge by auditors as li1r as the aetiology of Jj-alJ(l
is conccmcd, the next chapter draws on a num~r of perspectives within psychology,
sociology, and criminology in order to identify correlates of fraud. A number of

different theoretical perspectives in psychology, sociology and criminology arc
discussed and critically evaluated. Chapter 3 examines the usefulness of auditing

guidelines as far as frnud detection is conc~:med and a number of approaches to fraud
detection an: also critiqued, including the Loebbecke et al. ( 1989) fraud assessment

model.

On the basis of the theoretical discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, two models are

developed in Chapter 4, one addressing the reasons why people commit fraud and one
of fraud detection by auditors. Chapter 5 reports lindings from a study of 50 major
fraud offenders and provides case summaries of 24 illustrative cases. Chapter 6
describes a survey of 108 Australian auditors' experience of detecting irregularities,
including management and employee fraud.

The final chapter discusses both the findings obtained and !he conclusions that can be
drawn from them, as well as policy implications. The two models discussed in Chapter

4 are revised in the light of the empirical findings in Chapters 5 and 6. Finally, Chapter
7 coruiders in what sense this

thcsi~:

can be said to be making an original contribution

to the knowledge about the aetiology of fraud and

fri~t!d

detection by auditors.

CIIAI'TER 2

AN INTERDISCII'LINAUY API'ROACH.;ro ·1.'111~ AETIOLOGY OF FRAUD

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The first part of this chapter considers Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) ge11eraltheory

of crime and empirical studies of white-collar offenders. It then examines a number of
well-known explanations for criminal behaviour within psychology (in tenns of selfconcept/self-esteem; Eysenck's theory of personality and crime; psychopathy;
psychodynamic themy), sociology (differential association; control theory; theory of
drift), and the situational approach in criminology. Offender personality and
situational correlates of fraud arc also identified.

1.0

INTRODUCTION: THE AETIOLOGY OF FRAUD

Deception offences such as fraud arc examples of criminal behaviour. Therefore,
accountants and auditors should look to the criminological literature for insights into
the correlates of such behaviour. In the last century, psychiatrists, psychologists and
sociologists have put f01ward general theories of criminal behaviour1• In most eases,
the aim has been to provide a single theory that accounts for crime in general.
However, given the variety of behaviours that can be assumed under "crime", the
search has been largely unsuccessful. As Walker (1987) put it, the search for a single
theory of crime can be compared to searching for one theory of disease. Disappointed

I Sec Blockbum. 1993; Feldman, 1993; and Williums, 1991, rorn:vicws.
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with the search for a single theory, some criminologists have shiflctl their allcntion
away from individual offenders ami have, instead, concentrated on dmractcrlstics of

sitm.1tions which make it easier to commit an o!Tcncc (Clarke,

]l)gf)).

This chapter discusses a number of theories of crime. To put this discussion in context,

du: following questions arc considered:

i.

Arc white-collar offenders in some significant way different from conventional
offenders?

H.

Can existing theories of criminal behaviour provide an adequate explanation
for white-collar crime in general and fraud in particular?

iii.

If a specific explanation for white-collar offences like fraud is needed, should
we look for causes within the individual offender, the situation in which the
offence is committed or both?

iv.

Can one legitimately talk about causes or correlates regarding the question of
who, how, and why fraud is commil!cd?

Following the discussion of the various theories of crime from a criminological
perspective, auditing theories of fraud detection arc considered in the next chapter.

11

2.11

J•:XI'LANATIONS FOR WIIITJ•:-COLLAR OI•'FENDJmS

2.1

Can gtntr,ll thcori!;!s of criminal hchaviuur ,,rovitlc an adciJUlltc
cxphm:1tion for whitc-coll:1r crime in gcncral:1ml fraud in particular'!

Theories of criminal behaviour in tl1c twentieth century have been dominated by
positivism. Positivism in criminology is based on the belief that human behaviour is
detennined, i.e., that there are causes of human behaviour which can be explained by
natural laws. Another characteristic of positivism is that one should be concerned with

"facts" rather than metaphysical issues. Finally, positivistic criminologists believe that
the best way to discover the natural laws governing a particular behaviour is by means

of the "scientific method" as used in the natura! sciences (Blackburn, 1993;18).
Deterministic explanations of criminal behaviour are found in psychiatry, psychology
and sociology.

Positivist theories in criminology explaining crime in deterministic terms, have focused
on the offender in their search for causes of criminal behavioul. This practice is in
contrast to the Classical School's emphasis on an offender's deeds

lli:

the result of the

choices of rJ.tional agents who arc therefore responsible for the behaviour in question.
Positivistic criminologists have

b~en

criticised by critical criminologists such as

Ta:,'\Or, Walton, and Young (1973) for: (I) not questioning the concept of ''causes"; (2)
ignoring the fact that hwnan behaviour is rational and people internet with their
environment (including the criminal justice system) in a dynamic way; (3) not
questioning the medical model; und (4) for lrcaling people ns passive rather than active
2 Positiv!SIIc criminologists olso emphasise tho need to rchnbilitntc, rnlhcr Oum punish, the offender,
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decision makers. Positivism characterises most theories of cr!'lnc in this century,

including theories of white-collar crilm:.

In contrast, the Classical School of thought in criminology (sec Beccaria, I963) builds
on the premise that offenders are agents with free will. Consequently, because criminal
behaviour is conceived of as the result of rational decision making, i.e., is free willed,
the Classical School focuses on the type of crime that has been committed anc!
considers bow serious it is in order to decide the degree of retribution the offender

should be sentenced to. Unlike those interested in the rehabilitation of offenders, the
Classical School is not interested in the individual offender and his/her personality,
position in life, or needs, and thus conceives of retribution as commensurate to the
severity ofthe crime alone.

It should be noted that theories of criminal behaviour have been mainly concerned with

juvenile delinquents (rather than adult offenders) as well as with offenders known to
authorities. With these limitations of general theories of criminal behaviour in mind, let
us consider four well-known psychological and three sociological theories of criminal
behaviour as well as the situational approach to crime.

2.2

Arc

whitc~collnr

offcmlcrs in

"

~omc

signilic:mt way different frum

convcntiomd offenders'!
1

Gott!i"edson and Hirschi (1990) put forwanl a w.meraltheory of crime which :tllcmpts

to synthesise both offender-based cxplan<llions (i.e., both psychological and

sociological explanations that focus on attributes of the individual) as well as offencebased explanations within criminology (i.e., those that highlight the importance of
opportunities for crimes to be committed). Drawing on Bottoms' (1993) critique of the

theory, the following can be said about their general theory of crime: a number of

explanatory elements are utilised

to explain how crimes are possible, namely

opportunity, a suitable target, a free-thinking but basically self-interested hedonistic
individual lacking in self-control and making a free choice, and the absence of effective
crime-prevention situational factors. Noting that committing crimes even in the case of
persistent, career offenders takes up but a part of their time, the theory attempts to
account for individu:d differences in how different people are likely to commit
different offences or the same offences to a greater degree.

Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) make use of the concept of self-control. According to
these criminologists, low self-control is an enduring criminal predisposition which is
the result of defective socialisation. For them, socialisation, whether effective or
ineffective, takes shape primarily within the family and the school. They conceive of
low self-control as a single, unidimensional, enduring trait which is made up of: (I)
impulsivity, a preference for simple mU1er than complex tasks; (2) risk-seeking, a

3 Their theory Is a.n extension orHirschi's (1969) ~:onlro] theory discussed in scction4.2 below.

preference for physical rather than intellectual activities; (3) being self~ccnlrccl; ami (4)
having an

c.~plosive

temper (pp.89-91). Low scJt:control is also said to prcdi>rxJse

people to engage in certain other kinds of irresponsible behaviour which arc not
necessarily criminal offences (pp.9l-94). Gottfredson and Hirschi maintain that selfcontrol is Jacking in persons whose socialisation within the family

wa~

characterised by

the absence of nurturance, discipline and training. More spccilically, they argue that
low self-contrOl is established when parents: (I) do not monitor closely their children's
behaviour; (2) do not recognise deviant behaviour when it takes place; and (3) fail to
punish such behaviour (p.97). Furthermore, it is also argued that people with low selfcontrol are not only more likely to commit o/Tences but arc also more likely to be
unsuccessful at school, as employees, and in their marriages.

For Gottfredson and Hirschi, a primary cause of criminal behaviour is the combination
or interaction of low self-control and opportunity to commit a crime. By itself,
however, neither factor is a major cause of crime. The general theory of crime posits
that the incidence of crime in society decreases as a person's self-control increases with
age. Thus, the conunission of crime is explained in terms of a situation providing an
opportunity for an offence to be committed and without effective "capable guardians"'
and the presence or not of a person with weak enough self-control (in tum, a function
of his/her socialisation and age).

4 As termed in Cohen and Felson's {1979) routine activilics/opponunity theory, n "c~pablc guOfdian" in this
context refers to the presence of one or more persons (e.g .• police presence, neighbours looking on) or
technology (e.g., S«:urity cameros) that discourages offending b~usc it significantly incrcrucs the risk of
apprehension. In d1c context offmud, the exi~.cncc of middle mMagcmcnt nndfor competent intcnwl audlor
external auditors who watch out for frnud constitute 11!1 exnmpleofn 'capable guardian".
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Finally, Gottfrcdson and Hirschi mnin111in that specialisation umong ol1Cndcrs is a
myth lllld that criminals arc "l'el:mti/e", i.e., they perpetrate "a wide variety of criminal
acts, with no strong inclinution to pursue a sp~cific criminal act or a pattern of criminal
&"ts

to the exclusion of others" (p.9l). However, as Bottoms (1993:70) states "<he

empirical world is more complex than Gottfrcdson and Hirschi allow for". Before

discusf.:ng this and other serious criticisms levelled against the general theory of crime,
let us first consider some empirical support for Gottfredson and Hirschi's basic premise
that a combination of low self-control and opportunity is a (perhaps the) primary cause

of crime.

Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, and Ameklev (1993) reported a self-report study of offending
that used a 24-item questionnaire measuring self-control and crime opportunity in faceto-face opportunities with a random sample of 389 adults in Oklahoma City. The
questionnaire items developed by Grasmick et al. tap six components of the personality
trait of self-control derived from Gottfredson and Hirschi's conceptualisation of the
trait Their results support the general theory of crime, namely that it is the
combination of low self-control and crime opportunity which predicts both "fraud"
(Gottfredson and Hirschi's term for property offences) and "force" (Gottfrcdson and
Hirschi's term for violent personal crimes) that the respondents reported committing.
However, contrary to what the general theory would have predicted, crime opportunity

was a significant predictor of both fraud and force independent of its interaction with
low self-control. Grasmick et 31. also found that crime opportunity was a better
predictor of whether those surveyed had committed fraud than low self-control.
Grasmick et al. concluded that their findings provide promising support for certain

"

aspects of the general theory and that the theory has identified one mechanism th<JI
afli:cts crime. 'l11cir datu, however, "seem to weaken the theory's structural challenge"
and falls short of the expectations generated by the appearance of the theory (p.24).

Piqucro and Rosay (1998), however, have expressed concerns about the reliability and

validity of Grnsmick ct a!.'s self-control scale).

Regarding major criticisms levelled against Gonfredson and Hirschi's general theory of
crime, Bottoms (1993:72) points out that two different schools of thought within

criminology, positivism and classicism, are treated as potentially complementary. In
fact, classicism and positivism are inherently contradictory. Other criticisms of the
theory discussed by Bottoms (see pp.68-73) revolve around: (1) the absence of
empirical support for their premise that the age-distribution of crime does not vary
across social and cultural conditions; (2) a failure to show convincingly that their
theory covers all crime as they claim; (3) available empirical literature contradicts their
assertion that crimes basically "require little foresight, plruming or effort" (p.69); (4)
their treatment of the relationship between gender and victimisation is inadequate; and,
finally (5) they completely ignore "the socialisation and social control potential of

communities" (p.71).

Grasmick et al. (1993) criticise the theory for placing too little emphru;is on criminal
.,opportunity which most likely is linked to social structure. 'l1:te same authors also point
out that: Gottfrcdson and Hirschi's definition of low self-control includes risk seeking
whereru; (in an apparently logically inconsistent way) their definition of criminal

5 See Longshore, Stein nnd Turner (1998) for a response to Piquero Md Rosay (1998) and a defence of

,,,
opportunity includes little risk of tlctcction. The validity of Uottfi"cdson and Hirschi's
assumption that everybody is equally motivated to commit of!Cm.:cs and that individual
dillCrcnccs in olTcnding arc attributable primarily to low self-control and/or crime
opportunity is questioned by Grasmick ct al. Finally, Grasmick et al. criticise
Gottfredson and Hirschi's failure to elaborate on the situational circumstances and

individual characteristics which might mute or countcmct the effect of low self-control
(p.25). Consequently, they conclude that the theory "needs expansion, refinement, and
elabomtion before it can explain crime to the degree Gottfredson and Hirschi imply"
(p.26).

Benson and Moore (1992:252) argued that Gottfredson and Hirschi's theory "is
inadequate in explaining white-collar crime; its rejection of motives as important
causal forces is misguided". Evidence against Gottfredson and Hirschi comes from
studies showing that white-collar offenders are different from common criminals in
tenns of a number of demographic and criminal justice characteristics (Benson and
Moore, 1992; Marshall, Albrecht and Cherrington, 1980; Thomas, 1992, and Wheeler,
Weisburd, Waring and Bode, 1988). It should be noted in this respect that a limitation
of such studies is that they have been concerned with white-col!ar criminals reported to
the·police and processed by the courts. In view of the large volume of crimes and
offenders that remain unknown to the authorities (Williams, 1991:51-60), findings
reported by such studies cannot be readily generalised to white-collar criminals at
large. Their findings are nevertheless useful in increasing our knowledge about whitecollar offenders processed by the police, courts, and prisons. Another limitation of the

Grao;mick ct ol.'s scale.

?0

empirical

studi~s

discussed below is that the data upon which their lindin!;S arc huscd
\\
' it is by no mctms clear whether one should expect, /(Jr cxwnplc,
is dated. There(qrc,

today's fmud oftCnders to have the same demographic and criminal
characteristics

il!i

ju~tice

two decades ago. The last 20 years have seen an increasingly more

diverse population of people in western countries having tertiary education and
entering the professions. Changes in the structure and management of corporations
have affected the job mobility and career paths for many professionals in positions of
financial trust, factors that affect the composition ofwhite-col!ar offenders.

Marshall ct al. (1980-cited by Albrecht et al., 1995:7-8) compared incarcerated white6

collar criminals with prisoners serving sentences for property offences and with a
sample of non-criminal college/university students. Compared to property offenders,
white-collar criminals were more likely to be reported to the police, caught, arrested,
convicted and imprisoned and less likely to serve long sentences. Given that it takes a
nwnber of years for people to get into managerial positions or other positions of
financial trust, it came as no surprise to find that white-collar criminals were likely to

be older and better educated; they were also more religious and more likely to enjoy
better psychological health, to be generally more optimistic, hz.v<: higher self-esteem,

be self-sufficient, motivated, and to enjoy a sense of achievement and family harmony
and, finally, were more likely to express more social conformity, self-control, and
empathy. However, they were less likely to have criminal records or to be characterised
by alcohol and illicit drug abuse than the other property offenders. Compared to the

6 The tenn "property offence" refers to the following: theft, bu~gtruy, robbery, and fmud (i.e., obtaining
property or finnnciol advantage belonging to another by deception with the intention ofpcnmmentty depriving
lheothcrofil).

?.I

col!~g~/univcrsity student control group, white-collar criminals wtrc li:JUnd to be "more

dishonest, more

indcp~ndcnt,

more scxuully mature, more socially c.lcvianl unr.l more

empathic. However, white-collar criminals were much more similar to

~tudents

thilll to

other property offenders" (p.S).

Further empirical evidence against Gottfrcdson and Hirschi's theory was reported by
Wheeler et a!. (1988). They used data from 1976-1978 pre-sentence reports in I ,329

white-collar crime cases (antitrust offences, securities and exchange fraud, ptJstal and
wire fraud, false claims and

statement~.

credit and lending institution fraud, bank

embezzlement, IRS fraud, and bribery) and a control sample (Noo2Q9) of non-violent
crimes. They examined characteristics of white-collar crime that distinguish it from
non-violent offences in a total of seven districts (see also Wheeler, Weisburd and Bode
(1982)). They found that convicted white-co!lar crime offenders were of a higher
educational standard and were more likely to have been in employment for longer
periods and to be white and older in age than those convicted of common crimes. For
example, the typical white-collar convicted offender in the Wheeler eta!. (1988) study
was a forty-year old white male, while the typical convicted common offender was a
black male thirty years of age. More specifically, 45.5% of non-violent common

criminals were high school graduates compared to 79.3% of white-collar criminals and
3.9% of the former but 27.1% of the latter were college/university graduates. Wheeler
et al.'s findings support the common sense view that for someone to be in a position to
commit major fraud, he/she must have had the necessary education and so forth to rise
to a respected position over a number of years. Individuals without tertiary
qualifications, with a serious drug-addiction problem, or with a criminal record, would

??_

be significantly less likely to occupy responsible positions.

In a di!lCrcnt report that used the

&'ll11C

sample as Wheeler ct al. (1981!), Wcisburd,

Chayet ruJd Waring (1990), examined the criminal careers of white-collar offenders
and found that they started their criminal career at a later age than common criminals.
However, Weisburd et a!. also found that a proportion of white-collar offenders were
recidivists who did not specialise in white-collar crime. 'lltis last finding knds support
to Gottfredson and Hirschi's basic premise that white-collar offenders are no different
from common offenders and do not specialise in their criminal activities. Further
support for Gottfredson and Hirschi was reported by lbomas' (1992) five-year followup study "of 588 persons convicted in one week in 1980" (p.l25) in New Zealand
which included 44 fraud offenders. Thomas (p.l25) tbund that, "many fraud offenders
re-offended: J 5 (34.1 %) were later re-convicted of the same offence, and 30 {68.2%)
were re-convicted of fraud or any other offence". Benson and Moore {1 992:255) point
out that the sample of offenders used by Weisburd et al. "may not represent convicted
white-collar offenders generally". The sample used by Thomas can be similarly
criticised. The sample of offenders used in the Weisburd et a!. study was drawn from
seven judicial districts in the U.S. during the years 1976, 1977 and 1978. They
examined a number of offence categories of white-collar crime and a random sample
of 30 cases was selected from each offence category in each of the seven districts. As
Wheeler et a!. (1988:336-337) themselves point out, the list of ofTence categories did
not include a number of important federal white-collar crimes, including bankruptcy

fraud, conspiracy, and the study relied on data from convicted white-collar defendants
.. who cannot be considered representative of such ofTcndcrs generally, most of who

?1
would remain umlctcctcd. Consequently, the findings of Wcisburd ct ul. cannot be

extmpolatcd to white-collar crime of1Cndcrs generally.

Benson and Moore ( 1992) examined the question of whether white-collar offenders arc
different li"om common offenders by analysing data on 2,462 persons sentenced in
eight federal district courts between 1973 and 1978 for bank embezzlement, bribery,

income tax violations, false claims and mail fraud, and I,986 individuals sentenced for
three common crimes that included drug offences, postal forgery, and bank robbery.

Pre-sentence reports were the main source of data. Like Wcisburd et al. (1990), Benson
and Moore (1992) used an offence-based definition of white-collar crime, i.e., they

designated offenders as white-collar by the offences they committed rather than their
social or occupational status. Their findings contrndict Gottfredson ant. Hirschi's view
that white-collar offenders are no different from common offenders. Benson and
Moore found that offenders classified as white-collar were less likely to have prior
arrests, alcohol and drug abuse, and poor performance in high school than those
classified as conunon offenders (p.265).

The studies discussed thus far have involved surveying official w:ords on white-collar
offenders. Langdale (1990) reported an Australian study that used a case study
approach. Langdale was concerned with two cases only. She attended the court
proceedings, read the briefs of the case and followed un ru1structured intetview
approach with the offenders and the victims. No concrete reasons or benefits are
outlined for tlte methodology used and it is very unclear what the research was testing.
Qualitative case studies of two cases can provide some useful insight into corporate

?4

crimii'tal activity. Langdale found that the offenders did not sec themselves :ts
criminals; in li1ct they denied having deceived any of the victims. Such case studies,
however, need to be tOllowcd up with quantitative research. It is doubtful whether thr:
approach followed by Langdale provides the claimed "deeper understanding of
corporate criminal activity" (p.16).

Zietz (1981) also reported using a case-study approach with 100 women inmates at the
California Institution for Women serving sentences for embezzlement or fraud. She
first interviewed the women and surveyed their prison records in order to examine
whether the same conditions (antecedents) advocated by Cressey (1953) in A Study in
the Social Psychology of Embezzlement: Other People's Money as necessary for male

offenders to_ commit offences violating financial trust also apply to female felons.
Cressey's antecedents for financial tr..tst violators who had accepted a position of trust

in good faith are: (I) conceiving of themselves as having a non-shareable financial
problem; (2) being "aware that this problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the
position of financial trust"; and (3) being able to apply their "own situation
verbalisations which enable them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted
persons with conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds or property"

(p.30).

Cres:>ey found that the most important of the three antecedents was whether someone
was able to fbrmulate, in advance, a rationalisation that would permit them to justify to
themselves violating their position of financial trust. Regarding the nature of the
unshareable fimmcial problem, Zietz (1981:52-61) reported that tl1e following financial

?I
problems, also idcntilicd by Cressey, underpinned the tnJsl violation of tlw women in

her study: problems resulting from personal Jililurc, from business reversals, and
problems involving pressure or pcrsua~ion by u signilicant person. 1-lowcvcr, Zict1. also
found that, unlike Cressey'~ male trust violators, none of the women in her study had

been allCcted by:(\) physical isolation (though many had been adversely affected by
emotional isolation); (2) problems resulting frOm employer-employee relations; or (3)
a desire to gain status. Zietz concluded that the behaviour of the women in her study,
unlike that of the male offenders described by Cressey, "seemed tc have a Joan of Aic

quality. They showed a willingness to be burned at the stake, if necessary, to obtain for
a loved one the medical care he needed, or to buy, if possible, the love of a husband
attracted to a younger woman" (p.58).

Having found that the female inmates studied did not share the srur· 'haracteristics as
those reported by Cressey {1953) for his heterogeneous group of 133 melc financial
trust violators (embezzlement and fraud offenders), Zietz attempted to develop a
typology of female property offenders in general and embezzlement and fraud
offenders in particular. She focused on the "problems" the female incarcerated felons
tried to solve with their embezzlement or fraud and identified two typologies of such
offenders. The first group consisted of a number of subtypes. First, there were "honest"
women who breached financial trust in the context of: {I) shouldering their
responsibilities as mothers and wives; (2) because they were romantic dreamers, e.g.,
obsessed with keeping a husband or a lover they loved too much to risk losing; (3)
being greedy opportunists who defrauded in order to meet a financial need, and as a

result came to enjoy a new lifestyle they got used to and, consequently, persisted in

)()

defrauding in order to go on enjoying the same lifestyle; :md (4) women who came to
violate financial tmst as a result of having been pressured into or been persuudcd to do
so by another person.

The second group of women identified by Zietz also consisted of subtypes. 'Jbere was
the vindictive type who committed offences in order to benefit herself on the basis that
this was justified by what she perceived to be childhood deprivations or hardships she
experienced as an adult; there was the social cntrepreneu1 who perpetrated a variety of
fraud offences with or without an accomplice, who planned her crimes and justified
them by pointing to similar practices by legitimate entrepreneurs in the business world
or by referring to the criminal avarice of her victims. Another identified subtype was
the reluctant offender who perpetrated a variety of propert'f offences, but did not feel
particularly responsible for planning them and blamed a husband or a lover as having
pressured or talked her into committing the crimes concerned. Zietz reported that the
two groups of women differed significantly in how they viewed themselves, in their
motives, in what they valued in life and whether they engaged in a criminal lifestyle. A
basic limitation of this type of research is how to ascertain the reliability of what one is
told in interviews in general, especially by incarcerated felons. Inmates may well have
their ideas about what are _desirable answen; to the questions and numerous factors
influence how people attribute rt\'lponsibility for their behaviour. Zietz failed to ensure
adequately the reliability of her data. One way of doing so would be to interview the
spousesllovers of the women, where applicable. A final limitation of Zietz's study is
that it is not cleir whether the justifications offered by the inmates were the cause or
., the effec.t of their fraudulent activity. Despite its limitations, that study does provide

"

some insight into the thinking of women imprisoned fbr deception otlCnccs.

Recasting the typology of ICmalc li-aud ollCnder.s developed by Zietz ( 193 I) in terms
of components of a model of why people commit ffaud (sec Figure [,Chapter 4), we
have: (I) motives (e.g., domestic responsibilities, greed, financial pressure, or other

pressure such as emotional or even revenge on the company by

a disgruntled

employee seeking personal justice); and (2) justifications/rationalisations {so as not
to lose a husband/lover, the company deserved it). Of course, given a person with a

motive for committing fraud and being able to justifY it to him/herself, an opf.KJriUnity

is needed for fraud to occur. What is lacking in Zietz's typology is some explanation of

the reasons why, under the same circumstances, other women do not commit fraud. In
other words, what personality attributes of the women rendered them crime-prone in
combination with particular opportunities/conditions.

It can be seen that findings from five of the six studies discussed (the exception being

Weisburd et al., 1990) contradict Gottfredson and Hirschi's general theory of crime. In
other words, white-collar offenders differ from conunon convicted offenders in tenns
of a number of important demographic and criminal justice characteristics, namely
being older, better educated, likely to be first offenden;, to have steady employment
histories and, finally, to be less likely to have an alcohol or illicit drug abuse problem.

In considering these studies, it is important to bear in mind that different findings may
reflect differences in the research method used, such as the definition of white-collar
crime, the types of offences examined and whether the criteria of prior criminality or

recidivism was used. Furthermore, the term cmbc7zlcmcnt, as used in the U.S., may
cover a bnr.1dcr mnge of offences than in Australia and New Zealand. It is also
important to remember that the studies involve convicted white-collar offenders. It is
unknown whether such oftCnders arc representative of white-collar offenders in general
since only a proportion of such offenders comes to the auention of the authorities and,
of those, a number beat the charges against them or, if convicted, arc not sent to prison.
Consequently, a study that focuses on incarcerated fraud offenders, as Benson and
Moore (1992); Marshall et al. (1980); Thomas {1992); Weisburd et al. (1990); Wheeler
et al. (1988) and Zietz (1981) have done, can not justifiably extrapolate its findings to
the general population of such offenders. The comment made (and whici; would apply
less to research involving white-collar offenders investigated and prosecuted by the
police, but not necessarily incarcerated, see Chapter 5) should not be taken to mean
that such research should be dismissed; rather, that it should be treated with caution.
Finally, there is still a lot we do not know about what factors motivate fraud offenders.
Before considering a number of general theories of crime, it should be pointed out that:
fraud occurs in many forms. A great deal of the published literature on fraud
uses the term very loosely, often as a synonym for, or in the context of
discussion of, white-collar crime, i.e., crimes against business. However, not all
frauds would be classified as white-collar crimes (especially if they occur
outside an occupational context) and there are white-collar crimes other than
fraud. Fraud can also occur in the context of corporate crimes or crimes by
business (Edelhertz, 1983; Levi,1987; Geis, 1991). (Thomas, 1992: 123)

On the basis of the preceding discussion it can be concluded that Gottfredson and
Hirschi's general theory of crime is inadequate in explaining fraud. Therefore, auditors
wishing to improve their knowledge about why fraud occurs should consider other
theories of criminal behaviour which have been proposed from different perspectives.

,,,
A discussion of such theories follows hut it needs to be pointed out that the theories
concerned have not been tested on white-collar criminals. In the context of the present
thesis, the justilication of discussing these theories is that they provide useful pieces of

the jigsaw puzzle of fmml aetiology.

3.0

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF CRJMINAL BEHAVIOUR

Psychologists' interest in crime goes back to the end of the nineteenth century. As

Thomas ( 1992) points out, psychologists "do not appear to have considered fraud in the
context of white collar crime in much detail" (p.l23}. In fact, as Blackburn ( 1993:2)
reminds us, "crime has always been a minority interest among psychologists".
Psychological research into criminal behaviour has concentrated on who becomes a
criminal and why. Generally, psychologists have put forward positivistic explanations
of criminal behaviour. Thus, they are subject to the same criticisms mentioned earlier

with reference to positivism. It should be noted that critics of psychological theories
tend to lump them together. H{';Wevcr, as sbo·.vn below, this can not be justified
because such theories differ significantly.

In considering the psychological theories discussed below, one should remember that
there is disagreement among criminologists as to whether researchers should be
focusing on offenders, offences or both. The usefulness of psychologists' concern with
individual offenders is appreciated more when one remembers that "acts and
tendencies ... call for different kinds of explanation" (p.22). It should be emphasised
that psychologists are interested in explaining individual differences. In this way, they
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supplement the sociologists' I(Jcus on social am! cultural lhctors us dctcrmimmts of

crimina! behaviour. After all, individuals who arc brought up in the same environment
do not necessarily exhibit the smnc behaviour.

3.1

7

Self conccpt/cstccm/im:IAC ami criminal bchaviour

Behnviouristic psychologists, who like to explain behaviour in terms of conditioning,
frown upon the notion of the self as a separate "]" or "me" which people experience
subjectively. Social cognitive theorists (see Bandura, 1989) conceive of the self as a

structure that proces:;cs infonnation actively. Jn other words, it is viewed as a cognitive
schema. According to Blackburn (1993), the concept "refers to knowledge and beliefs

about oneself including attitudes of affective regard or self-esteem. Since the self is
generally believed to derive from and mediate social interaction, a deviant self-concept
may also mediate antisocial behaviour" (Wells, !978:197). Psychologists have
constructed instruments that measure self-esteem (sec Eyo's, 1981, "Tc!lllesse Self
Concept Scale"). Self~esteem is part of a person's social identity and is said to be
inversely correlated with a person's degree of neuroticism (Watson and Clark, 1984).
As mentioned below, neuroticism is a personality trait considered by Eyscnck (1977)
to be associated with criminal behaviour.

There are conflicting views about the exact nature of the relationship between self
concept and criminal behaviour. One such theory is that a positive self concept
insulates against deviant influences (Reckless and Dinitz, 1967). Another view is that
people will commit offences if they believe that in doing so their sclf~imagc will not

7 This section draws on Blnckbum {1993:197~200).
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suffer. When one's scll:cstccm is low, one is more likely to commit deviant 11c\s such
us cheating when an opportunity presents itself (Eisen, 1972}. Other uuthors (sec
Howells, 1978) argue that people arc motivated to maintain their self-esteem or to

augment it, even if it means committing deviant acts such as crimes. Finally,
researchers have reported a significant correlation between low self-esteem/negative

image and non-confonnity in young ofTenders (Richman, Brown and Clark, 1984) and
between low self-esteem and cheating (Aronson and Mellee, 1968- cited in Feldman,
1993:287-288). One explanation as to why there are such conflicting views (and no
identifiable prevailing or current view) between self image/esteem and deviant
behaviour/offending i5 that there is "a lack of an adequate theory of self concept"
(Blackburn, 1993:199).

Social identity theory {Tajfel and Turner, 1986) provides an explanation for the
relationship between one's self-categorisation and behaviour. This theory maintains
\hat much of people's social behaviour is motivated by the desire to understand and
evaluate one's self, and that this desire is satisfied through social categorisation and
social comparison. Social categorisation refers to how people simplify a complex
social world by placing themselves and others into categories such as gender or

successful business-person. Thus, one's social identity is defined by the social
categorisation process. According to Vivian and Brown {1995), together with the need
for self-evaluation and understanding, there may be a need for "self-enhancement". In
other wc·rds, people are motivated by the desire to know and evaluate themselves
favourably in relation to others, to have a positive social identity and behave
accordingly (see below).

1?.

Drawing on the psychology of sciJ:conccpt and social identity, one could hyrMhcsist.:
that someone in manugcmcnt who regards themselves as competent and a high-

achiever and is accepted as such by their colleagues enjoys high sell: esteem. If such a
person comes to perceive him/herself as having failed as a professional because the
company is facing imminent bankruptcy his/her self-esteem will be low, he will

accordingly be under pressure, and may well commit fraud to re-establish his/her self
image/esteem/social identity (Kaplan, 1980).

3.2

Personality and criminal behaviour

3.2.1

Eyscnck's Theory

}!

Madc!i (1980) defines personality as a set of characteristics, tendencies and
temperament that have been fanned by inheritance and by social, cultural, and

t.O.vironmental factors. On the basis of his assessment of available empirical findings
from a number of criminological studies of offenders under the age of 21 8, Feldman
(1993:160) states that "there seems, then, some basis for expecting personality
measures to correlate with criminal behavior and to discriminate between offenders
and controls", One view is that certain ~rsonality characteristics (e.g., beiug a neurotic
extrovert, high on psychopathy, having a weak ego or inadequate superego, or being
characterised by criminal thinking pattems9) facilitate the commission of antisocial
acts. In other words crime-prone individuals possess certain identifiable
characteristics/traits.
8 Sec, for example, McCord (1979).
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Caspi ct ul. (1994) examined the relationship between personality traits ami crime in

two studies. In New Zealand, they studied 18-ycar old males and JCmalcs from un
entire birth cohort. In the U.S., they studied an ethnically diverse group of 12 and 13

year old boys. In botl1 studies they used personality tests (Multidimensional Personality

Questionnaire (MPQ)) and a nwnber of independent measures of delinquent behaviour:
police records of contact, court records of convictions, self-reports, and reports from
independent infonnants, parents and teachers (pp.J66-7). Caspi et al. found that,

irrespective of country, age cohort, gender and race, those high on Negative

Emotionality (the tendency to experience negative emotional states 10) and weak on
constraint (i.e., having a strong tendency to behave impulsively) were more delinquent.
Crime prognoses in tenns of distinct personality traits, however, has not been
examined with adult white-collar offenders.

A well-known theory of personality and crime was put forward by Eysenck (1977) and
it is known as the Eysenck theory of crime and delinquency. This theory (unlike
psychodynamic theories such as that of Sigmund Freud - see below) is stated in a way
that makes it possible to falsify it. Eysenck's starting position is that human beings are
by nature antisocial, i.e., hedonistic, egocentric and destructive. Therefore, he asks:
why doesn't everybody commit certain criminal acts? In other words, what is it that
stops people from committing criminal offences? His answer is that it is people's
conscience, which he takes to be a conditioned reflex. According to Eyscnek, an

9 Sec Blackburn (1993) fora discussion of the relevant literature.
10 Persons high co "negative emotionality" nre said by Caspi ct al. (1994:169) to haven ''low Scncml
threshold for tile eKperience of negative emotions such ns fear, anxiety, and anger nnd tend to break down
under stress".
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individual's personality can be measured on three dimensions: extroversion (E),
JJI!IIroficism (N) and p.\Yr:hotidsm (P). Each of these personality traits is said to have a

biological basis and the three personality traits can be measured using the Ey.renck

Personality Inventory (EPI/ 1•

1bis section draws on Feldman's (1993) and Blackburn's (1993) discussion of
Eysenck's theory. The three determinant variables are:

l.

Extroverts (E) are said to be low on cortical arousal (i.e., brain stimulation) and
a high score onE points to a perr.::m who (in contrast to an introvert) is sociable,
active, optimistic, outgoing and impu!si.ve. Individuals who arc high on E are
said to be difficult to condition, will not have a strong conscience and,

consequently, will show higher levels of criminal behaviour.

ii.

The individual who is high on neuroticism (N) has a labile autonomic nervous
system (i.e., jumpy), which overreacts to painful stimuli (e.g., when being
punished for behaving in a particular way) and thus interferes with
conditioning. They are prone to mood fluctuations, are sensitive to criticism,
are anxious, restless, and rigid. A high N score is said to be associated with
higher levels of criminal activity.

iii,

As far as psychalicism (P) is concerned, people high on this characteristic tend
to be loners who search for pleasure, are social misfits and do not feel remorse

II See Black bum {1993), F~1dmnn (1993) 1111d Williams (1991) for delllilcd descriptions Md appraisals oflhe
theory.

"

lOr the trouble they cuusc others ami, finally, urc incapable of empathy. A high
I' score is also said to correlate with higher levels of olfcm.ling.

Eyscnck's theory predicts that offenders will have higher E, N and P scores. Studies

which have tested this hypothesis, comparing, for example, prisoners and, nonoffenders as well as studies of self-report offending, have reported conflicting
findings
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Farrington, Biron and LeBlanc (1982) reviewed 16 snxlies (including Allsopp and

Feldman, 1974; Bartol and Holanchock, 1979; Buikhuisen and Hemmel, 1972;
Eysenck and Eysenck, 1970; Farrington, 1979) which compared offenders with police
records and control groups. They concluded that while in most of the studies the

officially-known offenders scored higher on P and N, seven studies which used a selfreport measure of offending reported a significant positive correlation withE, a smaller
munbcr of studies reported a ~ignificant positive correlation with P and, finally, there
was no unequivocal relationship reported for N and offending. On the basis of their
own test of Eysenck's theory in London and Montreal, Farrington et aL concluded that
it lacked empirical support.

Eysenck's theory has been criticised by Blackburn (1993) on a number of grounds. The
following are some of the major criticisms made by Blackburn: (I) it only considers
punishment and ignores the importance of praise, positive reinforcement, in shaping
one's behaviour; (2) the EPI can be faked; (3) the P dimension as described by Eyscnck
12 See Bl~ckbum, 1993, for discussion of such studii!S.

1(,

contains u lot of iUnbiguitics; and (4) it ignores the importuncc of social

li~etors

in

explaining criminal behaviour.

Blackburn (1993: 127) concludes his comprehensive evaluation of Eysenck's theory by
stating that:

It must be concluded that Eysenck's theory of criminality is not well supported

... the crucial prediction that the ranks of criminals are swelled by extroverts has
not been upheld with sufficient consistency to justifY confidence in the theory.

Eysenck's theory has not been tested with white-co!!ar criminals. On the basis of this

theory one would argue that:

i.

not forgetting individual differences regarding one's E, N and P score and crime
proneness, people would not feel guilly about perpetrating white-collar crimes

such as fr,lUd because they have not been conditioned through punishment to
feel enough anxiety about it so as not to commit such act~; am't

ii.

white-collar crime is very widespread because most people do not disapprove
of it.

While fraud victlmisation studies support (ii) 13 whether white-collar offenders in
general and fraud perpetrators in particular feel remorse about their offending remains

13 Set: Cressey (1986), Dirkisand Nichol (1996).
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:m empirical question. Chapter 5 reports iindings rclcvWll to 1his ISSUe. Eyscnck's
theory

suggcsl~

some ways that link personality traits and criminal behaviour. Limited

support for Eysenck's theory is !Ound in the research finding that psychopuths arc very
similar to the extremely extroverted individuals described by Eyscnck (Bartol and

Bartol, 1994:323). Psychopathy is a controversial

per~onality

trait much discussed by

psychologists and criminologists alike.

3.2.2

The psychopath and crime

Psychopath is a clinical tenn which has some validity as a behavioural pattern that is

both identifiable and distinct. Psychopathy is often measured with the Peychopathy
Checklist (Hare, 1991). According \f) Bartol and Bartol, psychopaths are generally of
average or above-average intelligence, sociable, appt!ar fril!ndly, likeablti, well
educated with broad knowledge and interests (p.323). Additional features of the
psychopath include an ability to remain calm a.nd collected under :;!Xtremely stressful
conditions, they do not feel anxious, do not have a genuine sen8e of humour, and they
appear emotionally flat (p.323). Behavioural pattems typical of psychopaths inelud;!:
an inability to love and be affectionate towards others and to be extremely selfish; they
are unable to learn from their mistakes and, when drunk, they "become vulgar,
domineering, loud and boisterous" (p.323). Psychopaths are constantly under-a.roused
neuro-physiologically so they have an insatiable need for stimulation, cxdtement and,
in this sense, they are very similar to the extrt!mely extroverted individuals described
by Eysenck. In psychoanalytic terms, a
(Glover, 1960).

p~yd1opath

bus a weak superego [see belowl

1X

l'sychopnths should not, he confused with .wciopa/hl' or people with un anli-social
personality disorder (APD). As Bartol ami Bartol (1994:323) point out, the terms

sociopath and APD arc commonly used to refer to recidivist offenders who exhibit a

distinct inability to learn f<Dm experience. The psychopath, despite also sharing an

apparent inability to team from experience, may or may not commit criminal offences.

Most people would find psychopaths difficult to live or work with because they arc
irresponsible, unpredictable and thus unreliable. Their behaviour follows a cyclical

pattern in that for a period of time a psychopath will appear responsible and be
successful at whatever he/she is doing. However, quite unexpectedly, he/she will do
something which endangers his/her status irrespective of the importance of the
occasion and however serious the consequences of his/her impulsive behaviour.
"Because of this cyclical pattern, psychopaths rarely pursue consistent, successful
criminal careers. Rather, they are more likely to participate in capers or hastily planned
crimes that offer immediate satisfaction" (Bartol and Bartol, 1994:323). In the light of
the attributes of the psychopath (e.g., intelligence, charm, selfishne~s, lack of anxiety or
remorse, sensitivity to monetary gains and a weak superego), one could hypothesise a
significant positive relationship between psychopathy and a tendency to commit fraud.

3.2.3

Psychodynamic theory and criminal behaviour

Freud's ideas have influenced thinking in various disciplines. Blackburn (1993:11)
points out that while Freud himself "had litlle to say about crime", other
psychoanalysts have shown strong interest in criminal behaviour because of their

1'1
gcncmli(Jcu~

on imlividuul pathologies which arc expressed in crime. Consequently, a

number of psyclwana!yticnlly·oricntctl authors have expressed views on causes of

crime, however, there i:; no single p;;ychounalytic theory of crime (p. I I).

Like Eysenck, Freud regarded people as antisocial by nature. 'l11is is because humans,
whose behaviour is largely determined by how unconscious conflicts arc resolved, arc
born with instincts {e.g., aggressive, sexual, death) that demand satisfaction. Freud
advocated three personality structures and maintained that a child goes through a

munber of stage:; of psychosexual development (oral, anal, phallic), each of which is
characterised by an erotogenic zone (i.e., a part of the body which can be the source of
sexual pleasure). The first component of the personality structUJe is the id. TI1is stands
for our instincts. Inevitably, the id conflicts with demands imposed by our social
natures. The need to control the demands of the id gives rise to the ego which mediates
between the id and external reality. /be ego can thus delay satisfying the demands of
the id using fantasy and planning. In addition, the ego has at its disposal a nwnber of
defence mechanisms to help deal wiU1 conflicts experienced by an individual. The
defence mechanisms include: denial, repression, regression, projection, displacement,
sublimation and reaction formation.

An individual's superego represents the norms of his/her parents and social groups. The
superego consists of two parts: a set of moral principles, a conscience, violation of
which gives rise to guilt, and an ego-ideal, i.e., stwtdards to which the self aspires,
which provide the ego with values and goals (Blackburn, 1993:112). If the ids
demands are incompatible with a person's conscience, then the ego must ciU1cr

•Hl

neutmlise them or prevent them from reaching consciousness through the ego's clcfi.:nce
mechanisms. For example, ifU1e ids demand is for someone to be aggressive towards a
person they consider momlly wrong to attack, then if this wish breaks thruugh into
consciousness or is acted upon, the person will experience guilt. The ego, therefore,
needs to neutmlisc the energy generated by the ids wish or redirect it by, for example,
denying the unconscious wish or repressing it or displacing it. In cha,melling id drives,
the ego is guided by the superego. "Superego formation depends on psychosexual and
ego development through the child's relations with its parents, and is associated with
the resolution of the Oedipal conflict around the age of five" {p.l12).

Psychoanalysts explain criminal behaviour in

t~rms

of inadequate superego fonnation

and functioning. More specifically, criminal behaviour may result from a harsh, weak
or deviant superego. According to Blackburn, a person with a harsh superego may
commit a crime in order to be punished (p.ll4), while a weak superego (i.e., a weak
conscience) correlates with a person having a psychopathic personality, i.e., one which
is egocentric, hedonistic, feels no guilt wtd cannot empathise. Finally, a deviant
superego is one where a boy has a good relationship with his father, but the father is a
criminal and the boy comes to adopt the father's nonns and behaviour. People with a

weak superego, j,e,, those who have an underdeveloped conscience, are less able to
channel their energies into socially approved pursuits and thus feel no guilt when
committing antisocial acts (Albrecht, Romney, Cherrington, Payne and Roe, 1982:32).

Blackburn (1993) points out one major weakness of Freudian theory, namely that it
does not provide a comprehensive theory of crime because it not only fails to account
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for scvcml JCaturcs of (lrfcndcrs such as their uge hut, also, not all examples of criminal
behaviour can he auributcd to unconscious conllicts - the Jilct is that muny nimcs

involve rational decision making (pp.l15,116). In other words, Freudian theory

overemph:>siscs unconscious processes. Other major weaknesses of orthodox Freudian

theory are: (I) it ignores the importance of influences on a person's behaviour during
adolescence and later on; (2) it is not clear whether criminal behaviour is a
consequence or a cause of neurotic conflicts experienced by individuals; (3) it

overemphasiscs the importance of unconscious processes; and (4) it is not possible to
ascertain the effectiveness of psychoanalysis as a method of helping a person resolve
their unconscious conflicts.

Despite such weaknesses, Blackburn (1993) concludes that:
the psychodynamic hypotheses cannot be rejected out of hand. Psychoanalysis
is the only theory which attempts to deal systematically with the phenomenon
of affective experience, and contrary to the somewhat overdone positivist
critiques, the theory has proved to be falsifiable, and has withstood the tr.st in
severn! respects ... The resistance of psychologists to the r.otion of unconscious
processes has also begun to dissipate ... and with the ·cognitive' revolution,
psychology has moved closer to psychoanalysis ... (p.116)

To !he best of the author's knowledge, none of the psychological theories considered
above have been tested in the context of white-collar crime. Each provides a useful
insight into personality attributes of crime-prone individuals and thus goes some way
towards explaining why people commit crimes. Such knowledge enables us to expand
on existing models of the aetiology of fraud which, for example, talk about "attitudes"
and "motivations" (Loebbecke ct a!., 1989) as a necessary prerequisite for fraud to take
place, but fail to locate their explanation within a conceptual frruucwork, treating the

individual fraud offender in a vacuum.

In summary, it can be argued that the personality of the individual o!Tenr.lcr may be a
significant component of a psychological explanation as to why people commit fraud.
The psychological perspectives discussed provide some useful pieces to construct the
personality mosaic of fraud-prone individuals. These include:

weak superego/low self-control;
low self-esteem;
not being attached to other people;
egocentricity;
lying;
lack of anxiety and empathy;
over-sensitivity to monetary gain;
need for excitement;
being indifferent to the consequences of one's behaviour; and
impulsivity.

Th.ls Hst does not suggest that an individual must posseSs all the attributes for fraud to
occur. Possessing some of them can be enough under the right circumstances of
environmental opportunity and conditions.

4.0

SOCIOLOGICAL TIIEOIUES OF CIUMINAI.JII.:UAVIOIJR

Sociologists hnve been

con~crned

with which social groups become delinquent. Most

sociological theories of crime hnve been concerned with explaining juvenile
delinquency by lower-class male offenders.

Such theories can be grouped into

"learning",

"conflict" anci

"strain",

"control",

"labelling",

"radical"

theories.

Sociologists researching crime have traditiona!ly been interested in identifying causes
of delinquency in social structure and cultural factors (Blackburn, 1993:87). In other
words, ''they have emphasised the causal

pro~esses

in the social environment" (p.88).

Th.is section considers three well-known sociological theories of crime: (I) differential
association; (2) control theory; and, finally, (3) theory of drift (see Blackburn, 1993;
Feldman, !993, and Williams, 1991, for reviews of sociological theories of crime).

4.1

Differential association

In an attempt to explain white-collar crime (i.e., criminal offences by persons of high
socioeconomic status), Edwin Sutherland (1939), put iiJrward the theory of differential
association (Sutherland and Cressey, 1970). This is a learning theory which explains
criminality by asserting that crime is learned primarily by association with others. Such
learning is said to take place in small groups and involves botl1 lhe tcclmiques for
committing a particular crime as well as the values, attitudes, rationalisations and
motives necessary for its commission. Williams, (1991: 195) indicates that, "whether a
person takes part in criminal activities depends on the amount of contact they have
with criminal activities or with those who Sllpport or arc sympathetic towards criminal
activities".
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The notion of dillCrcnlial association is useful in understanding the professional career
conman who intentionally sets out to victimise a company. Such an of!Cndcr would

often get him/herself into a position of trust within the company (sometimes by forging
qualifications and work references or would set up a company to prey on other
company by exploiting the trust he/she manages to establish) or vis·il·vis the company.
In their association with other criminals, such offenders can acquire skills and
techniques useful in committing fraud, such as how to produce forgeries of various
documents and how to otherwise deceive financial institutions. Another example of

how the notion of differential association can be applied to the aetiology of
management fraud is by focusing attention on the importance of the corporate culture
that often condones unethical and illegal means of acquiring wealth, whether for
oneself or the company. Adopting such a perspective, for example, might lead a
researcher to ask about the processes by which a manager becomes aware of and
adopts the norm that "it is okay to use insider information to trade in shares". A final
example of how the type of people one associates with can facilitate the conunission of
fraud is the case where someone in a position of trust in a company that is vulnerable
to fraud victimisation (e.g., due t0 weak internal controls) is befriended by a non-

employee of the company (e.g., a real estate agent) and together they embark on a scam
to defraud the company.

Williams (1991) discusses a number of criticisms of differential association theory

(pp.197-198)'
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i.

It cannot account for the lirst time a crime is committed bccuusc if the
behaviour docs not exist, it cannot be learned.

ii.

It does not cater for individual diflCrcnccs when it comes to being influenced

by one's a'lSociates. As Blackburn (1993:90) points out, differential

a~sociation
·'•,

is "an incomplete theory, since it rests on vague psychological a~s'~mptions

about human learning".

iii.

It cannot account for crimes committed by individuals who have not associated

with criminals or people who hold similar attitudes. Of course, as Williams

points out, behaviour may be learned through observing others, watching

television, from books, etc.
iv.

"A further criticism is that this approach carmot explain irrational, impulsive,

opportunist or passionate criminals, who would then. be acting due to one of
those factors rather than as a result of anything they have learnt" (p.l97).
v.

It is impossible to measure the effect of differential association as an
explanation of why an individual has conunittcd a particular crime.

vi.

One cannot, on the basis of this theory, decide whether differential association
is the cause or the effect of a person's criminal activities.

vii.

Finally, differential association, as formulated by Sutherland (1939) and
Sutherland and Cressey (1970), is not ··concerned with the process of acquiring
criminal attitudes and behaviors" or "with their perfomtance and long-term
maintenance" (Feldman, 1993:234).

Despite the above criticisms, according to Williams (1991: 198) and Blackburn
(1993:90), there is evidence for a link between differential association and criminal

"'

behaviour. The theory appears to be more useful in explaining white-collar or corporutc
crime. One could hypothesise, for example, that new business executives arc

"inducted" into the "executive subculture" and this includes allitudcs and norms which
are conducive for the commission of certain white-collar offences. Furthermore,
placing one's self into the category of successful company director, bank manager,

solicitor, or accountant, defines one's social identity favourably relative to what others
in a similar occupational position enjoy in life.

4.2

Control theory

Control theorists in sociological criminology (e.g., Hirschi, 1969), like their

counterparts within criminological psychology, start with the assumption that people

are born free to break the law and that criminal activity is natural since the uncontrolled
human tendency is to look for pleasure and avoid pain. The search for an account of
why people commit offences is a search for constraints and/or controls on behaviour.
Hirschi (1969) argued that four elements are nect:ssary for someone to be a law-abiding
citizen:

i.

Attachment to other people. Evidence for this is to be found in one's conscience

and the nonns one has come to adopt, as well as whether one cares about what
others think.
ii.

To develop a commitment to conventional goals and the responsibilities that go
with them.

iii.

To be involved in conventional activities which arc incompatible with lawbreaking.

47

iv.

To have a belief "in the moral validity of conventional values" (Blackburn,

1993:92).

According to Hirschi ( 1969), these four clements arc important because they arc
associat.~d

with the bond between a person and society. If this bond is weak an

individual will exhibit criminal behaviour.

Hirschi (1969) does not provide details about how bonds develop or break down or

how weak bonds produce criminal behaviour or why an individual selects one kind of
criminal activity rather than another {Williams, 1991 :250). Blackburn (1993:92) states
that empirical studies have reported conflicting findings regarding the negative relation
between bonding elements and delinquency that control theory would predict. Finally,

criminologists disagree on whether control theory can account for crimes such as
Watergate and oil sanction busting in Rhodesia that are committed by the powerful
(Box, 1981-cited by Williams, 1991 :262).

4,3

Theory of drift

The American sociologist Matza (1969) reintroduced the notion of free will into
criminological theorising with the idea of "drift". Matza's theory maintains that
individuals choose to drift in and out of criminal behaviour or, to put it differently, to
drift between law-abiding and criminal behaviour. In other words, offenders arc not
committed to criminal behaviour. Matza, too, has been concerned with explaining
juvenile delinquency. His theory, however, has applications to adult offenders
(Williams, 1991:239). According to Matza, there are constraints on atTending and the

I

stall! of drifi is reached by means of a number of techniqm.!~' rJfneutrali.ralion. These
are justifications which explain or neutralise the oflCndcrs' criminal behaviour. More
specifically, they enable individuals to:

i.

Deny responsibility for their offending by blaming factors beyond their control

(such as poverty, their family background, influence of friends and so forth) for
their behaviour.
iL

Claim that no one has been harmed by the crimc(s} concerned because, for

example, the victim can afford the financial loss ancllor the insurance company
will pay.
iii.

Claim the victim deserved !he harm caused because, for example, the victim
also commits offences and/or because he/or she or the company provoked the

offence.
iv.

Condemn the condemners by claiming that they too commit crimes so they are
in no moral position to condemn the offender and, finally,

v.

Claim greater loyalty to a particular group. This justification may be used by
delinquents to refer to their loyalty to a street gang, but a white-collar criminal
could use loyalty to his/her oompany or family in order to justify a particular
crime. This does not mean, however, that either the street gang or a company
actually demands that a member or an employee commit a crime. Rather, the
choice is up to the individual,

Matza's techniques of neutralisation are no different from the notion of rationalisations,
justifications put forward by Albrecht, et. al, (1995) or Cressey (1953, 1986) to explain

why people commit Ji"aud. The theory expluins how it is possible J(Jr someone to lead a
double life, commit fmud and sec themselves us respectable members of the
community. There is cmpiricui5Upport for his view !hill individuals are not necessarily
committed to either criminal or luw-abiding behaviour (Williams, 1991 :242) and the
theory is not dctenninistic in its predictions. As Williams (1991) puts it, most
delinquents "have some area of choice as to whether they will perfonn criminal acts
when both the opportunity and the temptation ari5c" (p.243).
It is possible for someone to initially get into trouble financially and, as a result, drift
into criminal behaviour. For example, a bank manager may decide to lend someone
more money than is justified by the type of security provided, in the hope that the
excess funds will soon be paid back and/or because, due to a very beary workload
and/or incompetence as a manager, he/she had no time to do the necessary paperwork
that would render the Joan objectionable. Subsequently, however, the loan is not repaid
and the manager ends up stealing from the bank to cover up the bank loan decision. Jn

,,

i.i'

thi~ sense, a person may be said to "drift in" to fraud rather than to commit the crime(s)

'

~tJ. the basis of a rational, free-willed decision.
\\.

In concluding this brief discussion of these three well-known sociological

the~ries of

crime, it can be said that theories which attempt to explain juvenile delinquency can
not readily be used to account for white-collar offenders and why they offend.
However, particular concepts from these theories (e.g., differential association, weak
self-control, a person's rationalisations that render criminal behaviour possible) can be
used to explain causes of white-collar crime.

5.0

'"

A SITllATIONAL TlllmRY OF FRAUD

Unlike the psychological

with the law

a.<>

~md

sociological theories of crime, which treat compliance

a consequence of internalised norms or moral prohibitions, the

situational approach to criminal behaviour is concerned with crime prevention (see
Clarke, \980; Clarke and Mayhew, \980). More specifically, it "sees crime as the

outcome of immediate choices and decisions, and[... ] focuses on the proximal rather
than the distal influences on crimes as specific events" (Blackburn, \993: 104). Without

ignoring the importance of individual differr:nces, advocates of the situational approach
do not assume environmental

determini~m.

The situational approach to understanding

why people commit crime developed out of a disillusionment with theories that assume

crime is the result of some disposition of the individual (p.\04).

Seen from this perspective, the career, professional fraud offender is motivated to
exploit and, if need be, to create opportunities. Most frauds, like most crimes generally,
are best understood as "rational action perfonned by fairly ordinary people acting
under particular pressures and exposed to specific opportunities and situational
improvements" (Hough, Clarke and Mayhew, 1980 -cited by Blackburn, 1993:104).
Conceptuillising fraud offenders as rational decision milters focuses on the aetiology of
fraud as the result of benefii:J outweighing the costs and could well lead one to
advocate the use of deterrents to reduce fraud victimisation. Fraud reduction could b.!
achieved by increasing one's subjective perception of risk of apprehension and severity
of likely penalty upon conviction, so that the calculated costs of punishment arc
significantly greater than the individual's subjective benefits or profits of the fraud (See

13mithwnitc, 1989).

6.0--

THE AETIOLOGY OF FRAUI>: WHAT EXI'I.ANATION'!

Historically, it appears that fraud is more prominent when there is a recession, or an
avalanche of corporate collapses (Clolcry 1993). KPMG's (1995b) report of Canada's

1,000 largest companies indicates the following reasons for alleged increases in fraud
(multiple responses):

i,

economic pressures- 88%;

ii.

weakening of society's values- 70%;

iii.

more sophisticated criminals- 56%;

iv.,.-;

lack of emphasis on prevention- 51%;

v.

staff downsizing- 50%; and

vi.

lack of government intervention- II%.

!I

There may be cultural factors affecting the detenninants of fraud. An international
survey conducted by KPMG (1996:8) attributed the major reason for the increase in
fraud to be "society's weakening values. This wns the nwnber one reason given by the
regions of Hong Kong, Middle East/Asia, Europe and Australasia. Consistent with the
Canadian survey, North America and Afuca liSted economic pressures as the major
reason for the expected increase".

'{he preceding di~cussion has shown that li"uud offenders arc different lfom common
ollCnders in terms of a number of demographic <md criminal activity characteristics
Despite a number of criticisms that can be lcvclicd against the psychological and
sociological theories of crime, each theory has something to contribute to our
understanding of the reasons people commit crimes. This knowledge can be
supplemented through the situational approach, which highlights situational factors and
conditions providing opportunities for crime.

Prior research in criminology indicates that a single theory can not account for a broad
range of criminal behaviours. Given that the tcnn "fraud" covers a list of diverse
situations and individuals, and because serious fraud offenders do not appear to be
versatile, the best we can do is to provide a multi-disciplinary explanation for specific
types of fraud offences.
interdisciplinary approach

E!liott and Willingham (1980) also recommend that an
b~>:

taken when studying management fraud so as to better

understand how such acts are committed, by whom, and in what type of organisations.

Reference was made earlier in this chapter to Blackburn's {1993) argument that
"whether behaviour is a function of a person or a situation depends on what is meant
by behaviour" (p.21, emphasis in the original). This point is very importilllt to the
present thesis and, therefore, Blackburn's argument is quoted at length:

The claim that behaviour is a function of the situation usually refers to specific
ao:ts. However, a specific act or occurrence must be (at least) a function of the
situation, because it depends on environmental opportunities and conditions: A
could not have hit B without B's presence in that particular context. It is
therefore tautologous to say that behaviour is "situation specific", because what
identifies a specific act is the situational context in which it occurs. On the

11

other hrmd, if "behaviour" means a tendency, it is clearly a property of the
purpose: it is something he or she carries around with them, which is the
product of their prior history. Terms such a~ "sociable" and "aggressive" ...
describe tendencies or cnpacitics residing in the person, which arc manifl!st
only under relevant conditions ... Acts and tendencies thcrcli:Jte call for
ditTcrcnt kinds of explanations. A specific act is a function of the situation and
the person. The situation is necessary to provide the conditions and
opportunities for action, but only !he person has the power to produce that
action ... traits arc weak predictors of specific acts ... traits summarise average

and likely behaviour, and cannot reasonably be expected to predict single nets,
unless other conditions are known ... Theories of criminal behaviour vary in
whether they focus on crime, as the aggregate of criminal activities, crimes, as
specific criminal acts or events, or criminality as a disposition to engage in such
acts (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1988) ... to contrast "situations" and
"dispositions", or proximal and distal factors, as causes of "crime" is a false
dichotomy. Clearly, early family experience cannot itself explain why an adult
commits a specific criminal act. Equally clearly, some people have strong
criminal dispositions, which can only be explained by prior history, not the
immediate situation. (pp.21 ~23)

The studies cited above report correlates of white-collar crime, and characteristics of
both the person and situational factors. On the basis of such data, one cannot predict
with accuracy who will tum out to be a major fraud offender. What is needed for such
a predictive statement is detailed and reliable data on both characteristics of offenders
and specific situations. If enough such information were available to generate a
predictive model, then one could attempt to provide a probability explanalion, i.e., how
was it inevitable that such an act should have taken place? In the absence of such
detailed infomtation on recurring behaviours or because the behaviour in question is a

~'ne-off event, the best one can hope for is a possibilily explanalion (Walker, 1977),
i.e., how was it possible for someone to commit fraud? By virtue of being narrative,
such an explanation is of an historical kind. The existing empirical literature on li"aud
offenders only allows for possibility explrumtions. In other words, in attempting to
~-

provide an answer to the question "Why is fraud committed?", the available empirical

I
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literature cnnblcs us ~~ point to correlates of fraud that make it possibk Jbr the crime to
take place. Such factors, whether operating alone or in combination, can be said to
titcilitatc the commission of the crime. We cannot talk about direct single causes of

fraud on the basis of relevant Utcorics in criminology, psychology or sociology because
no single feature of a person or a situation makes it inevitable that fraud will be

committed. Rather, fraud is more likely to be the result of multiple factors operating
contemporaneously.

7.0

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that a number of criminal behaviOur correlates relevant to the
offender's personality and situational factors have been identified by psychologists,

criminologists and sociologists. The characteristics of offenders that are likely to be
related to their criminal behaviour include the following: (a) psychological (weak
superego/low self-control, low self-esteem, not being attached to other people,
egocentricity, lying,

lack of anxiety and empathy, over-sensitivity to monetary gain,

need for excitement, being indifferent to the consequences of one's behaviour; and
impul,sivity) ; and (b) sociological (one's associates, being part of a criminogenic

corpomte culture, possessing techniques of ncutralising one's guilt, and finally being
prepared to exploit opportunities). Without ignoring the fact that the theories of
criminal behaviour discussed have not been tested on white-collar offenders the present
thesis argues that such correlates of criminal behaviour are nlso to be found runong
.fraud offenders. TI1c personality correlates of li"aud identilied together with the various
motives discussed in the next chapter enable us to talk about fraud-prone individuals.

"

The notion of fraud-proneness is used to rc!Cr mainly to a person with low scl/~cuntrol
who is motivated to commit fmud. One's level of self-control (which renders a pcn;on
crime-prone) in combination with crime opportunity appears to be worth invcstiguting
further as one mechanism that affects crime. The existence of an opportunity and
pressure on someone to commit fraud are not enough to account for individual

differences in who does or does not commit fraud.

Given the importance of an individual's personality and motives in any attempt to
explain individual differences in why people commit fraud, as we!! as situational
factors (e.g., opportunity), aetiological factors of fraud identified in this chapter are

incorporated in the model proposed in Chapter 4 and tested in Ute research reported in
Chapter 5.

CIIAI'TI·:n]
AUDITOHS ANI> FJ{AIJJ)

IH~TECTION

CIIAPTim. SUMMARY

The first part of this ch:~pter discusses why frnud is not detected by auditors as
frequently as financial statement users would like them to. The focus is then shifted to
a critical

ev:~luation

of a number of approaches to fraud detection, including Loebbcckc

ct ai.'s (1989) fraud assessment model, and the cognitive approach.

1.0

WHY FRAUD IS DIFFICULT TO DETECT

Due to the nature of auditing and its inherr;nt limitations, fraud is very difficult to
detect. Interestingly, a survey of British accountants by the Audit Faculty of the
ICAEW found that the two areas considered as the most difficult to detect were
transactions with related parties and manipulation of computer programs ("Fraud
Fears", 1997:13). One reason fraud is difficult to detect is because it may be committed
by people who arc familiar with accounting procedures and can cover it up. In addition,
auditors do not have the:

requisite education and background to recognise its characteristics ... [and]
because of the limited amount of time an auditor spends looking at the records
of a business, he or she typically docs not have the time or inclination to review
the personal characteristics and lifestyle of possible white-collar criminals.
(Wells, 1993:93-94)
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Wells also mentions that there is a built-in conflict since auditors arc asked to
investigate upper management who indirectly arc the same group that hired them.

More import;mlly, why should they spend a lot of time detecting fraud when if they do
there is the "spectre of protracted litigation, grand juries, and trials, and one
immediately sees why the auditor may hope the issue of fraud never sees the light of
day" (p.94).

Another reason fraud is difficult to detect is because auditors do not possess the

necessary skills. In fact, the U.K.'s APB discussion paper (APB, 1992) identified the
auditors' lack of skills as a key issue giving a cause for concern.

Knox, Deputy Director of the serious fraud office (1994), believes that auditors fail to
detect fraud for the following reasons:

i.

the scope of audit testing and inquiries were inadequate;

ii.

the scope of the auditors' work has been restricted by management;

iii.

the auditors have failed to understand the company's business;

iv,

failure to identify related party transactions;

v.

reliance on uncorroborated representations from management; and

vi.

deteptions practised on auditors. (p.128)

A further difficulty is time pressure. The AICPA (1978:114-121) recognised that the
time pressure auditors

face leads to

increased

reliance on

management's

representations. Furthennore, due to tight reporting deadlines, senior personnel are

spread too thin, hence having an impact on the effectiveness of the amlit. To illustrate,
Elliott aml Willingham {1980:31) believe tlial "large transactions ncar the end of a
reporting period have been a feature of a number of fraud cases". Time pressure,
however, may well prevent the auditor from following up large, unusual and infrequent
transactions. Such transactions need to be followed up and measures should also be
considered by the auditor to ensure that light year end deadlines will nol be
experienced.

Despite the above-mentioned difficulties, there are some auditors who are able to
detect fraud even though it might be well hidden (Bell, Szykowney, and Willingham,
1991; Jamal, 1991; and Johnson, Grazioli, Jamal and Zualkennan, 1992).

2.0

APPROACHES

TO

ENHANCING

FRAUD

DETECTION

BY

AUDITORS

A number of models have been developed to assist auditors to obtain expertise in fraud
detection, even though it is a rather infrequent experience for them (Loebbecke et al.,
1989).

Different authors on the subject of fraud detection have taken different approaches and
put forward a range of different suggestions aimed at enabling auditors to be more
effective in detecting fraud, These ran be differentiated into general approaches and
specific models.

2.1

General approaches

There is a growing supply of published texts on how to detect and/or investigate fraud
(see Albrecht eta!., 1995; Bologna, Lindquist, and Wells, 1993; Huntington lmd Davis,
!995; and Thornhill, 1995). Similarly, some of the Big Five finns have recognised the
need to survey fraud victimisation (sec Ernst and Young, 1996 and KPMG, 1996;
1995a and b; \993a and b), and offer fraud awareness training to thdr clients.

Arthur (1995) maintains that for external auditors to be proficient at detecting fraud,
they should be able to use some of the techniques already developed by pre-emptive

fraud investigators. According to Arthur, Pre-emptive Fraud Investigation "is a review
intended to assess the vulnerability of an organization to fraud" (p.23). On the basis of
his survey of suppliers (security !inns) and users (accounting firms) of pre-emptive
fraud investigation services, Arthur lists the following requirements for auditors
wishing to be proficient at fraud-detection, they:

i.

need to develop more effective inter-personal skills;

ii.

should acquire investigative work experience;

iii.

should use non-financial information and information external to the
organisation under review;

iv.

should use subterfuge (e.g., undercover methods, and surveillance); and

v.

should adopt a more susp!cious and proactive attitude towards fraud.

(j()

Finally, he recommends that more experienced and senior auditors should be used "at
the coal !hcc" to review crucial documents and to carry out basic tests to detect fraud.
One weakness of Arthur's survey is th~t the security firms whose opinion was sought
about external auditors' fraud detection ability had a vested interest in criticising
auditors to justify the pre-emptive fraud investigations services their companies
provided.

Also, it is highly unlikely subterfuge will ever become an ar.ccptablc

external audit tool because it raises important ethical and professional issues. Finally,
the use of pre-emptive fraud investigation methods will add si!,'llificant!y to the cost of
an audit, a major obstacle to introducing such methods into the audit process.

According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners Manual (1994:1.601), to
examine company books and records for fraud, one must know and understand the
environment where the entity operates (i.e., the business, the industry, major
customers, the methods of receipts, the procurement methods) and the accounting
system (i.e., the system of internal controls, past, present and future, internal fraud, the
audit trail).

2.2

Triangle approach in detecting fraud

Sorensen and Sorensen (1980: 196-225) discuss a number of auditing approaches that
can be used to detect management fraud, nan1ely the Triangle Model, which comprises
three parts: (I) a strong, involved, investigative board of directors; (2) a sound,
comprehensive system of internal controls; and (3) alert, capable independent auditors.
If any of the points in the triangle do not function properly, the entire triangle wi11
collapse, and the opportunity for management fraud is increased.

,,,
In order to avoid the triangle collapsing and the opportunity for fraud increasing
auditors need to audit the board where the board members do not take an active role in

the company's opcrutions. Auditors need to ascertain the knowledge and understanding
of its individual board members, and assess the board's composition and operation

(e.g., how many non-exe\:Utivc directors are on the board, and whether board members
attend meetings). In addition, companies should fonn audit committees to assure the
adequacy and effectiveness of accounting and other controls m well as the objectivity

of the financial statements.

Sorensen and Sorensen also advocated management involvement in material
transactions.

A specific "review should be made [by the auditors] to detennine

management's direct or indirect involvement in material transactions which are
included in financial statements" (Touche Ross, 1976:10).

Red flags arc tied to

conducive economic factors (e.g., pressure to finance expansion via current earnings
rather than through equity or debt) and business structures (management tendency to
exert extreme pressure on executives to meet budgets), hence a procedure like a
specific review of management involved in material transactions should be integrated
into the appropriate sections of the basic audit program to avoid over auditing.

They also recommend using the risk-based audit approach, which requires the auditor

to have an understanding of the overa!! economy, industry, and environment in which
the client operates and a general knowledge of the operations of the client's business

AUS 304 (AARF, 1995c).
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Elliott and Willingham (1980;38) recommend Umt the audit team's detection
effectiveness can be cnhancctl by:

1.

Improving the "preparation ofindividuals entering the profession" (p.24).

ii.

Audit finns ensuring that they have "measures of individual's sensitivity to

evidence of potential fraud, the measures to be used to recruit and promote
auditors with greater regard for their acuity in detecting fraud" (p.25).

iii.

Varying the "audit procedures from year to year" (p.25) so that perpetrators of
management fraud do not become familiar with the audit procedures.

iv.

Learning auditing procedures that should have been perfonned in an audit
where fraud is known to have been committed. To illustrate, following the

McCusker (1990) report on Rothwells, once again the significance of debtors'
confirmations became apparent.
v.

The creation of a database of fraud cases to assist auditors in maintaining
sensitivity to management fraud indicators.

vi.

Appointing members to the audit team with a sociology or a psychology
background to question employees on their role in the internal controls, or
interviewing outgoing employees who would least fear reprisals.

Pincus (1994) recommends an individual approach. She claims that auditing finns need
to recruit and select auditors who are sensitive to red flags. II is doubtful, however, that
auditing finns can assess this sensitivity of auditors. She recommends combining this
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approach with Sullivan's (1993- us cited by Pincus, 1994) frontal 1 and sirJcl approach
in order for auditors to be effective in fraud detection.

A practical suggestion about how to enhance auditors' fraud-detection capacity has
been made by Davidson (1994) who argues that auditors ought to spend time in

forensic accounting departments to gain knowledge about fraud detection.

There is undoubtedly a need for the effectiveness of these fraud-detection enhancement
techniques/approaches to be ascertained empirically.

2.3

Manipulating trade--offs for the auditor

In an attempt to obtain more infonnation on the relationship between the occurrence

and detection of fraud and substantive testing versus complianre testing and audit fees,
an experimental simulation was used by Matsumara and Tucker (1992) to gain some
tmderstanding about factors that impact on fraud detection by auditors. They developed
a theoretical frrunework drawing on game-theoretic analysis and economic
experimentation. The manager moves first by committing fraud. Unaware of the
manager's move, the auditor plans his/her compliance and substantive procedures.
Substantive testing allows the auditor to detect fraud with a probability that increases
with the level of testing (p.753). They examined the importance of four independent

I This approach uses increased "manpower nnd heavy artillery· such as larger samples nnd more detail tests"
(PinC'tS, 1994:91). With this approach, while ouditors will detect frnud, the cost of auditing will increase and, os
Pincus claims, will have economic rnmiflcntions for the companies 1111d the survivnl of auditing !inns.
2 This approach involves getting the auditors "smartc~· about frnud (Pincus, 1994:92). Auditors nee<:! to know
more about the nature of the client's business 1111d the industry ond auditing finns wo11IJ need to invest m their
auditors' tmining and improve<:! docision mnking.

(,4

variables oil the auditor's tests of transactions and balances, fraud detection and
incidence of fraud, namely: {I) the auditor's penally (JinruJcial penalty or loss of
reputation); (2) auditing standard requirements; (3) the quality of the intcmal control

structure; and (4) the audit fcc. They reported the following findings using 39 students
(undergraduate business and MBA) as subjects wha were asked to play the role of

check<;!r (auditor) and marker (manager):

i.

Increasing the auditor's penalty decreased fraud occurrence, decreased tests of
transactions, increased detailed tests ofbalances, and increased fraud detection.

ii.

Increasing audit procedures increased audit costs, decreased discretionruy

testing, increased fraud detection and decreased fraud commission.

iii.

With strong internal controls, auditors increased tests of transactions and
detected fraud more frequently and managers committed fraud less frequently.

iv.

Increasing the audit fee resulted in less fraud due to increased testing being
done.

v.

A direct relationship exists between the extent of tests and likelihood of fraud
detection and, consequently, fraud prevention.

It should be noted that Matsumara and

Tu~kcr

(1992) focused on irregularities in

general, i.e., fraud (misrepresentation of fact) and defalcations (misappropriation of
assets). Therefore, as they themselves admit, their findings cannot be generalised to
management fraud (p. 754). A methodologi~al weakness of the Matsumara and Tucker
(1992) experimental simulation study is its apparent low external validity because they
used university

~rodents

as subjects. In fact, they concealed the purpose of the study by

(,5

rcfcrrin~;:

2.4

to managers as "markers" and auditors as "checkers".

Tile Red-Flags' Approach

Under this approach, fraud indicators are cues ("red nags") meant to alert an auditor to
the possibility of fraudulent activity, which could have a material impact on the
financial statement in a given circumstance. The use of red flags is evident in textbooks
on fraud detection (Albrecht et al., 1995, 1982; and Bologna and Lindquist, 1987) and

in auditing standards AUS 210 (AARF, 1995a). Recognising til~ auditor's difficulty in
detecting irregularities including fraud, AUS210 (AARF, 1995a) provides a checklist
of fraud indicators that might alert the auditor to detect an irregularity.

The notion of "red flags" has been conceptualised by the accounting profession in a
very narrow way. Price Waterhouse (1985:31) defined "red flags" as "potential
symptoms existing within the company's business environment that would induce a
higher risk of intentional misstatement of the financial statement" [own emphasis
added]. Such a definition ignores attributes of an individual holding a position of trust
that point to his/her being crime prone, as will be shown later in this thesis (see
Chapters 5 and 6). It also ignores various external pressures which have an impact on
an individual and increase the likelihood of fraud being commi!tcd.

According to Sorensen and Sorensen (1980), the red flags approach began in the mid1970's with Touche Ross designing a set of warning signs for fraud. Following

ru1

3 Red nDgs nrc cuc,o; lhut muy be picked up by c~lemnl nuditors or internal nuditor.; which moy put them on
nolic~ lhnt someone in the company moyb~ engaged in some form offmudulcnl or irnpropcroonducl.

increase in the expectation that auditors ought to he responsible for fraud detection,
some of the U.S. Big Six [then] audit firms developed the red flags approach within
their practices (rincus, \989).

Uretsky (1980:90-91) emphasised that auditors must be alert for signals that
management lacks integrity\ conditions that may provide a motive for management
fraud, and to signs that fraud has occurred. Red flags are situational indicators, which
indicate thnt the auditor should be more watchful and suspicious than usual.

According to Elliott and Willingham (1980:28) red flags do not indicate the presence
of frauct. Instead, they represent conditions commonly present in events of fraud and
they therefore suggest that auditors should be more concerned with fraud when such
indicators are present.

Views similar to Elliott and Willingham have been expressed by Johnson, Grazioli and
Jamal (1993:485), who argued that neither the use of red flags nor the development of
specialised individuals have "been particularly successful" in fraud detection. Johnson
et al. arrived at this conclusion on the basis that the problem of fraud detection is better
solved "through reasoning rather than through recognition and experience" (p.486).

4 A questionnaire survey cf t56 nuditors from a [then] Big(, !1rm by Sh~ub and Lawrenoe (19%) found that
siluational factors that increase professional scepticism include: the c~istcncc of a related party transaotion, client
financial stress, prior client inaccuracies, ond prior clicnt-audi!or communcation. It was also fou11d thot the
professional s.:cpticism of tho auditors wns counteracted when the dicntwas important to the practioc of tho
•udit finn as n source of 1tfcrrals (p.155).

,,,
KPMG's (1993b) fraud survey of the largest companies in the U.S. found that the most
frequent reason why frauds remained umlctcctcd was insensitivity to red flags. More

specifically, it was found that approximately half of the reported fraud "could have

been detected more quickly had red flags not been ignored" (p.2).

The effectiveness of the red flags approach depends on the auditor's interpretation of
the fraud cues, and its correlation with other evidence found during the audit.

Therefore, conununication among audit team members is imperative to enable them to
compare, analyse and correlate various signals. For a small audit team this might be
easy, however, for a large audit team involving up to 100 audit staff, tax consultants

and infonnation technology advisers, in Hrious offices or even states, it will be very
difficult to achieve. As Pincus {1989:155) states, studies {e.g., Sorensen, Grove and
Selton, 1983; Wallace, 1983; also see Jones and Maher, 1987 *cited by Pincus, 1989)
"have not yet established impressive predictive ability" of the red flags questionnaire.

Pincus (1989) investigated the usefulness of the red flags approach with an
experimental study. One hundred and thirty seven auditors, with an average of 18
months' experience at a large CPA finn, were asked to evaluate the possibility of fraud
during the planning stage of an audit. An actual case was used. Subjects were asked to
review a set of detailed background information for an audit client and to assess the
likelihood that material fraud existed. In order to assist their assessment, about half of
the subjects were provided with a red flags questionnaire comprising 73 questions
(while the other half were not) and were given either a case where the current year
financial statements were materially misstated due to fraud or were given a no-fraud

"'
case. Pincus found that: (I) the "subjects wl10 used a red flags questionnaire to aid
them in fruud risk assessment considered a more comprehensive and uniform ~cl of

potential fraud indicators than those subjects who did not usc a questionnaire" (p.l6l );
and (2) "there was no significant difference in the assessed fraud risk by questionnaire
users and non-users for a no-fraud case, and the non-questionnaire users outperformed
the questionnaire users for a fraud case" (p.l60). In other words, the use of a red !lags
questionnaire did not impact significantly on the auditors' fraud risk assessment for the
fraud case {p.160). One can argue, however, that the Pincus study did not prove the

case against the usefulness of red flags for the following reasons: (1) the auditors used
were relatively inexperienced; 1 (2) as Pincus herself admits, several fraud indicators
listed by non-questionnaire users were not included in the red flags questionnaire; and,
finally, (3) there is the possibility that "the red flags questionnaire used in this study
may have underemphasised negative indicators" (p.l62).

There is general agreement among authors on the limitations of the use of red flags.
According to Pincus (1989:155), the predictive ability for red flags is limited by the
nature of the approach. While red flags are associated with fraud, the association is not
perfect.

In addition, Pincus (1989) ru1d Purvis (1987) pointed out that one major disadvantage
of red flags is that they focus attention on specific cues and could prohibit the auditor
from identifying or observing other reasons.

5 According to Bonner und Pennington (1990), in ~rdcr 10 make rcu.<onc<.l "sscssments of !he likelihood of
fmudulent financinl reporting, nudilors should have al lc"st cisllt and onc·hntf years' c.p<ricnce,

69

Rcgrmling the advmttagcs of red flags, Pincus (I 989: ]55) is of the view that they: (I)
arc functional to the extent that they appropriately raise the auditor's sensitivity to the
possibility of fraud; (2) add structure to the consideration of fraud; (3) provide
consistency among auditors; and (4) could increase the possibility of detecting fraud.

In testing ti.( predictive ability of red flags, Albrecht and Romney (1986) state that

"this validation is important because most of the red flags were identified from single
fraud

c~,es

rather than a statistically valid study" (]).324). As a result, they prepared

"two qU·estiOimaires, each containing 87 red flags, {categorised into situational
pressures, opportunity to commit fraud and personality factors). One questionnaire was
written in the present tense and served as the control group instrument" (1986:324). It
was sent to partners on engagements where fraud had not been found and was not
suspected. The partners had to indicate whether the red flags were present. The major
limitation which detracts from tile survey is that the questionnaire was sent to 20 finns
and data on 27 past frauds and 36 non-fraud cases were identified. The respondents
were asked to rank the red flags, and as the authors themselves state, there "was an
insufficient number of responses to statistically test the red !lags" (p.33l ). It was found,
however, that only one-third of the 87 red flags were significant predictors of fraud.

Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that the board of directors plays a crucial role in
monitoring the actions of top managers and, furthcnnore, it constitutes the highest
internal control mechanism that performs that task. They also argued that the presence
on the board of outside directors {who are more motivated to discharge their
monitoring responsibility and not to conspire with top managers to victimise
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shu;choldcrs) reduces the risk of limmciul stalcmcnl fraud. In a recent study Beasley
(1996) examined the relationship between financial statement fraud (i.e., management
fraud) and the composition of the board of directors. He utilised data on 75 fraud and
75 non-fraud firms matched for "size, industry, national exchange where common

stocks traded, and time period". He also controlled for "differences in motivations for
management to commit financial statement fraud and for conditions that enable
management to override board monitoring to carry out the fraud" (p.445). It was found
that the inclusion of a larger proportion of outside members on the board of directors

(but not the presence of an audit comrnittee) significantly reduces the risk of financial
statement fraud.

2.5

Fraud Assessment Model

Loebbecke and Willingham (1988) and Loebbecke et al. (1989) developed a
descriptive model based on empirical work conducted. in two studies. A pioneering
research project, it tried to identify as ml!eh information as possible on both
management fraud and employee fraud.

One basic premise of the Loebbecke et al. (1989) fraud assessment model is that
material management fraud (MI) occurs when the following three components are
present: (1) conditions that provide an incentive (C); (2) person(s) in position of
authority and responsibility have a reason or a motivation (M) to commit a fraud; and
(3) pcrson(s) in position of authority and responsibility have an attitude or set of ethical
values that allow them to commit that irregularity (A).
P(Ml)"'J{C,M,A)
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In developing their model, Locbbcckc and Willingham ( 1988) considered the content
of the then relevant U.S. Auditing Guideline SAS 53 (AI CPA, 1988) which identified
£1ctors to consider when assessing the likelihood of management fraud being prcscllt.

They proposed a reorganisation of those red flags and developed a model which tested
management fraud cases reported by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
as well as by Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. They recognised that
their model was biased towards those cases investigated by the SEC. As a result, they
extended their model in an attempt to gain more information on: "how oficn can an

auditor expect to encounter fraud? Where is it encountered and how is it likely to be
detected? What are the common types of fraud? What industries seem to be more
fraud-prone than others?" (p.3). They contacted the audit partners from one U.S. (then]
Big Six finn and asked them to participate in a questionnaire sutvey. From the 277
audit partners who agreed to participate, the researchers selected 165 and administered
their instrument. The sutvey consisted of two Parts. Part I obtained summary
infonnation of two types: (I) demographic data about the participant and his/her audit
experience, and (2) summary information about each of the irregularities with which
the participant had experience. Part II of the suJVey obtained detailed information about
one material irregularity which was selected by the participant. The purpose of the
survey was to obtain a better understanding of auditors' experience wiU1 detecting
irregularities and to obtain a better understanding regarding material irregularities and
the presence of red flags. They had a response rate of 73% and the respondents had an
average of 19.5 years of audit experience.
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Management fraud' was found to be more prevalent in public than in private

companies as well as in technology rnlll communications, transportation and
manufacturing companies, but was less frequently encountered in the educational
sector. It was mainly committed by top management and occurred in revenue,

inventory, related parties transactions, other assets, and accounts receivable. Regarding
defalcations', they were more likely to be committed by a variety of personnel at all

levels in an organisation and tended to occur in payroll and cash receipts. Finally, like
defalcations, management fraud came to light as a result of substantive tests. They also
found that about 25% of instances of defalcation or management fraud occurred with

new clients and with clients who had been audited for up to ten years rather than for
those who had been audited for more than ten years (p.J2). The authors concluded that
since detecting a material irregularity is such a rare event, auditors need to maintain
their vigilance and not fhil to detect them due to a sense of complacency.

On the basis of their findings, they recommend the use of their assessment model on
every audit as opposed to a check-list approach. Their model intemalises the reasoning
process. The work of Loebbecke and his associates has been important in highlighting
fraud-vulnerability differences between different types of industries as well as between
different financial areas within the same company. They also reported useful correlates
of fraud, which can be used by auditors to help detect fraud.

6 Man•gemcnt fwud is irregularities including fmudulcnt finantio\ reponing undertaken H> render financial
stotemcnts misleading SAS SJ(AICP/1, 1988~
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Their model, however, contains a number of important limitations which detract li-om
its usefulness. First, aU(Ji\ors need to make a subjective assessment on each of the three

components, and if any one requirement is absent, the overall assessed likelihood is

zero. Since it is a subjective assessment, there is the risk that an auditor might not be
able to identify a condilion(s) that would allow a material management fraud to occur.
Furthennore, in practice, fraud can occur with only two clements being present (sec

Chapter4).

Second, it has been maintained by Hackenbrack (1993) that how auditors assess the
risk of fraudulent financial reporting using red flags is related to whether they are

:JSsigned to the audit of small or large companies. Those (like the ones in the
Loebbecke and Willingham, 1988, study) who arc assigned to audit large companies
are more likely to focus on opportunities-for-fraud red flags. In other words, one's
experience influences one's audit judgement. Consequently, since their model is based
on a biased sample, it may not be useful to auditors who are routinely assigned to audit
small companies.

Third, Locbbecke et al. assumed that the decision concerning whether an irregularity
does or does not exist is a dichotomous one. However, this view ignores U1e fact that
irregularities can be located at different points along a continuum and there is
discretion in deciding whether there is enough evidence to constitute a material
irregularity.

7 Dcfalc•tions arc misappropriation of""s~ts by cmployccsSAS 53 (AlCPA, 1988).
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Fourth, their model conccptualiscs the pcrpctmtor as a pathological individual with
devi;ml attitudes and ethics. Criminologists, however, question such a simplistic
perspective of deviance, especially one in tcnns of pathology (sec Taylor, Waltnn and
Young, 1973). The view that there arc two types of people, honest and dishonest, can
not be sustained given the amount of evidence from studies of criminal behaviour

stowing that committing offences (with the exception of a few very serious violent
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Finally, it is not possible to generalise the findings from Locbbecke et al. (1989) to
auditors at large because it was based on the responses of audit partners who frequently
do not perfonn the bulk of the audit work and make assessments on fraud indicators
but simply review and approve the work of other auditors. Furthermore, their findings
were from only one firm and the training and audit experience of those audit partners
would differ from those in smaller firms (see Hackenbrack, 1993).

2,6

Type of audit experience and differential approach to fraud detection

Recognising some of the weaknesses in L0ebbecke et al. (1989), Hackenbrack (1993)
conducted two studies to determine the effect of experience with different sized clients
on auditor evaluations of fraudulent financial reporting indicators. In a simulation
study, the author administered a one-tJage description of a hypothetical company to
establish a baseline from which to evaluate 16 fraud-related situations. Each situation
was based on a fraud-risk factor listed in the AICPA (1987) Treadway Commission's
Good Practice Guidelines for Assessing the Risk of Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
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Each auditor hml to rate how much each imlcpcmlcnt situation would increase the
company's exposure to fraudulent financial reporting. After completing the rating task,
the auditors categorised each of the fraud-related situations as either an incentive or an
opportlmity. The 21 participants who had three years' audit experience were selected

from 87 auditors who participated in a national public accounting finn's fourth year

continuing education course (attendance was not based on industry specialisation). He
found significant disagreement about the amount of fraud-risk associated with the
fraud related situations presented. None of the fraud indicators examined was found to

be significant.

In a second study Hackenbrack (1993:1 03), examined possible systematic differences
in auditors' opinions about the relative importance of incentives versus opportunities
when making fraud-risk assessments as a function of whether an auditor's experience
had been with small or large clients. The hypothesis tested by Hackenbrack was that
the stronger a company's control structure, the lower the control risk assessment made
by the auditor, hence greater emphasis will be placed on compliance procedures. Large
client auditors are more accustomed than small client auditors to situations where
control risk is assessed as low, and spend "considerably more time evaluating and
testing control strnetures... [and] are more likely to suffer a loss, in tenns of expected
audit efficiency, if key controls arc found not to be in place and effective" {p.104).
Large client auditors were therefore expected and were found by Haekenbrack to place
more emphasis on opportunities than the small eli en! auditors. Hackenbrack (p.l 09)
goes on to say that if "opportunities do pose a greater threat in large companies than in
small companies, one implication is that audit efficiency could suiTer if an auditor

"'
typicnlly assigned to large engagements were to be assigned to a small engagement."
He believes that being an expert in large companies rather than small ones, the auditor
would perceive that there exists an abumlancc of opportunities in the small company,

and would assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting as "high" and perhaps be

Jmnccessarily sceptical.

In Hackenbrac!:'s second study, three audit partners, one at each of the offices of two
national accounting finns, coordinated the distribution of experimental materials to
auditors with about three years' audit experience. The materials were given to equal
numbers of subjects from two groups: one with experience mainly on small companies
and another with experience on large companies. In order to establish a baseline from
which to evaluate eight fraud-related situations, the auditors first read a one-page
description of the same fictitious company used in study one. Four of the situations
were incentives to commit fraudulent financial reporting and four were opportunities
that rendered such fraud possible.

The subjects were asked to categorise each of the eight fraud-related situations as either
an incentive or an opportunity. More specifically, the subjects carried out two tasks.
Initially, they carried out a paired-comparison which required them to judge the
relative fraud risk created by each incentive V1S-d-v1:S each opportunity. For each pair of
situations they indicated which situation created the greater risk of fraudulent reporting,
and rated it by how much on a seven-point scale. The subjects were then given ennis
011 which were reproduced the eight fraud-related situations. They had to sort them so
as to have the situation that created the greatest fraud risk on top nnd the least fraud-
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risk situation at the bollom of the pack. A pair of fraud-related situations

WllS

rated

positive if the opportunity was placed on top of the pack and negative if the incentive
was placed on top of the pack. The total of the 16 signed ratings yielded an index of the

relative emphasis placed on the opportunities by an auditor. In other words, the larger

the index, the !,'Teater the emphasis placed on opportunities. Another index was
computed showing the relative emphasis placed on opportunities by auditors in the
card-sorting task.

Analysis of the paired-comparison data showed a positive relationship between the
average-size company to which the subjects were assigned to during the most recent
calendar year in millions of dollars, and the relative emphasis they placed on the
opportunities vis-ii-vis the incentives used in the study. A similar finding was obtained
with the card-sorting ta~k. The findings were obtained taking into account the subjects'
months of audit experience, industry experience, prior experience with fraudulent
reporting, and firm affiliation or office affilHion. Hackenbrack concluded that "audit
seniors presented with the same facts and instances had different opinions about the
risk of fraudulent financial reporting. The auditors, assigned predominantly to the audit
of large companies, placed more emphasis on the opportunities than the auditors
ru;signed to the audit of small companies" (p.l08). The policy implication of this
finding is that (!) "such differences of opiillon may lead to differences in planning
decisions about the extent of supervision, the extent and selection of audit procedures,
and the degree of professional scepticism to be applied on tha engagement"; and (2) the
need to develop fraud risk engagement tools with high utility cannot be
overemphasised (p.108).

78

The findings of Hackcnbrack's two studies, however, need to be treated with caution
because: (I) what auditors say they do or influences them may be diffen:nt from what
they actually do and what factors influence them in real audit work; (2) the auditors

who participated had on average 37 months' experience in auditing and only 33% of
them had experienced fraud detection, i.e., the respondents were relatively

inexperienced in fraud detcction1; and (3) Hackenbrack did not instruct his subjects to
make any assumptions about materiality levels, despite the fact that they were

'\·reminded that the definition of fraudulent financial reporting is intentional material
misstatement. Hackenbrack's studies point to the importance of auditors' experience
with different size clients (it could be argued that partners in the then Big Six firms

would have bigger size clients than smaller tier firms, which indicates a possible
weakness in the Loebbecke eta\. ( 1989) study).

2.7

Tbe cognitive approach to fraud detection

Briefly stated, the cognitive approach aims to understand people's decision making by
focusing on how they process and utilize information available to them and explaining
differential usc of the same information. In other words, this approach concerns itself
with the thinking and reasoning that underlies one's decisions. As will he shown below,
the cognitive approach has been used to detect fraud by utilising infomtation about an
auditor's expectations regarding the likelihood that fraud has occurred, and his/her
degree of perceptual field-dependence (sec below Bernardi, 1994a). From this

8 Sec Donn or and Pennington {1990).
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perspective, fraud detection by auditors is largely a function of the extent to which

auditors selectively perceive, interpret and utilise infbnnation about fmud so as to

justify to themselves carrying out additional tests. Another way the cognitive approach
can be used to detect fraud is by enabling the auditor to think like the person who has

perpetrated the fraud. The auditor is thus able to avoid being fooled by the fraud
offender's deception tactics (see Jamal, Johnson and Berryman, 1995; Johnson ct al.

1993).

2.7.1

Fraud detection: Psychological attributes of auditors

There is evidence that an auditor's perception of a client's integrity and competence are
important factors in fraud detection (Anderson and Marchant, \989; Kaplan and
Reekers, 1984). Using a modified version of the case study used by Pincus (\990),
Bernardi {1994a) tested the following hypotheses:

i.

fraud will be detected by auditors at a higher rate when they are provided with
!ow-integrity and competence infonnation about their client;

ii.

fraud will be detected by auditors at a higher rate when their prior expectations

regarding the existence of fraud increase;

,,
iii.

fraud will be detected by auditors at a l1igher rate when they are more field
independent (i.e., are able to recognise embedded figures within larger and
more complex figures, as measured by the "Group Embedded Figures Test"),
of high moral development (as measured by the short fonn of the ''Defining
Issues Test") and are of intcmallocus of control (as measured by the "Internal-

HO
External Locus of Control Test")''.

The subjects in Bcrnanli's experimental study were randomly assigned to the
experimental conditions (i) and (ii) described above, and comprised· 152 managers and

342 seniors from five Big Six [then] auditing firms in the U.S. it was found that the
auditors' fraud detection ability was significantly affected by perceptions of client
integrity and competence only for high-moral development managers.

Managers

outperformed seniors but this difference was moderated by the latter's moral
development, and finally, a positive relationship was found between an auditor's prior

beliefs concerning the existence of fraud and fraud detection.

Bernardi (1994a)

concluded that "auditors should be more suspicious about the probability of fraud
existing" (p.78) and that "accounting fim1s should develop specialized training aimed
at increasing auditors' awareness of the probability of fraud" (pp.78-79).

In her discussion of the Bernardi (1994a) study, Pincus (1994) argued that the reason
why no differences were found between field-dependent and field-independent 10
auditors may well reflect a shift towards a more field-independent population
distribution for auditors. Fm1herrnore, that shift may reflect more field-independent
people being attracted to auditing as a career and/or remaining in the field and not so
much the increase in computer technology in auditing.

Pincus also questioned

Bernardi's hypothesised relationship between an auditor's locus of control and fraud

9 Soc Bernardi (1994;1 nnd 1994b) for dct•ils rcgnrding these different tom,
I0 A fiold-indcpcndcnt person (the opposite of a field-dependent p<rson) is someone wlw is good •t rccognit.iog
figures whkh nrc embedded within larger and more complc~ figures (Bernardi, 199~o:71). Ficld·indcpendcnt
individu•\s hnvc been found to be more effioicnt nt conotructing inferences, to be better "t solvmg pmblcms ond,
finntly, to detect fraud •t a higher rate (p.71).

"
detection, on the basis that an 'auditor can influence outcomes and events in the cxtcnml
audit despite hisfhcr locus-of-control rating as far as everyday life is concerned (p.92).

Another criticism levelled against Bernardi (1994a) by Pincus (1994) concerned the
finding that auditvrs who failed to detect fraud were insensitive tu ethical attitudes of
their client's management.

Pincus argued that this finding was attributable to

weaknesses in the rese[!fCh design used by Bcrnan:ii, namely the extreme manipulation
of the client integrity/competence or that some ofthe subjects misinterpreted the moral
development scales used or, fina!ly, that adding the competcncelintegrity scale

experimental manipulation was unrealistic. Pincus concluded that "further research on
auditors' sensitivity to management integrity is the only means to detennine whether
Bernardi's results are disturbingly real or spurious" (p.94). 11

2.7.2

Using general strategies

Managers are in a position, if they wish, to wordl"frame" their annual report in such a
way as to conceal fraud or to otherwise mislead financial statement users (Kalmcman
and Tversky, 1986- cited by Jamal, Johnson and Berryman, 1995). According to Jamal
et al. (1995:86), "a framing effect occurs when alternative descriptions (frames) of a
problem activate different representations in the mind of a problem-solving agent".
Thus, a ''framing effecl" would refer, for example, to

t}!~

impact of changes in

management's descriptions in the annual report on the auditor's decision making. In the

ll Su Bernardi (l994b) for his reply to Pincus 11994).

context of an audit, a representation is a mental image of such task-relevant constmcts
as materiality 1md audit risk and their interrelationship. Kahncrnan and Tvcrsky ( 19ll6)
proposed that there are two ways a framing effect can be detected:

i.

Using multiple representations, i.e., considering alternative representations of
the particular problem (e.g., gains vs. losses). By being in a position to know
the different solutions for different representations of the same problem, the
auditor can identify which particular representation is likely to be invalid; and

ii.

using a procedure that will transform all problems into a standard

represetttation. An example of such a procedure is the convcrston of different
streams of cash flows into net present value (Jamal et al., 1995:87).

Jamal et a\. reported that financial statement fraud can be better detected by converting
alternative versions of a problem into a standard representation, instead of a multiple
representation. Twenty-four audit partners were asked in a simulation study to think
aloud while canying out a concurring partner review in four cases in which client
management had constructed a misleading frame (description of the company) and a
financial statement fraud. All the (seven) auditors who used a standard representation
were successful in detecting both management's frame and the financial statement
fraud in all the four cases used. Auditors using a single representation dete<:ted neither
the frame nor the fraud. Four auditors who used multiple representations were only
successful in detecting the company's overall company frame and not the fraud in the
four cases. Jamal ct al. concluded that their results suggest that a strategy that uses
multiple representations may not be effective in complex tMk domains such as auditing

(p.l 02).

"
Finally, Jamal ct al.'s findings lend support to the idea that management has the power
to deceive auditors by using framing ciTeels. Over half (13) of the audit partners who
took part in their study were deceived by management despite their training, experience
and motivation not to be deceived (p.\02).

2.7.3

Using specific strategies to counter management's deception tactics

Johnson ct a!. (1993) developed a cognitive model using an interdisciplinary approach.
Their model transforms the problem of fraud detection by auditors into an adversarial
information processing problem in the context of one auditor examining the financial
statements of a company, the management of which is assumed to attempt to deceive
the auditor. Their model proposes that while management attempts to deceive the
auditor by utilising their knowledge of the business and accounting practices as well as
deep cognitive strategies and tactics for constructing a deception, auditors can use
strategies and tactics for detecting such deceptions. Furthermore, they claim that fraud
detection requires lmowledge which is not based on direct experience of fraud
detection and consider fraud to be an instance of a deception created in order to cheat
on a social contract. For an auditor to detect such a deception, they must first
understand the strategies for constructing a deception.

A deceiver can use

"dissimu!ative deceptions [hiding the real]" or "simulative deceptions [showing the
false]".

For an auditor to detect such deceptions, they need to identify the

misrepresentation created by the deceiver. Johnson et a\. consider this an easy task
since there are constraints created by the deceiver, for example, information which is

not readily available to the auditor. Johnson ct al. identified a numhcr of "strategies
and tactics that have been developed as a means of constructing a deception, and usc
them to specify constmints that must be processed by any agent that attempts to detect
this deception" (p.469).

A basic goal of management is to create a favoumble impression among financial
statement users such as creditors and investors. Additiomtl goals of management that
can lead to the creation of a deception were suggested by Turner {1980: I 01 -104 -cited
by Jolmson et a!., 1993:472) and include the following:

i.
ii.

iii.
iv.
v,
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.

overstatement of earnings {e.g., in order to maximize compensation);
obtaining financing (credit, capital) despite condition of financial distress (e.g.,
by fulfilling contractual obligations such as bond covenants);
evading legal tax liability;
manipulating the company's stock price;
consolidating management's reputation despite unsatisfactory perfonnance
(e.g., by increasing R&D investments);
concealing the sale or assignment of fictitious or misrepresented assets;
fulfilling regulatory constraints (e.g., portfolio restrictions);
concealing illegal activities (e.g., bribes); and
embezzling,
,,
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Table I (reproduced from Johnson
ct !!I., 1993:472) showS seven deception tactics that
,,

can be used.tc cover up an overstat~~cnt of earnings.

Table 1:

Examples of Deception Based on the Goal of Overstating Earnings

Strategies for
Deception

Masking

Double play
Mimicking

Dazzling

Inventing

Repackaging

Decoying
"•-""'"'-'.,

Examples of Tactics for Creating Deception

..
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.

Failing to record or disclose an expense or a liability.
Eliminating differences with the target representation
by deleting non-complying items.
Improperly ahplying Generally Accepted Accountinf.
Principles, w ere an item is not individually materia .

Add in~ a misleading narrative ::bout the company.
Sprca mg the extent of the fraud into small
manipulations, individually not material.
De-emEhasizing issues by reporting them in the notes
to the mancial statements rather than reporting them
in the financial statement.
Creating fictitious transactions or transactions without
substance.
Creating external factors justifying attributes that
deviate from the mislcadmg representation.
Changing the labels that characterize attributes in the
financial statements.
Reframing issues to maliciously justifY attributes that
deviate from the target representation.
Creating "blind alleys"; anomalies which after a close
examination tum out to be inconsistent with the
misleading representation.

It would be useful if auditors had some way of identifying intentional misleading

assertions made by management that constitute fraud. As a starting point, it would be
helpful to know the tactics management use to conceal fraud in the financial
statements. Johnson, Jamal and Benyman (1991) reported three such tactics, namely:

i.

by describing a company as expwtding rather than on the verge of colhtpsc, for
exiUllple, management deceives an auditor into having IUlse expectations about
the company; as u consequence, the auditor fitils to notice inconsistencies;

ii.

by presenting infonnation about the company in such a way (creating a
"frame") as to induce the auditor to test non-irTegularity hypotheses in order to
evaluate inconsistencies that arc created; and

iii.

breaking up an impropriety and presenting and rationalising a series of small
manipulations to particular accounts in the financial statements (each one on its
own immaterial) in order to minimise the likelihood of the auditor detecting the
material misstatement.

According to Johnson et al. (1993), the strategies the· auditor can use to detect
deception fall into two categories:

i.

Strategies for finding evidence suggestive of the process used to perpetrate the
deception. The auditor can first look for "situational" red flags as signs that
management's personal financial situation is in distress or that a manager's
compensation scheme relics on the company's income, which would motivate
management to deceive the auditor. Second, the auditor can look for signs
showing manipulation activity such as a manager who insists personally on
approving all payments of a particular kind.

ii.

Strategies that utilise infonnation contained in the manipulation environment.
The auditor: (1) recognises cues that reveal a manipulation; (2) is cautious
about what inferences he/she draws in order to avoid committing him/herself to

H7
accepting management's representations early on in the audit; (3) reduces the
scope for numagcmcnt to deceive by making the audit both exhaustive and

accurate (thus preempting management's attempt to deceive); and finally (4)

focuses on the goals and limited actions management can take in order to
concentrate on what and how a manipulation can be cffccted. The last strategy
is known as the "intentional-based" strategy and is "one of the most likely to be
uncovered in the concurring partner review task" (Johnson ct aL, 1993:475).

Johnson et a\. go on to outline four deception tactics (sec Table 2) and the line

of reasoning actually used by their model to solve the case used in their study.

Correspondent~

Table 2:

Between Detection Tactics and Lines of Reasoning in

an Auditor Model (Reproduced from Johnson ct al (1993"479))
De~eption

Tactics

Anti-repackaging

.

lF an attribute of the environment:
is such that the Deceiver has control
over it and
is inconsistent with expectations

.
•

'"'

the attribute contributes to the
attainment of one of the ascribed
Deceiver's goals,

TIIEN hypothesize that repackaging has
occurred and provisionally assume the
worst case interpretation of that
inconsistency.

Line of Reasoning (partial) actually usc!l by
the model to solve the Surgical Product Case.
Inventory line of reasoning
RULE44
IF an expectation for inventory is needed
Til EN compute it as: last year value of inventory
• (J+pereent of change in sales).
RULE45
IF the expectation for inventory is available, and
inventory is greater than its c~~:pcctation •
(l+allowable variation)
THEN assume that inventory is inconsistent and
call the difference between the value of inventory
and its e~~:pecL.1tion *(!+allowable variation) the
inventory discrepnncy.
RULE84
IF inventory is inconsistent,
THEN generate a "valuation of assets" hypothesis
about manipulation of the accounting process, and
assign the value of the inventory discrepancy to it.

I
-·---

- - - - ------- -- --

Changes In Accounting

Anti-double play

IF an attribute oft he environment:
is revealing of a manipulation and
it is not sufficient to conclude that a
manipulation has taken place
TIIEN hypothesize that a double play has
occurred and

provi~ionally

do not explain 11

away.

Estimat~:

line Iff

rea.~oning

RULE2
IF accounting estimates changes arc grc3tcr than
zero,
THEN assume that the change in ~ccounting
estimate is inconsistent, and assign its full value
to the homonymous discrepancy.
RULE II
IF a change in accounting estimate is
inconsistent, generate a "changes in policies"
hypothesis about manipulation of the accounting
process and a;sign the value of th~ accountmg
estimate change discrepancy to it.

----··----···--1

Anti-mimicking
IF an attribute in th.! environment

Successful Research Division line of rcawuiug

over which the Deceiver has
control
is consistent with the expectations,
and this attribute is inconsistent

The model has no rule that applies to the
qualitative infonnation contained in the narrative
part of the financial statements.

with another attribute in the

Functionally, this is equivalent to the
prescription of the tactics, i.e., to ignore the cue.

environment,
and the fact that the fonncr
attribute satisfies the expectation
contributes to the attainment of

one of the ascribed Deceiver's
goals,
TIIEN hypothesize that mimicking has
occurred and provisionally ignore the
fonner attribute.
Anti·dccoying
IF an attributc in the environment
a)is inconsistent with expectations and
b)does not contribute to the attainment of
one of the Deceiver's goals,
TIIEN, hypothesize that decoying has
occurred and discard that attribute

Litigation line of reasoning
The model has no rule that applies to the
litigation cue.
Functionally, this is equivalent to the
prescription of the tactics, i.e. to ignore the cue.

Johnson et a\.'s (1993) model of fraud detection makes usc of the "risk hierarchy"
from Johnson et al. (1992). Their model is a means of solving the problem of frnud
detection through reasoning rather than through experience and recognition. Its main

weakness is that it is time-consuming and imposes a high demand on human
resources, as it requires that every inconsistency, however small, be evaluated as a
potential fraud. Consequently, its wide adoption by auditors generally (as opposed to
fraud auditors) is questionable.

The moclcl satisfies four independent basic

information processing requirements, namely: (l) activation; (2) detection; (3)
editing; and (4) rcvaluation 12 • Johnson et al. (1993) validated the model on four
known cases and two clean cases. The model was also compared with the judgement
of 24 experienced concuning partners. Their model was successful in detecting fraud
in all five cases to which it was applied and it was found that the tactics used in the
model to detect fraud are very similar with such tactics used by auditors who have
been successful at detecting fraud. Johnson eta!. (1993:485) concluded that neither
the use of red flags nor the use of auditors who have specialised knowledge about
particular industries to examine financial statements has been particularly successful
in detecting fraud.

12 Described in more detnil, ~ccording to Johnson ~tal. (1993:476-478) tho four rcquiremonlsl~tages are ns
follows: (l) in activation the nuditor looks for cues in the nnanci~l statement, calculates expectations, identifies
inconsislcncics between cues and cxpcclationl, lhus generating potential symptoms of mnnipulations; (2) in
detection the auditor uses one or more deecption-dctcction tnctics lo genomic hypotheses about the
mMipulations of tho environment, some ofwhkh concern possible goals of management; (J) editing, in the light
of the manipulations hypothesized in (2) in using doccp1ion-dctcction tactics, the nuditor edits the initial
representation in (I) and for ench inconsistency identified in (2) th~ auditor identifies n dollar value which
expresses its likely impnct on the operating income of the hypothesized manipulation. Finally, (4) in rcvnlua1ion,
the audilor makes a decision concerning the appropriate action 1o be taken, i.e., Qetcnnines the mntcriatitY of the
hypothesized manipulations und the conclusion reached is expressed in the nudit opmion. The ~ucccss of the
method described is based on two principles: (i) coverage· this stales that "success in the task of fraud detection
is based on the use of dte go:tls of a fmudulcnt management for intcrprcl"tng detected incon~istcncics'", nnd (ii)
composition • litis >IDles tltot "success in the task oF frnud detection is b35cd on the ~bility of combining cues thnt
arc function•l to tltc nclticvcment of man•gcmrnt gonls ""clements of a tnrgcr mnnipulntinn" {Johnson cl nt.,
1993;478).
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3.0

CONCLUSION

The usefulness of the various fraud detection approaches (i.e., general, triangle,
manipulating tradc-offs, red nags, fraud ui:scSsmcnt, differential approach, and
cognitive) described in this chapter will be enhanced if the various approaches arc
used to supplement one another.

To illustrate, the counter-deception strategies

advocated by Johnson ct al. (1993, 1992) can be supplemented with knowledge
derived using Loebbecke et al.'s (1989) fraud assessment model. To assist auditors,
a fraud detection model is developed in the next chapter which integrates and expand
on the merits of models discussed in this chapter. The next chapter describes and
argues the case for (I) a descriptive model of the aetiology of fraud; and (2) an
eclectic fi"aud detection model. Empirical findings about the usefulness to auditors of
both models are reported and discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively.

CIIAI'TJ<:R4
MODELS OF WUY PEOPLE COMMIT FRAUO AND FRAUD

DF.TI~CTION

CHAI'TER SUMMARY

After noting that the literature in psychology, sociolOb'Y, and criminology docs not
offer one generally-accepted explanation of why people commit frnud, the first part of
this chapter identifies a number of factors which should be accounted for in a model of
why fraud is committed. It then proceeds to describe and critique three models/theories
that have been put forward and their components regarding the aetiology of fraud. On
the basis of this evaluation and the conclusions reached in the previous chapter, a
model (ROP) of why fraud is committed is developed and its three components
(Rationalisations, Opportunity, and Person) are elaborated on. The model's
assumptions (tested in the empirical research reported in Chapter 5) are also described.
Also drawing on the discussion in the previous chapter of models of fraud detection, a
new model is proposed, and its assumptions and aims are described, as are potential
fraud indicators.

1.0

INTRODUCTION

The modeVtheory of why people commit fraud put forward in this chapter incorporates
and expands on ideas from existing models, It is argued that we can identify factors
which make the commission of fraud possible, but not inevitable. The factors arc
presented as "correlates of fraud" since a correlation indicates an association between
two factors but not a causal relationship. The model depicts the three component~

necessary for fmud to occur. Systematic knowledge concerning the aetiology of ffaud
is then incorporated in a fraud-detection model to enhance auditors' fhmd-d\!tcction
ability.

20

THREE MODF.LS OF FRAUD: Albrecht ct al. (1995); Cressey (1986);
and Locbbcckc ct al. (1989)

As far as the concepts used by the three models arc concerned, even though they all
tbcus on workplace fraud they do not use the same terms for it. Cressey is concerned
with embezzlement while Loebbecke et a]. talk about management fraud and
defalcations, whereas Albrecht el al. use fraud in such a way as to encompass both.

For Albrecht et al. (1995) the essential components are presented in the "fraud triangle"
and consist of: (1) perceived opportunity to commit fraud; (2) financial and/or nonfinancial pressure; and (3) rationalisation. These arc explained below:

i.

Perceived opportunity to commit fraud, convert the fraud and conceal the
offence. Albrecht ct al. provide the following examples of opportunities: lack
or circumvention of controls that prevent and/or detect fraudulent behaviour;
inability to judge quality of work; lack of disciplinary action; asymmetrical
information; ignorance and apathy, and no audit trail (p.27).

ii.

Financial and/or non-financial pressure. Financial pressure includes factors
such as greed, living beyond one's means, high personal debt, high medical
bills, poor credit, personal financial loss, unexpected financial needs, (p.20).

Vk·e pressure includes !Uc!ors such as gambling, dmgs, alcohol and expensive
sexual rclatiunships. /York-related pre.l'.Wre such as !o get even with one's
employer or somebody else, getting lillie recognition li1r joh performance,
experiencing joh dissatisfhetion, fearing losing one's joh, hcing bypassed fbr
promotion and feeling underpaid, (p.24). Other pressures such as having a
spouse who insists (either directly or indirectly) on

an

improved lifestyle or a

challenge to beat the system.
iii.

Rationalisation. Albrecht ct al. list the following examples: the organisation
owes it to me; I am only borrowing the money and will pay it back; nobody
will get hurt; I deserve more; it's for a good purpose, and finally, something has
to be sacrificed (p.46).

On the basis of his studies of embezzlers, Cressey (1986) identified the following three

components necessary for fraud to take place:

i.

Someone with an unshareable financial problem. According to Cressey. people
have problems of this nature "if it seems to them that they cannot tum to
ordinary, legitimate sources for sorely needed funds" (p.l99).

ii.

Someone who knows how to solve rhe problem in secret by violating his/her
position of financial trust. Cressey points out that, "everyone in a position of
financial trust has hundreds of opportunities to violate that trust. That's part and
parcel of being trusted - if there is no opportunity for people to steal, it is
meaningless to say that they are trusted" (p.200). Furthermore, it is oHen the
ca£e with professionals in positions of financial trust that knowledge and

'l4

techniqLLC5 cunccming fr:.utl arc taught

iii.

Someom: wlw
fraud "right",

fmS.I'!'SSt'S

ttL~!,

:L~

part of profcssinnal training courses.

neutmlisiiiK verhali.\'1/liom· that render committing

lOr example, in tcnns of "necessity", "just borrowing the

money", "don't can:" or "business is husincss''.

Finally, Locbbccke et al. (1989;5-7) suggested that the following three components

must all be present if management fraud in particular is to take place:

,,

i.

Condilions (i.e., the "degree to which conditions arc such that a material
management fraud could be committcd"

1
).

Examples of conditions listed by

Loebbecke et al. {1989:6-7) include: management operating and financial
decisions are dominated by a single person; management (particularly senior

accounting personnel) turnover is high; organisation is dccentralised without
adequate monitoring; the existence offrequent and significant difficult-to-audit
transactions or balances; a weak control environment; failure to establish
policies and procedures that provide reasonable assurance of reliable
accounting estimates; conditions that indicate lack of control of activities (e.g.,
constant crisis conditions, disorganised work areas, frequent or excessive back
orders, shortage or delays); a lack of control over computer processing;
inadequate policies and procedures for security of data or assets; and complex
calculations affecting the balance or class of transactions.
ii.

Motives (i.e., the degree to which the pcrson(s) in "positions of authority and
responsibility in Lie entity have a reason or motivation to commit nmnagcment

I These= wcak~os:;es in internal cmlln>l.<.

1)5

fmud"). Examples of motives tlmt may result in management fraud inclttde:
management places undue emphasis un meeting cHrnings projections;
profitability of entity relative to

iL~

industry is inadc(jualc or

incon.~istcnt;

sensitivity of operating result:; to economic factors (inllation, intt:rcst rates,
WJCtnp!oyment, etc.) is high; rate of change in entity's

indtL~Iry

is rapid;

direction of change in entity's industry is declining with many business failures;
solvency problems or other internal or external matters that bring into question
the entity's ability to continue in existence arc present; excessive emphasis on
meeting quantified targets that must be achieved to receive a substantial portion
of management compensation.

iii.

Altitudes (i.e., "the degree to which the person or person(s) in positions of

authority and responsibility in the entity have an attitude or such set of ethical
values that they would allow themselves - or even seek - to commit
management fraud"). Loebbecke eta!. list the following: management's attitude
towards financial reporting is tmduly aggressive; management places tmduc
emphasis on meeting earnings projections; management's reputation in the
business community is poor; frequent disputes about aggressive application of
accotmting principles that increase earnings; and evasive response to audit
inquiries (pp.6·7). It should be noted at this point, however, that there is an
inconsistency between Loebbeckc ct al. 's definition of attitudes and the
examples provided. As argued below, in effect Loebbecke ct a!. 's attitudes can
not be taken to mean rationalisations.

All three models postulate three components as essential for an explanation of why

people commit fraud. As argued he[ ow,

howcv•~r,

I ,oehhcckc ct al.\ examples l(!r their

allitmle.\' component arc synonymous with and should he included with their conditions

component. '!11is is why Table I

show~

two components for the Loebbcckc ct al.

model. While the tenns used by the different authors for cnch component arc cliiTcrcnt
(see Table 1), all three refer to the need to have a person with a motive who
rationalises/justifies committing fraud by exploiting a perceived opportunity.

Table 1:

Necessary Components for Fraud to Take Place

Albrecht

Perceived
opportunity to
commit fraud

Financial and/or
non fimmcia!
pressure

Rationalisations

Cressey

Knowhow

Unsharcable
Financial
Problems

Possesses
neutralising
verbalisations

Loebbecke

Conditions/
Attitude

Motive

Loebbeckc et al.'s "conditions" is synonymous with Albrecht et nl.'s "opportunity".
Cressey's "the knowledge of how to solve the problem in secret, by violating a position
of financial trust" (p.l99) appears at first glance to be different from "conditions" and
"opportunity". However, the notion of opportunity is contained in Cressey's emphasis
on someone with the knowhow to commit fraud. This is because, as Cressey points
out, someone can only be said to hold a position of financial trust if he/she has
opportunities to violate that trust.

The way Locbbeeke et al. define "attitudes" is synonymous with Albrecht ct nl. 's
"rationalisations" and Cressey's "ncutralising verbalisations". However the examples

'>7
of "attitudes" they lbt (sec almvc) arc a set uf company characteristics which arc

conducive Jlx Jhmd to occur. Thus, unlike 1\lbrcchl ct al. and Cressey, they litil to lfokc
into account the importance of rationalisations that make fraud possible for an
individual ollCndcr. This omission is perhaps explained by the filet that they only
surveyed audit partners, had no data on individual o!Tendcrs and did not draw on

relevant psychological, sociological, and criminological literature on the aetiology of
fraud. Recasting Locbbeckc et al.'s model in terms of the ROP model components

(see below) we have only a crime-prone person with a motive (P) and opportunity (0).

Loebbecke eta!. (1989) and Cressey (1986) both indicate that all three elements (as

they state them) must be present if fraud is to take place, Albrecht et al. (1995) nrc the
only authors who draw attention to their three clements as inreractive. By interactive
they mean that "... the greater the perceived opportunity or the more intense the
pressure, the less rationalisation it takes to motivate someone to commit fraud.
Likewise, the more dishonest a perpetrator is, Ute less opportunity and/or pressure it
takes to motivate fraud" (p. I 9).

In their use of "attitudes" Albrecht ct a!. 's and Cressey's models utilise knowledge
from such other disciplines as psychology, sociology and criminology pertaining to the
type of person who is likely to be a fraud offender. However, they all can be criticised
for: (I) not doing so within a psychological, sociological or criminological theorcticnl
framework; and (2) not dealing adequately with the notion of traits that render
someone to be crime-prone. In other words, no attempt is made to nccmmt !Or
individual differences as far as the aetiology of fraud is concerned by considering the

,,.
individual otlCndcr's pcroonulity traits whi'.:.h

predispose.~

h'mllhcr to commit rmud

under particular circumstances. '!his is a serious deficiency in their models. Their
explanations of why people commit lfaud arc inco1nplctc and, consequently, their
practical usefulness for auditors who want to enhance their fraud-detection ability is

limited. In addition, all three authors have also failed to conccptualise "opportunity" so
as to include the broader socio-economic context in which fraud takes place and to

locate it within a theoretical framework such as Clarke's (1980) snuational approach to
criminal behaviour,

The model of fraud developed in this chapter incorpcrates and expands on ideas in the

three models discussed, including the notion of rationalisations, as well as
incorporating the notions of a crime-prone person and situational factors that facilitate
the crime.

3.0

A MODEL OF WHY PEOPLE COMMIT FRAUD

The model of fraud put forward incorpomtes the ideas of the three models discussed
earlier but expands on them by making good their common drawback of ignoring
individual differences in crime-proneness. The model also: (!) incorporates the
emphasis on the three fraud elements being interactive; (2) emphasises the importance
of a motivated crime-prone individual; (3) stresses the importance of offenders'
rationalisations/ justifications of their fraudulent activity; and (4) acknowledges that
the process by which employee or management fraud comes to be committed is not
necessarily a straightforwwd one.

,,,
The model also acknowlcr.lgcs !hut fi"aml ollCndcrs arc not homogeneous; some h:wc
no second thoughlq about embarking on a spree of fraud of/Cnccs; for others, however,

it can be an agonising decision and then end up being serial fraud offcmlcrs when they
only intended to commit a single offence. Finally, others continue to commit other

fraud offences not out of a need to cover up those already committed, but because they
come to enjoy U1e proceeds of their first offence and believe they can go on

perpetrating fraud without getting caught. For this type of individual, greed

ha~

replaced the original need for money to pay a debt. In other words, offenders become
overconfident, greedy and compulsive, thus continuing offending until they get caught.

3.1

Assumptions of the model

The following assumptions underp[n the model:

i.

Generally, fraud is made possible by the presence of three preconditions,
namely, an opportunity to commit the crime (0); one or more motivated
crime-prone persons (P) who is/are likely to be in a position of financial
trust and who has/have the knowledge of how to commit the fraud, convert

the money, and conceal the offence; and, the use of rationalisations
(R)/justifieations (i.e., the thinking processes) that enable the individual(s)
concerned to carry out fraudulent activity by overcoming any inhibitions
imposed by one's conscience or by one's perception of the risks involved
(Albrecht eta!., 1995; Cressey, 1986).
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ii.

Ench of the conditions arc correlated with fi"aud occurrence. /Jowcvcr, if un
opportunity for fraud docs not exist, this docs not

ncccss~rily

stop a crime-

prone person with a motive and the necessary rationalisations li"om crcuting
such an opportunity. To illustrate, a professional career fraudster

sel~

out to

infiltrate a company, or even establishes one in order to perpetrate his crime
irrespective of the state of the national economy, the financial pressures on the
company or the system of internal controls.
iii.

Fraud offences and offenders are characterised by a significant degree of
heterogeneity (Cressey, 1953) and no single explanation can account for all
frauds.

iv.

Employee and management frauds are committed for a variety of motives such
as having an unshareable financial problem, acting out of love for the company
and the employees, financial pressure, acting out of greed, wanting personal
justice, wanting a challenge and, finally, being a professional/career corunan
(Albrecht eta!,, 1995; Zietz, 1981).

v.

The majority of potential fraud offenders have a perceived urgent need for
money while a minority seeks some other non-financial reward.

vi.

Correlates of fraud exist at different levels of analysis: society, the individual
company, the individual perpetrator(s) and, finally, situational factors.

vii.

There are individual differences in how a person in a management position will
resolve a particular company financial problem and/or a particular personal
problem that calls for the raising of money urgently (Cressey, 1986). People
predisposed to dishonest behaviour are more likely to commit fraud

ru;

a

solution to a financial problem they face, if they perceive an opportunity to do
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so mul believe they will not be lbuml ou!.
viii.

There arc individual dilfercnccs in how a

r~rson

in a non-manugcmcnt position

will choose to resolve a particular individual/family problem that calls /Or the
mising of money. Such differences arc largely explained by the crime-

proneness of an individual (Albrecht ct a!., 1995).

The model of employee and management fraud must account for established facts

about the offence and the offenders as well as the processes by which the offenders
come to conunit the offence. It is known, for example, that demographic, criminal

justice, and personality attributes of such offenders include the following:

getting first convicted when of a mature age (Benson and Moore, 1992);
being a specialist offender, i.e., only committing fraud (Thomas, 1992);
•

being predominantly male of high educational status (Wheeler et al., I982);
having weak self-control (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990);
having a weak superego (Blackburn, 1993);
because of their socialisation into some aspects of co1p0rate culture
(Sutherland, 1949) there is often an absence of constraints on their behaviour
because they are not committed, are not involved and do not believe in
conventional values and goals (Hirschi, 1969);

•

egocentricity (Eysenck, 1977);

•

feeling no anxiet:-; or remorse (Eysenck, 1977);
insensitivity to the consequences of their behaviour (Eysenck, 1977);

•

over-sensitivity tc. monetary gain (Bartol and Bartol, 1994); and
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un ability to mtionalise their misbehuviour, neutralise guilt and

~o

justify it to

themselves (Albrecht ct a!., 1995; Cressey, 1986; Mat .....a, 1969).

Some of the apparent inter-relationships between the demographic offender attributes
listed above arc explained by the following·. the upper echelon of the executive world is
male-dominated, as arc the accounting and legal professions; tertiary qualification.:> arc
almQst essential for someone to acquire a senior position of trust within a company; it
takes a number of years before one can lay claim to such a management position and,
finally, having a prior criminal record as an adult correlates with leaving school early
and not with completing a tertiary degree (Farrington, 1993).

A representation of the model is as follows:

Pr(Fraud)=f(R,O,P)

The probability of fraud is a function of the three components. The model will now be
referred to by the acronym ROP (see Figure 1). The three components of ROP are
elaborated on below.

Two basic features of ROP are that it attempts to account for: (a) the interactive
relationship between the different components; and (b) individual differences, i.e., not
everyone who is motivated to acquire extra money and is presented with

ru1

opportunity to do so actually goes ahead and commits fraud. Another important feature
ofROP is that it concedes that there is an overlap between the different components.

I()J

To illustmtr.:, thr.: far.:t that somr.:onc has the knowJr.:dgr.: to r.:ommit thr.: lb!Ud and r.:onr.:cal
the

oflCn~c

ctm be considered either as a characteristic of a motivated crime-prone

person or as part of the notion ofoppurtunity. Also, as alrr.:ady mentioned, "motive",
"opportunity" and "rationalisations" cannot be considered indr.:pcndr.:nt of the
individual offender's personality.

To use an analogy, a law-abiding member of the public walking along a residential
street sees houses, whereas a recidivist burglar assesses opportunities for breaking into
houses and identifies lucrative targets. Similarly, a weak internal control remains just
that to a manager or an employee with strong moral scruples, but it is perceived as a
great opportunity to steal money by deception by someone with a weak conscience and
thus predisposed to break the law ifhe/she believes he/she can get away with it.

It should be noted that "crime-proneness" as an attribute of an individual is not used in

the ROP model as a dichotomous variable but is conceptualised as being located along

·.,

a continuum. The existence of any one of the ROP model's three components is not
enough for fraud to occur. Many people may become aware that there is a weakness in
the system of internal control of a company but only those who are crime-prone will

perceive it as

Wl

opportunity to commit the offence. Furthennore, a crime·pronc

individual will go ahead, exploit an opportunity and commit a fraud with or without
accomplices if he/she can justify the deed to him/herself. A person who does not
possess the neeessary rationalisations would not be in a position to justify committing
the crime to him/herself. In this sense, the components of the ROP model are
interactive
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Drawing on Blackburn's (1993:21-23) distinction hctwccn acts and tendencies, it can
be stated that:

i.

there exist one or more acts/occurrences of fraudulent activity which depend on
environmental opportunities and conditions for their occurrence;

ii.

there are individuals who, for a nwnber of psychological, sociological, and
other reasons (e.g., financial pressure) are fraud-prone, i.e., given an
opportunity to commit fraud they are likely to exploit it and justify it to
themselves;

iii.

only an individual, or two or more individuals conspiring together, haslbave the
power to commit an act of fraud;

iv.

corrunitting fraud is a function of the situation (i.e., opportur.i.ty in terms of
both company characteristics and situational factors that facilitate the
corrunission of fraud) and the existence of a person with both the necessary
predisposition and motive as well as rationalisations;

v.

personality attributes of individuals by themselves are weak predictors of
specific acts of fraud, but arc useful red flags for auditors insofar as they
summarise average and likely behaviour; and

vi.

one could expect to predict a single act of fraud if one knew enough about an
individual's personality traits that point to his/her tendencies to break the law,
and if one had enough information about a given situation in terms of
opportunities for fraud and relevant conditions.

Finally, the model needs to be viewed in the broader socio-economic context. The fact

1116
is that !Tnud increases during economic recessions when high interest mtes exert
financial pressure on both companies and ind!viduals. In addition, the existence of
l·!

multiple moralities within society and a largely utilitarian approach to ethics by the
corporate culture {i.e., a state of "anything goes", of "!!thical neutralism") in the
competition for profit which expects a lavish lifestyle from its members, are conducive
for fraud (Cressey, 1986). Consequently, a crime-prone manager/ accountant! lawyer
who cannot maintain mortgage payments on the family home because of drastic
increa::es in interest rates may wdl exploit opportunities to commit fraud against
clients.

3.2

The three components of the proposed model

3.2.1

Opportunity

Fmud is facilitated by: the existence of opportunities for individuals who ,ry:lude to
commit the crime; a lack

C'·~ emphasis

on fraud-prevention controls by a company; the

absence of a code of conduct (KPMG, 1995a); and the presence of inadequately trained
internal and/or external auditors.

Two characteristics th11t affect the opportunity for fraud are organisational structure and
management style.

Changes in management style such as the shift from a hierarchical,

authoritarian one to a more democratic one, coupled with the influence of economic
rationalism and staff downsizing, have resulted in flatter organisations where middle
management (which used to watch out for fraud signs) has disappeared.

J()7

Undoubtedly, a poor control system provides opportunities for someone to commit
fraud. Such opportunities include, for example, sloppy paperwork, the isouing of
cheques payable to cash and giving discounts to clients who pay cash. ntc fraud
surveys by KPMG (1996, 1995a, 1995b, 1993a, 1993b) found that poor internal
contra! was the one factor that underpinned most frauds both in Australia and in 17
other countries. Albrecht et al. (1995) provide a comprehensive discussion of fraud
opportunities within companies. Drawing on Albrecht et al., it can be said that such
opportunities can take the form of:

i.

Inadequate

internal

communication

or

controls
labelling;

(improper
ineffective

management
hiring

modelling;

procedures;

bad

unclear

organisational structure and assigned responsibilities, and an ineffective
internal audit department).

ii.

Lack of adequate control procedures that prevent fraud (e.g., inappropriate
segregation of duties or dual custody; Jack of a system of authorizations,
independent checks, physical safeguards, and docwnents and records).

iii.

Noncontrol factors that provide opportunities for fraud to be committed (e.g.,
inability to judge the quality of perfonnance; failure to discipline fraud
perpetrators; lack of access to information; ignorance, apathy or incapacity, and
lack of an audit trail).

Cohen and Felson (1979) put forward the idea that crime can be understood in terms of
people's daily routine activities. They also drew attention to the fact that criminal

I
I 011
ollCnccs olicn take place due to the absence of capable guardians (e.g., police prcscnc~:
or other fom1s of surveillance) who increase the risk of of!Cndcrs being apprchcndcd,
thll~

preventing the commission or of!Cnccs being committed. Both intcm<d and

external auditors can be thought of as capable guardians. Auditors do not fullil the role
of the capable guardian when, for example, they come to rely more on management's
representations due to reporting deadlines; and/or senior audit partners arc spread too
thin (i.e,, they are deployed ineffectively as far as overseeing the quality of audit work

is concerned) due to excessive time pressure. Under such circmnstances fraud becomes

more likely.

A theory of why fraud is committed must also account for the fact that employee and

management fraud often involves more than one offender. KPMG's (1995a) national
fraud survey found that collusion was involved in one-third of the cases and comprised
8% internal collusion and 24% collusion with third parties (p.ll ). Similarly, KPMG's
(1996) international (18 countries) fraud survey reported that collusion between
employees and third parties was the second most common element that allowed fraud
to occur (p.12). Collusion in fraud cases against a company is often necessary for
offenders to circwnvent separation of duties, an impediment made easier to overcome
by weak internal controls. Therefore, collusion between someone within the company
and a client of the company or some other outside party is essential for some t'jpes of

fraud to take place.

Situational factors such as a perceived low risk of being detected and a perception that
upon conviction the likely penal sanction will be a relatively lenient one, contribute to

I 9
«

I -\.'-'

frnud as they negate any notion of dclerrc lCC (Brnithwatc, ~~&~.!). A good reason why
an oftCndcr may remain undetected is tha there is a_1tcndency for such individuals to
not only hold positions of trust, but also to be hard working, not to take holidays and to

be able to cover up their offences effcctiv ly (Loisel, 1996). Prosecution difficulties in
convicting major frnud offenders mell!1s

at such defendants are in a strong plea-

bargaining position. The fact remains, ho

ver, that even though many people hold

positions of trust in a company and are a are of opportunities to commit fraud, not
everybody does it. Let us, therefore, co ider what might explain such individual

differences.

3.2.2

Person with a motive and a crim prone personality

The challenge for a theory of fraud is to a

colUlt

for individual differences. The fact is

that not all crime-prone individuals who p rceive an opportunity I'J commit fraud nre
motivated to do it. Also, not all motivate crime-prone individuals who perceive an
opportunity eventually commit fraud bee

II5C

they may not possess the necessary

rationalisations. As Albrecht et al. (1995:4 ) point out, some people commit fraud due
to a lot of financial pressure while othe s do it "even though no real pressure or

opportunity for fraud exists .... Most pe pic are somewhere in between these two
eldremes". Excluding professional career conmen, it can be said that "When the
combination of pressure, opportunity and tionaJisation becomes severe enough, they
cross the line of honesty lllld commit frau " {p.49). lt should also be noted that while
for.many fraud offenders the decision to ommit the offence is a rational one, for a
minority it is the result of a slow process hereby they half-heartedly commit the first
offence as a quick-fix solution to an unsh cable financial problem (Albrecht et al.,

I
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1995; Cressey, 1986). They experience a lot of guilt; they hope they will be abh: to pay
the money back very soon nnd that will be the end of their misbehaviour, but they lind
they have to go on committing frauds to cover up those already committed, i.e., they
sink deeper and deeper into fraudulent activity as they "rob Peter to pay Paul". Such
offenders may well stumL!e across an opportunity to conunit fraud (e.g., as when
someone entrusts them with a large amount of cash), or they first commit fraud to

misappropriate small amounts of money but the small thefts snowball and the

offending gets completely out of controL

2

Drawing on a large number of fraud cases described in the literature and on the basis
3

of lengthy discussions the author had with MFG officers regarding fraud offences and

offenders they had investigated for major fraud and the different circumstances under
which fraud occurs, the following types of individuals who commit fraud(s) as well as
the circumstances under which they do so can be identified:

i.

The offender is predominantly a highly educated male, of mature age when first
convicted and is not versatile in his/her offending.

ii.

The offender has weak self-control.

iii.

The offender rationalises his/her crimina! behaviour, justifies it to him!herM:!f
and feels no guilt for the crime,

iv,

The offender is a professional, career conman, who infiltrates a company (or
even establishes one, even though a bankrupt) and gets him/herself into a

2scc A\brcchlclal., 1995; Bolognu, 1993; Crcss~y, 1986; Ziclz., 1981.
3 DctiSgl Wayne Monk, Oct/Chief Inspector Ro\>crt Cockerel, nnd Commnndcr Allen Bowles.
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position of trust in order to commit the crime. In other words, fi'aud is the goal

from tl1c moment this type of person enters a company.
v.

The offender commits a fraud because of a belief, sometimes unrealistic, that
he/she can get away with it ami, also that hdshc will be able to return the

money to its rightful owner(s).

vi.

The company faces

fi~mncial

problems and is in urgent need of money and

someone in a management position rationally decides to commit one or more
frauds to rescue the company, belicwing that he/she wil! be able to pay back the
money to its rightful owner(s) and/or because of a belief that he/she can
meanwhile conceal the offence(s) and not get punished. Here fraud is

committed more out of love for the company than any animosity towards it or
some egocentric motive.
vii.

A company's financial problems lead a particular member of management to

experience socioeconomic status disequilibrium and self-concept incongruence

as he/she and/or his/her family can no longer enjoy the same lifestyle:
a.

bu~

due to strong self-control adjusts his/her expenditure accordingly

and does not need to connnit fraud; or
. b.

due to weak self-control does not adjust his/her expenditure
accordingly, and commits fraud once or repeatedly. For some people,
being seen to be successful is more important than being honest.

viii.

An individual in a position of trust persuades, or (by virtue of having weak self~

control) is persuaded by, an outsider to embark on a scam to deceive and to
share the money stolen.
ix.

Fraud is conunitted by a crime-prone individual in response to a felt personal

I

112
need, e.g., to buy a house because one is engaged to be married or in order to
help loved ones.

x.

Duc~tll some vice pressure (e.g., gambling, drugs, alcohol, expensive scxuul

relationship) or for sheer excitement, an individual lives b<;yond hisfhcr means.
The financial pressure could also come from a spouse who insists (directly or

indirectly) on a more expensive lifestyle than the individual can afford. Fraud is
committed in response to such an unshareable financial problem by individuals

who possess the necessary neutralising verbalisations to justify committing the
offence.
xi.

According to Albrecht et al. (1995), someone in management or an employee

of a company commits fraud because of some animosity towards the company
in order to get even. An employee may be disgruntled because of feelir;g
unrle~paid,

overlooked for promotion, job dissatisfaction, fear of losing his/her

job, or getting little recognition for his/her job performance.
xii.

Utilising an orthodox (i.e., Freudian) psychoanalytic perspective, the
uncorucious wishes of a high socioecoilomic status individual, whose company
is facing insolvency, may be sublimated and find expression by perpetrating a
fraud which provides the needed recognition or status in the context of the

corporate culture (Blackburn, 1993: 114).
xiii.

A person with an antisocial personality disorder (see Blackburn, 1993;
Eysenck, 1997) is excessively egocentric, feeling no anxiety or remorse, and
being insensitive to the consequences of committing one or more frauds on the
victims. Such a person is predisposed to commit fraud under some financial or
other pressure that call for the urgent mising of money if there exists an
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opportunity for frnud.
xiv.

Finally, someone rnay commit fraud to prove they can beat the system, i.e., a~ a
challenge (Albrecht ct a\., 1995).

3.2.3

Rationalisations

It needs to be emphasised that, as Cressey (1986) has argued, ultimately a trusted

person with an unshareable financial problem who perceives an opportunity to commit
fraud does so as a result of neutralising verbalisations that make possible frauds against
or for the company. In other words, in order to corrunit fraud it is not enough for
someone to be in a position of trust, with an unshareable financial problem and an
opportunity to commit fraud in secret. By violating that trust, acting alone or with one
or more accomplices, they need to talk themselves into a belief that, somehow, they
have a "right" to perpetrate the crime. Therefore, it is the ability to rationalise and
justify committing the offence(s) that ultimately makes fraud possible. In this context,
hc,iit a manager feels towards d1e company (an example of motivation which muy
reflect one or more company characteristics) is important in understanding his/her
neurralisalion techniques (i.e., rationalisations) which make fraud possible4•

Cressey's (1986) theory of why managers commit fraud involves a psychological
process which includes among its three components "the ability to find a fonnula
which describes the act of embezzling in words which does not conflict with the image

4 The president of the Institute of Chartered Accountllllts in Australia (ICAA) otthotimc of writing, Rob Wylie,
hus warned thnt economic rationalism 1111d staff downsizing hnYc indirectly crc~tcd the idcnl climate for frnud
('A Climate for Fraud', 1996:9}. Tho possible impact of these changes nnd stuff downsizing includes flx~d-tcnn
appointments, incrwcs In job Insecurity, a dwlinc in corporotc loynlty,low momlcnnd the adoption by stnffof
n mercenary attitude to one's employers. These lli'C fattors that contribute to frnudulcnt activity.
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of oneself as a trusted person" (p.l99). Cressey called this "nculralising vcrbalisations'',
and argued that "they make up the most important element in the process which gets a
trusted person in trouble, or keeps the person out of trouble" {p.200). Cressey stated

that "every trust violator [he himself] interviewed used a neutralizing verbalization"
(p.20 I). More specifically, Cressey found that imprisoned embezzlers made use of the
notion that their case was one of "necessity", or that their loved ones were in a dire

situation c that their employers "were cheating them". However, such justifications
were cast in terms of "borrowing", "ownership" or "don't care" (p.201). He pointed out
that rationalisations' used by fraud offenders are not made up by offenders on the spur

of the moment but "they are learned, and are reflections of cultural ideologies
pertaining to the propriety of committing crime under certain circumstances" (p.201 ).
In this serue, the rationalisations one uses to justify conunitting fraud are related to
both one's socialisation and personality (which encapsulates one's velues, attitudes and
behavioural patterns) generally as well as to socialisation into the contemporary
corporate culture.

Cressey argued that neutralising verbalisations used by both management and
employees who commit fraud are accounted for by Sutherland's (1949) differential
association theory. According to this theory, people rationalise their behaviour in ways
they have learned from associates, CreS£ey also argues that the source of
rationalisations used by management who commit fraud for the company (e.g., to
increase its profits) is a number of ideologies which penneate the business world. He
lists four such ideologies: (1) honesty is the best policy but business is business; (2) it's

~

Whnt he termed "vocabularies of motive".
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all right to steal a loaf of bread when you arc starving; (3) government regulation of

business is socialistic and counterproductive (p.201 ); and (4) it's necessary (p.204).

Thus, rationalisations are made possible, on the one hand, by the existence of widelyacce·~'ed ideologies that are part of the corporate culture and the socialising effect and,
on the other, the socialising effect of differential association.

Rationalisations is the third element in Albrecht et al.'s fraud triangle, the other two
being perceived opportunity and pressure. On the basis that generally "there are very

few, if any, people who do not rationalize" (p.46), these authors maintain that "nearly
every fraud involves the element of rationalization. Most fraud perpetrators are first

time offenders who would not commit other crimes. Someway, they must rationalise
away the dishonesty of their acts" (p.46). Such rationalizations sometime mean lying to
oneself and sometimes to others (p.47). Albrecht et al. (1995:46) provide the following
list of common rationalisations used by fraud perpetrators:

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

vi.

The organisation owes it to me.
I am only borrowing the money and will pay it back.
Nobody will get hurt,
I deserve more.
It's for a good purpose.

Something has to be sacrificed ~ my integrity or my reputation, (If I don't
embezzle to cover up my inability to pay, people will know I can't meet my
obligations, which will be embarrassing because I am a professional),

It needs to be emphasised at this stage that, as already argued above, that all three

components of the model (opportunity, a crime-prone person with a motive, and
rationalisations) are necessary for fraud to occur.
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4.0

A MODEL OF

FRAUDMDI~TECTION

There has been an increasing amount of published literature on how auditors can
become better at detecting material misstatements, including employee and
management fraud. Fraud detection, of course, does not exist in a vacuum but needs to
be considered in the broad context of audit work and against the backdrop of the
knowledge of why people commit fraud. Having a definition of fraud detection helps
to focus attention on the areas concerned. Albrecht et al. (1995) state that it "includes
tho

steps or actions taken to discover that a',,fraud has been committed"; that "one of the
most difficult tasks is detennining whethevor not a fraud has actually occurred", and
that the "detection of fraud begins by identifYing symptoms, indicators, or red flags
that can be associated with fraud" (p.53). Recognising indicators of fraud is but the first
step in detecting fraud, because the auditor then needs to pursue the indicators
concerned until an unequivoc:il decision can be made as to whether fraud has in fact
been perpetrated. Consequently, the availability of a checklist of red flags, however
exhaustive, is not going to lead to more fraud being discovered than would otherwise
be the case if the red flags are considered in isolation from other relevant infonnation

about fraud risk, and if the auditor is not inquisitive enough to pursue fraud indicators
he/she has recognised.

Chapter 3 discussed different approaches that have been put forward to enable auditors
to better detect fraud. While some of the approaches are very simplistic and do not
warrant serious consideration, others have merits that point to the need of combining
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different apprm1chcs. For example, the pmctical usefulness of a comprehensive list of

red flags is significantly diminished if an auditor has no knowledge of various
deception strategies management can usc as well as counter strategies he/she can usc,

to detect such deceptions. Similarly, complaints by a company's employees, clients or
competitors, can provide the auditor with useful informationltip-offs that can alert

him/her to the possibility that fraud may have been perpetrated.

The model developed in the next section is intended to: (1) bring together the essential
components of a fraud detection strategy and guidance on the relevant tactics; (2)

enhance auditors' ability to detect fraud by incorporating a component based on the
ROP model; and (3) demonstrate how feedback from auditing experience in detecting

fraud utilisine the model can be used to traln auditors in the task, as well as to set up
and update fraud-detection data bases in order to keep up with the inventiveness of

many fraud perpetrators.
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4.1

The model's content

People commit fraud, U•' :refore, lm auditor needs to be aware of existing knowledge
about why people commit fraud if he/she is going to detect it.

"Ibc pattern-

recognition/risk-assessment decision making process that precedes fraud-detection by
an auditor would be incomplete without knowledge about the reasons people commit
fraud. Hence, the ROP model is an essential part of the proposed eclectic fraud
detection model as shown in Figure 2.

The phrase "adequate knowledge of a company's envirorunent where the entity
operates" means the auditor has an understanding of the overall economy and industry
in which the client operates, and a general knowledge of the operations of the client's
business as provided in AUS 304 (AARF, l995c). Information of this kind should be
incorporated into the auditor's overall fraud-risk assessment regarding the business,
industry, major customers, methods of receipts, and procurement methods. Such
knowledge would, for example, draw the auditor's attention to whether it is a high risk
industry or a high risk financial area within the company. The fraud surveys by KPMG
(1996; 1995a; I993a) found that high risk industries are manufacturing and finance and
high risk financial areas are cash, inventory, revenue and expense cycles (see also
Deakin University, 19%, and Loebbecke et al., 1989).

The accounting and internal control symptoms of employee fraud and operational ones
listed by Albrecht et al. (1995:76-11'3) are categorised under:
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Irregularities in source documents. Common fraud symptoms involving source

1.

documents, such as cheques, sales invoices, purchase orders, purchase
requisitions, and rceeiving reports include items such as missing documents,
alterations on documents, duplicate payments, photocopied documents, etc.
ii.

Faulty journal entries. The following arc common journal entry fraud
symptoms: journal entries without documentary support; unexplained
adjustments to receivables, payables, revenues, or expenses; journal entries that
don't balance; journal entries made by individuals who would not nonnally
make such entries; and journal entries made near the ends of accounting
periods.

iii.

inaccuracies in ledgers. Two common fraud symptoms related to ledgers are: a
ledger that doesn't balance and master (control) account balances that do not
equal the sum of the individual customer or vendor balances. The first
symptom is indicative of fraud in which cover-up in the accounting records is
not complete. The second ledger symptom is indicative of manipulation of an
individual customer or vendor's balance without altering the master receivable
or payable account in the ledger.

iv.

Unexplained changes in financial statements such as a disproportionate

increase in debtors when compared to sale.$ growth.
v.

Internal control weaknesses such as: lack of segregation of duties; lack of
physical safeguards; lack of independent checks; lack of proper authorizations;
lack of proper documents and records; overriding existing controls; and an
inadequate accounting system.

vi.

Fraud symptoms involving relationships with other parties include items such
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as significant litigntion, a frequent change in ~olicitors or auditors, a high
turnover of key management positions or board members, etc.

The part of the model dealing with fraud symptoms/indicators,1rcd nags drJ.':ts heavily

'

on the work of Albrecht eta\. (1995). Considering the various fraud-risk information
sources from left to right, we note the importance of the auditor paying particular

attention to information that someone in management, for example: has been/is under
financial pressure; has a criminal record or his professional credentials are otherwise
dubious, or leads an extravagant lifestyle beyond his means. Finally, the auditor

~lmuld

need infJnnation that someone in management exhibits behavioural changes such as

sudden mood swings; is a heavy drinker, a heavy smoker; is on drugs; is unable to
relax; suffers from insomnia; is unable to look people in the eye; is defensive; and
argumentative. Albrecht et al. (1995) describe the "psychological aftermath of crime"
as comprising "guilt > fear > stress > behaviour changes" (p.126). It can be argued,

however, that there are people who do not feel any remorse after committing a crime
(Eysenck, 1977). Information about an individual's employment history and contact
with the criminal justice system can be easily obtained by means of background
checks. Similarly, the auditor's fraud-detection ability will be enhanced by the

company's relationship with its lawyers, auditors, board members, regulators and the
Taxation Department, management, banks and other lenders, related parties and other
companies and, finally, with its vendors or custom<!rs (see Albrecht et al., 1995:104105). Useful intelligence inforrna:ion about a company's relationship with other parties
and the life of its management or employees can sometimes come from tips and
complaints by the company's employees, clients or competitors.
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Albrecht ct al. (1995) discuss fmud symptoms indicative of the following spccilic

types of potential fraud:

i.

Management

fraud

(operation

performance

anomalies,

management

characteristics that indicate possible motives, organisational structure

anomalies, irregularities in relationships with outside partics) 6•
ii.

Employee fraud {accounting anomalies, internal control wealmesses, analytical
anomalies, extravagant lifestyle, unusual behaviour, tips and complaints).

iii.

Investment fraud (e.g., "unreasonable promised rates of return, investments that
do not make snund business sense, pressure to get in early on the investment. .. "
(Albrecht et al., 1995:66).

iv.

Kiting (e.g., signature and maker on kited cheques are often the same, area
abnormalities, i.e., many out-of-area cheques; frequent deposits, cheques, and
balance inquiries, escalating account balance, bank abnonnalities, average
length oftime money is in the account is short)1 •

Authors on fraud detection emphasise the importance of the auditor and other fraud
examiners looking out for, recognising and pursuing further "anomalies" of one kind or
another. One such bnsic "anomaly" is an overly complex organisational structure
which, according to Albrecht et al. "seems to exist without real purpose", but is
intended to "mask financial statement frauds by not allowing auditors and other
6 Sec pp.60·64 in Albrecht cl al. for funllcr de toils.
7 Sec AlbTcChl Cl al. (1995:70).
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outsiders· to undcrst;md that tmnsactions were not at ann's-lcngth unll that suhstantial
amounts of revenue and inwmc were not legitimate" (p.95). Finally, the possible

existence of frnud may be indicated by what Albrtcht ct al. lcnn "analytical fraud

symptoms, i.e., out-of-the-ordinary procedures and relationships that arc implausible"
such as increased revenues with decreased cash flows, increased inventory with

decreased payables, etc,

If we take a look at the fraud detection model we also see that the auditor's endeavours

to detect fraud are more likely to prove fruitful if: he/she has the support of his finn;
the auditor possesses certain attributes and adopts a suitable approach to the task;

addresses inherent risk before control risk which, in tum, should precede detection-risk
assessment (Monroe, Ng, and Woodliff, 1993); and he/she is able to synthesise fraudrisk infonnation from a variety of sources that point to "anomalies". If one or more of
these ingredients are not present, fraud detection is likely to prove an el' , . <! goal for
the auditor. While the proposed model addresses the broad range of infonnation-inputs
into effective fraud detection, it does not claim to guarantee that, using it, an auditor
will detect carefully-concealed frauds. It needs to be pointed out in this context that
while, on the one hand, recognising even one fraud indicator can lead an auditor to

discover fraud, on the other, recognising a number of red flags and pursuing them
extensively may prove a false alarm.

For the proposed fraud detection model to be applied successfully, the auditor i:;
required to process, evaluate critically, and synthesise a significant amount of
infonnation (including infonnation contained in the ROP model) about a client. It is
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the ability to synthesise the infOnnation conccmcd that is essential for the model to
work.

,,

,,,

5.0

CONCLUSION

The interactive model of the aetiology of fraud holds that fraud is generally committed
as a result of a combination of factors, namely, rationalisations, opportunities and
person(s). It is argued that a variety of peOJile commit fraud for a variety of motives

and who the offenders are cannot be attnlmtcd to a random pror.ess. The model sets out
the different ways in which fraud becomes possible when a crime-prone individual
under fmancial pressure or with other motives, perceives at least one opportunity to
commit fraud and the individual has both the knowledge to commit (alone or in

collusion) and conceal the fraud and possesses the neutralising verbalisations that

enable him/her to perceive committing the offence once or repeatedly seem "right".
The need to locate the three sufficient components ofROP in a broader socioeconomic
context is emphasised. Rationalisations constitute the most vital of the three
components that make up the psychological process of infommtion processing and
decision making that precedes an act offraud. By incorporating ideas from the existing
models and expanding on them, and by introducing the concept of crime~pront.ness
drawing on knowledge in ol:t.o:r disciplines, ROP can be said to be a new model with
high usefuhtess potential for anditors.

The need to enhance auditors' fraud detection ability cannot be overemphasised. Audit
··experience alone, however, cannot make auditors fraud-detection experts. The ROP

125
model of the aetiology of fraud is an important part of the eclectic fmud detection
model Jcvc!opcd in this chapter. The model of frautl detection highlights the

importance of having a competent, clhica[]y-mindcd auditor, who is well versed in the
aetiology of fraud, in management deception strategies and counter deception
strategies, and who enjoys the full support of his/her finn as far as fraud detection is
concerned. Moreover, an auditor should have a good overall view of the company's

environment and internal control system, be alert to information about both individuals
within the company who are high risks of potential fraud as well as about the

company's relationship with outside parties and, finally, be aware of and guard against
his/her own unintended biases in carrying out the audit.

Two studies were conducted to test the models developed in this chapter. These
studies are reported in Chapters 5 and 6. The firnt study was concerned with
demographic, modus operandi and criminal justice characteristics of major fraud
offenders prosecuted successfully by the MFG in Melbourne. The firnt study also
aimed to construct a two-component profile of the major fraud offender and to test the
ROP model as well as Loebbeckc ct al.'s (1989) fraud assessment model. The second
study involved a survey of 108 Australian auditors' experience of detecting
irregularities including management and employee fraud. The second study also tested
a nwnber ofhwotheses based on tht: fraud detection model proposed and examined the
applicability ofLocbbecke et al.'s fraud assessment model. The ROP model could not
be tested in the second study as the auditors surveyed (sec Chapter 6) were in no
position to provide adequate data on offenders' crime-proneness and rationalisations.

CIIAI'Tli:.RS
PROFILING MAJOR FRAUD, OFFENDERS PROSECUTED BY Tiff~
POLICE

CHAPTER SUMMARY

After outlining the method of crimina! profiling, attention is focused on the empirical
study of 50 major fraud offenders, the methodology used and the da!a co!!ected. A list
of24 representative case swnmaries is provided before reporting the findings obtained.
Relevant findings are then discussed with reference to the applicability of the ROP
model developed in this thesis and

Loebbecke et al.'s (1989) model of fraud

assessment. Demographic, modus operandi, and criminal justice characteristics of the
offenders are also reported as there are interrelationships between offence, offender,
victim, and criminal justice factors. This chapter goes on to report a profile of major
fraud offenders which comprises a general-level component and another component in
tenns of particular typologies of fraud victimisation.

1.0

INTRODUCTION

An apparently untapped source or knowledge for auditors is to be fOund in official Iiles
on serious fraud offenders prosecuted by specialist police squads like the MFG in
Melbourne or the Serious Fraud Office in London and in New Zealand. Who are these
offenders who commit fraud for or against companies? What motivates their criminal
behaviour? How do they justify doing what they do? Do they stand out in any way? If
so, how can auditors use such infonnation to assist them in detecting fraud? The
criminological research reported in this chapter attempts to provide answers to these
questions.

The film "Silence of the Lambs" popularised one approach to investigating serious
crime known as "criminal profiling". The well-known British expert on criminal
profiling, Professor David Canter, argues, in his 1994 book Criminal Shadows: Inside

the Mind ofa Serial Killer, that a profile is like a silhouette, a shadow, that an offender
leaves behinrl at the scene of the crime. The profiling process developed by the FBI's
Behavioural Science Unit (see Douglas, Ressler, Burgess, and Hartman 1986), also
known as "psychological profiling" as well as by its technical tenn "criminal
investigative analysis'', is "an investigative technique by which to identify the major
personality and behavioral characteristics of the offender based upon an analysis of the
crime(s) he or she has committed" (Douglas and Burgess, 1990:1). llms, while
profiling does not yield the specific identity of the offender, it points to the kind of
person most likely to have committed the offence{s) (Douglas ct al., 1986).

I
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The concept of ofli:ndcr profiling is based on the argument that "neither a crime nor an
offender is completely unique" (Jackson and Bckcrian, 1997:2). In other words, there
are limits to the number of motives and the methods of carrying out a crime -there arc

always patterns to be identified and to be compared with those in other cases (p.2). In
view of the fact that fraud often involves serial offenders, offender profiling can
provide auditors with useful knowledge to improve their fraud-detection ability.
Profiling "can be based on clinical experience, research and statistical analysis of

offender databases" (Jackson and Bekerian, 1997:3).

1.1

The profiling process

According to two FBI special agents Douglas and Burgess {1990) who have
contributed to the development of criminal profiling, the technique is a viable

investigative tool against violent crime. Criminal profiles draw on demographic and
police data on particular categories of offenders and interviews with known offenders.
According to Douglas and Burgess (1990:1), the process by which a criminal profile of
a violent offender is constructed, generally involves the following seven steps:

;,
.,,ii.

'~Hi.

~~>~~
vi.

vii.

i

evaluation of the criminal act itself;
comprehensive evaluation of the specifics of the crime scene(s);
comprehensive analysis of the victim;
evaluation of preliminary police reports;
evaluation of the medical examiners' autopsy protocol;
development of profile with critical offender characteristics; and
investigative suggestions predicated on construction of the profile (p.l).
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In order to develop a psychologicul profile of a serious criminal it i.> csst."'ltialthatlhc
crime scene be carefully studied. In the case of mujor fmud, the crime scene may he
someonc's ollice, one or more computers used by the offender and the system of"
internal controls. The weapon used by a fraud offender is his/her deception strategy
, and tactics. Turco (1990) emphasises the importance of being able to utilise

''

\'hemogmphic material based on population studies of known perpetrators of particular
crimes when it comes to constructing a profile. In the case of major fraud, such data
could include the type and style of deception used, the relationship between the
offender, the victim(s) and the method(s) used to conceal the offence(s). The offender's
motive(s) is an integral piece in this crimlnal jigsaw puzzle.

Criminal profiling (personality assessment) has been used to narrow the field and thus
assist police in: managing hostage negotiations, identifying anonymous letter writers
and individuals who have made oral or written threats of violence, investigating single
and serial cases of arson, rape, and sexual homicide (Douglas and Burgess, 1990).
Profiling has also been used with serious obsessive-compulsive offenders, including
exhibitionists and kleptomaniacs (Reese, 1979- cited in Blau, 1994). Finally, in an
unusual proactive aPPlication of profiling, Hagaman, Wells, Blau and Wells (1987)
developed a family homicide profiie that could be used to predict such an event and
possibly prevent the homicide. Proactive profiling has not been used with fraud.

According to Copestake (1994:171 criminal pro filers like Canter maintain that in order
to understand and predict crime one needs to look for clues in the lives of individual
offenders, in the "shadows" they leave behind. In order to understand the individual

nn
o!Tcndcr and their crime, one needs

\(l

assess the "distorted story about lili: each

o!Tcndcr tells him/hcrsclt". "Distorted stories about li/C" refer to ofli.:ndcrs'
rationalisations that help them to: (I) justify their criminal behaviour to themselves and
reduce, if not remove completely, any sense of guilt; and (2) resolve any discrepancy
between, on the one hand, viewing themselves as successful and "respectable"
citizens/professionals and, on the other, the knowledge that they are committing
crimes.

Turco (1990: 148) points out two limitations of profiles based on such data. First, an
accurate prediction before the arrest of the subject is not possible since a large number
of people fit the demographic characteristics of the profile but do not commit the crime
in question. Second, there is no real theoretical basis for the profiles. Turcc does admit,
however, that such profiles allow organisation of material collected by police
investigators. A theoretical basis is provided for the profile of fraud offenders put
forward below.

According to investigative profilers at the FBI Behavioural Science Unit, profiling has
been used by law enforcement in the U.S. "with success in many areas... " (Douglas and
Burgess, 1990:1). Tetem (1989 - cited in Blau 1994} reviewed 193 cases where
profiling was done and found that 45% of the cases, had been resolved. Of more
interest, perhaps, is Tetem's finding that in 17% the accuracy of the profile was such ~s
to identifY the suspect. Tetem also reported that in 77% of the cases the profile had

been of significant help to the investigation. B1au (1994) concluded his discussion of
the usefulness of criminal profiling stating that it is a potentially useful tool.

nt
Of course. some of the dcmogruphic attributes of fmud offenders (e.g., age and
educational status) are obvious. This is due to the time and qualifications nonnally
required to ucquire a position of finEUJciul trust in a corpomtion where one cun effect
major fmud.

Utilising data from police prosecution files on major fraud offenders, the study
reported in this chapter attempts to:

i.

collect and analyse demographic, modus operandi and criminal justice data;

ii.

identify clues to the fraud~ in the lives of the offenders and in the
rationalisations they tell themselves and to the police investigators;

iii.

construct a two-component profile of offenders consisting of: (l) at a general
level, demographic characteristics; and (2) a classification in terms of offender
typologies;

iv.

compare fraud indicators in the ROP model and Loebbecke et al.'s (1989) fraud
assessment model with those identified in the Major Fraud Group of the
Victoria Police (MFG) eases;

v.

investigate Loebbecke et al.'s argument that all three of their model's

components must b!! present for fraud to take place;
vi.

test Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) premises in their general theory of crime
that: (a) white-collar offenders (like the major fraud offenders studied) do not
specialise in one type of crime, but are versatile; and (b) that a person's selfcontrol in interaction with criminal opportunity, is the major cause of crime;

ond

1.12

vii.

examine the validity of the eight assumptions underlying the ROP mode! of
fraud correlates.

Drawing on the existing empirical literature, the study reported in this chapter
investigates whether the following seven propositions are applicable to the serious
fraud offenders examined as well as the validity of one prediction of the ROP model
and one of the Loebbecke et al. (1989) model of fraud risk assessment:

i.

the probability of fraud occurring is a function of opportunity, a motivated
crime prone individual and rationalisations;

ii.

a serious fraud offender will tend to have weak self.control, be egocentric and
indifferent to the consequences ofhi~/h;o:: behaviour;

iii.

some of their motives for committing the offence are such as to distinguish
them from common offenders (i.e., persons perpetrating major index crimes
other than fraud). More specifically, unlike common offenders like burglars or
armed robbers, their motives will include greed, revenge and committing frnud
as a challenge, i.e., in order to beat the system.

iv.

they generally utilise techniques of neutralisation to reduce their status

'

incongruenr..e that arises out of their offending (Matza, 1969);
,_"c_-

j\V•

the majority are first offtnders (Cressey, 1986);

·-·/

.i.

there are identifiable clues to the crimes perpetrated in the lives of such
offenders;

vii.

a criminal profile of such offenders is possible;

viii.

that, generally, Pr(Fraud)= JtR,O,P); and

IT\

' . , ix.

according to Loebbeckc ct a\. I'(MI) = f(C,M,A), However ifthc hypothesis
that fraud is possible with two components, is borne out by the findings, it wi!l
cast doubt on Loebbecke ct al.'s (1989) fhtud risk assessment model by
falsifying its basic premise that all three conditions must be present for a
material irregularity to occur.

The seven propositions and the two predictions listed above were tested in a study of
50 major fraud cases prosecuted by the Major Fraud Group of the Victoria Police.

2,0

A CASE STUDY APPROACH OF 50 MAJOR FRAUD CASES IN
VICTORIA

2.1

Methodological considerations

2.1.1

Why study MFG records?

The MFG is the largest of the crime squads within the Victoria Police. The MFG was
selected for two reasons:

i.

Access was granted by the Victoria Police to MFG records.

ii.

There are a large number of cases processed by the MFG, a relatively quick
turnover of cases, and a high conviction rate of offenders. The basis for this
expectation was the fact the MFG comprises teams of investigators from
different

specialist fields

(detectives,

accountants,

lawyers,

computer

specialists, and criminal intelligence analysts), the specialist function of the
MFG and its length of expertise and resources.

1:\4

According to the then Ollicer-in·Chargc of the MFO, Commander Allen Bowles, the
criteria !Or the MFG to take on a fmud investigation arc: instruction by the Assistant
Police Commissioner for Crime to undertake a particular fmud investigation; the
complexity of a fraud being such as to be impossible for divisional detectives to
investigate; and/or evidence of corruption by public officials. The study was
commenced at the beginning of 1995 once approval was granted by the Victoria Police
and it took 10 months to complete.

When a criminal prosecution case file is created by the MFG it contains the following
information:

i.

details of the charge (the charge, under what law the suspect has been charged,
whether it is a summary or an indictable offence, whether there arc more
charges);

ii.

the person charged;

iii.

details of the offence (statement to the police by the accused and other parties
interviewed by the police in investigating the matter, and the police record of
the interview(s) with the suspect{s)); and

iv.

when a defendant is sentenced

by a court {the date(s) of the trial, the date of

sentencing, the identity of the court and of the judge concerned,, the
presentment (i.e., how many counts of a particular charge), type of plea and
details of the sentence{s) imposed.

During the pcrind January 1990- October 1994 the MFG investigated 196 fraud
matters. It is not possible to be 100% accurate about how many cases arc investigated
by the group annually since investigations are a continuing exercise and the group
only recently attempted to computcrisc

it~

ht~S

records and create a comprehensive

database. At the time of writing, a national database was in the process of being
created. The 196 cases were listed by occupation of the offender (see Table 1).
Occupation was used because the study was concerned with financial fraud by people
in positions of financial trust. To have used instead the type of fraud committed would

have meant including cases such as social security fraud, medical fraud and credit card
fraud which were outside the scope of the research.

Occupation of Offenders in the Population

Table 1:
Number of
offences

...,

%of
offences

Occupation of Offender

76

38.7

other (chefs, gardeners, cleaners, clerks,
salesmen, receptionists)

29

14.8

unemployed, pensioners, prisoners,
students

22

11.2

20

10.2

19

9.7

IS

7.6

8

4.0

4

2.0

3

1.5

..
....
....
..

management, finance consultants, bank
managers
company directors
lawyers
accountants and bookkeepers
bank tellers
brokers, gold dealers
other professionals (doctors, engineers)

Occupational categories included iri the cases studied
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2.1.2

Selection of major fmud cases

ln view of the study's focus on major fraud commiucd by people in positions of
financial trust, a case was selected for inclusion in the study on the basis of three
criteria:

i.

it had been processed by the court and the defendant had been sentenced (in
which case infonnation about the offenders would be considered public
knowledge) and the fi!e was accessible;

ii.

it involved one or more of the following convictions for deception (as
opposed to theft):

iii.

a.

obtaining property by deception;

b.

obtaining financial advantage by deception;

c.

forgery and uttering;

d.

false accounting; and/or

e.

deception; and

the offender(s) belonged to such occupational categories as company
directors, lawyers, bank officials, accountants, brokers, share traders and
management which involve financial trust.

In deciding which cases to study from those prosecuted by the police, it was
considered important that the types of frauds and the individuals involved be of the
kinds encountered by auditors. It could be argued, however, that cases of fraudulent
financial reporting (in order to support earning trends, plans for bonus compensation,

n7
proxy ~tlpport li1r n bro,1d rnnbrc of propll.~nb, nr merger und m:quisitions) as opp!~~cd
to framlulcnt financial reporting to conceal theft of assets, should be preferred
because that is where auditors are at a greater legal risk and where financial
statements arc most likely to contain material misstatements. On the other hand,
frauds involving theli of assets or misappropriation of a%ets arc what the majority of
auditors in Australia are most likely to encounter in their work and there have been
eases agninst auditors for failing to detect them. Supp0rt for the types of fraud cases
studied was provided by the survey of Australian aUl!itors' experience with fraud
detection (see next chapter) which found that a minority of the respondents had
1

encountered a fraudulent financial reporting case as opposed to theft cover up.

Selecting cases processed by the court is justified on the basis that if someone has
been convicted of a crime it is accepted as evidence that they committed the act in
question. The alternative of using cases of individuals investigated and charged with
deception offences by the police was decided against for the fol!owing reasons: (I) a
person is considered innocent until proven guilty; (2) the charge(s) of which
someone is/are convicted by a court or pleads guilty to after being charged is/are
sometimes different from the original charge; (3) if a trial is pending, the police
would be reluctant to allow access to information about a case as the infonnation
only becomes public when considered during the trial which results in conviction;

I According to SAS 82 (AICPA,1997, parn.4) "fraudulent finMtial reporting refers to intentional
or omissions ofnrnounts or disclosures in finMcial statements. Frnudulcnt fimmci~l reporting
may Involve acts such as the following: (a) mMipulation, falsification, or nltcrotion of accounting records or
supporting documents from which fimmcial statements an: prepared; (b) misreprcsenllltion in, or intention•!
omission from, the financial statements of events, transactions, or other significnnt infolll!ntion; 1111d (c)
intentional misnpplicntiou of accounting principle> relating to wnonnts, clnssifiCIItion, mrumcr or prcsenllltion,
or disclosure."
rnissll!lcmen~
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and (4) vitnl information about the respon~e of the criminal justice system to such
convicted offenders (e.g., the penological approach to sentencing, the type und k:ngth
of tbe sentence) becomes available only if a person is found guilty und is sentenced
or pleads guilty and is sentenced.

As in Benson and Moore (1992) and Wcisburd et al. (1990),

:m offence-based

definition was used to select cases, thus making it possible to compare results.
Application of the three criteria resulted in a final list of 50 cases of fraud. The final
list of cases was obtained as foilows. Drawing on the computerised records of the
MFG, at the end of October 1994 there were 196 briefs for fraud matters since
January 1990 where the occupation of the accused/defendant was given. Of those,
the investigation was completed (i.e., there was a completed brief available) for 99

cases. Thirty-seven matters involved occupations that were either beyond the scope
of the research or where the cases should have been included but were not because it
proved impossible to locate the files. Cases that were excluded involved social
security fraud by, for example, an unemployed prostitute, two unemployed
professional punters as well as 13 unemployed persons, four prisoners and two oldage pensioners convicted of social security fraud. A number of doctors involved in
medicare fraud, a concreter who falsified invoices, 1md a housewife who collected
large amounts of money for fictitious charity causes should have been included but
were not because it proved impossible to locate their files. Four additional cases
were also not included; they involved two cases where the police investigation
concluded there was "no case", and two others which had been prosecuted and been
dismissed by the court at first hearing because no prima facie case was established

by th6 pro:-.x:cution against the acctl<>ed.
I!

1!

Like Langdale (1990), a number of difficulties were expcriinccd in gelling hold of
the brief's.

Once commencement of the search of the briefs began, it became

apparent that all completed pre· 1993 briefs had been destroyed due to Jack of storage
space and some of the post-1993 cases were net located at the Major Fraud Group's
offices but at other Metropolitan police squads or stations anr.! some in country
stations1 • Hence, it took a Jot more resources and time than anticipated to locate,
arrange access, and code the data for analysis.

It proved impossible to access a total of eight files also relating to fraud by persons
in positions of financial trust. Three of the files were located at country police
stations a fair distance from Melbourne and the detectives responsible for them
proved impossible to meet with due to their being on leave and/or allending court for
other cases and/or attending training courses. The other five additional cases were
not included in the study because (even though the offenders had been convicted and
sentenced) they were the subject of an appeal to a higher court against conviction or
sentence imposed and case infonnation could not be made available to the author at
that stage in the legal proceedings. Those eight cases identified as relevant to the
study but not included were not different from the 50 that were studied because they,
too, involved deception offences by person~ in positions of financial trust. In other

2 It is the prncticc at the MFG that dctectlvcs working on nn ongoing investigation who arc transferred
from !he MFG to other stations are llllpected to take the brief with them nnd to follow the case through to
its completion.
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words, no systcmntic bias existed in those eight

case~.

It was not considered necessary, as in Langdale ( 1990), to attend court hearings since

the briefs had all the details required about the case and the offender. Unlike
Langdale, the present study was not designed to look at "legal difficulties in alleged
business fraud, the loss and hardship it may or may not cause, the offender's
perspective and

cons~;;quential

media report" (p.l7). In addition, as Langdale

discovered, "the length of each brief was considerable and the fixed court date not
less than eight weeks" (p.17), factors that made it impossible for the research to
focus on additional aspects of fraud trials in view of the constraints on time and
resources available to the researcher. The amount of money involved in a fraud case
varied from $17,173 to $108,580,000 with the mean average dollar loss to the
victim(s) per case being approximately $4.4 million. While the cases studied cannot
be said to be representative of serious fraud cases investigated by the MFG in
general, they can be said to be representative of major management fraud
investigated by the MFG (e.g., misappropriation of trust accounts money, false
valuations, false loans, stealing customers' money) and prosecuted by the Director of
Public Prosecutions in Victoria.

Unstructured interviews were also conducted with MFG detectives to supplement the
data on offenders available in the MFG briefs. The data were collected for the
purpose of generating a taxonomy (i.e., a list of typologies) of such offenders. A total
of 13 interviews were carried out with detectives who headed particular
investigations and were responsible for preparing the prosecution brief,
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The types of fraud involved in the fifty MFO cases used in this study arc shown
below in Table 2.

Table2:

Types of Fraud in the MFG Cases
Types of Fraud

Number of

%of

Cases

cases

Financial statement manipulation and theft of
assets

23

46

Trust account fraud

14

28

Theft of assets

II

22

Financial statement manipulation

I

2

Financial statement manipulation and trust

I

2

50

100

account fraud

Total

2.2

Data collection and coding

For the purposes of the study, following lengthy discussions about fraud offenders
with three experienced senior members of the Major Fraud Group !)'vtFG) of the

Victoria Police, a pilot qualitative case study (N='6) was canied out to familiarise the

author with the content of the police files and to enable a coding guide to be

constructed3• Subsequently. major fraud cases investigated and successfully
prosecuted by the MFG were studied and data coded for quantitative analysis. The

3 A coding guide was prepared beforehnnd to cn~ble the rcscru:chcr to identify key ru:cas for statistical
analysis of the data. The researcher followed two approaches: (I) once the brief was read, the case wru
given a number and, in order to guarantee wnfidcntiality, the case was also summru:ised anonymously; nnd
(2) the facts of each cas~ were coded for nnolysis.
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coding guide cn[lblcd the coding of data pertaining to 27 variables largely lfom the
literature revie\V (sec Chapter 2 and Appendix JJJ). Data was also eol!ected to test the
OJ;~POrtunity

and person compooents of the ROP model. Qualitative data on

offenders' rationalisations were also collected.

The following arc the main demographic and criminal justice characteristics for
which data were collected a..11d coded and the rationale for their inclusion: offender's
gender, marital status, age, occupation, criminal record, type and number of frauds
committed and other non-fraud offences, under what legislation (state or federal) the
offender was charged, number of victims, relationship with the victims, number of
accomplices, how the fraud was discovered, motivation, whether the offender was
specialist or versatile, pre-trial status, type of legal representation, court of first
instance, severity of sentence, amount of money involved in the fraud(s), type of
irregularity committed, and whether fraud indicators were present. Two additional
variables, ethnicity of the offender and the length oftime it took police to prosecute a
case, were dropped from the analysis because the former was difficult to detennine
reliably and the latter because it was decided not to address the issue of MFG
efficiency and effectiveness.

The variables were chosen because they had been identified as relevant to the
aetiology of fraud in the discussion of the empirical literature and/or because they
form part of the ROP model. Additional variables relating to processing of the cases
by the courts were dropped at the data-analysis stage following a decision to focus
more on fraud.
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i.

Gender

Goltfrcdson and Hirschi (1990); Ross (1977); Wheeler ct a!. (1988, 1982); and
Weisburd et al. (I 990) discuss males a~ offenders of whitc-eollar crime. Whcelt:r ct
nl. (I 988) argued that women offenders are under-represented among the highest tier
ofwhite~collar

offenders, such as antitrust and securities fraud, because they occupy

relevant organisational positions in lesser numbers than males. The Wheeler et al.
(1988) sample was drawn from 1976-1978 records. Nowadays, however, women
have higher educational achievements and are more likely to choose a professional
career. As mentioned earlier, it has been claimed that women commit fraud for
different reasons than men, Zietz (1981) reported that women who committed white·
collar crime were more likely to do so due to family needs than to fund high living,
unlike their male counterparts. However, limitations of the Zietz study (discussed in
Chapter 2) mean that we crumot accept unquestioningly her conclusion that women's
criminality is motivated by family needs more than men's. Zietz (1981) was also
testing Pollak {1950) and Reckless' (1961) findings that female crime has
traditionally been underestimated in criminology (Pollak, 1950:161) as well as the
claim that female crime is due to women being "more deceitful than men" (Reckless,
1961:8). Reckless argued that women belong to a "special order of criminal
behaviour" (p.78) and findings should not be generalised. Gender differences in
criminal behaviour have also been proposed by Barnes and Teeters, (1959:62) who
stated that there is a group of women who are "calculating, fascinating and
intelligent, who capitalise on their chann and femininity", However, the question of
whether women white-collar offenders nrc more deceitful than their male
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counterparts cannot be answered on the basis of existing empirical evidence'.

Gender was not used us a dctcnnining factor when the sample of cases wus selected
by the present author. Finally, on tho:: basis of the existing litt:raturc, there is no
reason why the ROP model should distinguish between male and female fraud

offenders.

ii.

Marital status

While neither Wheeler et al. (1988) nor Weisburd et a!. (1990) investigated the
marital status of the white-collar crime offenders, Ross (1977:32) wrote that the

white-collar crime perpetmtor is not anti-social and "is likely to keep his marriage
vows, pay his debts, mixes well, stands by his friends, he is ready to protect maidens,

or help poor widows". However, the study of female prison inmates by Zietz
(1981: I 04) found that "all of the women in this group had one or more unsuccessful
marriages and were currently living alone, with or without children, or with their
parents". Marital status, as an indication of a defendant's social tics, is a legallyrelevant factor at the sentencing stage (Thomas, 1979), and may be useful in
understanding offenders' motives and rationalisations. Both financial and non financial pressures for someone to commit fraud can be related to their marital status.

4 Gender is n foetor that is tnken intD nccount by the judiciary in imposing sentences Dn convicted crimin~l
dcfcndnnts (ThomiL'I, 1979). Discussion of the issue ofscxism in sentencing Is beyond the scope ofthisthcsis.

iii.

Age

In contrast to the majority of convcntional/strct:l offenders who lend to be aged
under 18 (Feldman, 1993), the average white-collar offender in Wheeler et al.

(19~ll)

and Weisburd et al. (1990) was 40 years old. The average age for street criminals in
Weisburd et al. was 20 to 30 years. Weisburd et al. (1990) also reported that whitecollar offenders are likely to begin their careers later than street criminals.
Undoubtedly, there is a link between age and white collar offending, since by the
time one completes one's tertiary education and obtains sufficient professional
qualifications and experience to command a highly paid position of financial trust
such as accountant, solicitor, or bank-manager, one would be at least 30 years old.
There is, however, scope for age differences between different major fraud offenders.
Interestingly, as far as female inmates serving sentences for fraud are concerned,
Zietz (1981:114) found that "age did not appear to be a significant factor, although
the majority were less than 30 years of age".

iv.

Occupation

Wheeler et al. (1988) compared convicted white-collar and common crime offenders

on a variety of social and demographic indicators. As would be expected, they found

that white-collar offenders had a higher educational attainment than street offenders,
and had histories of steady employment. Coleman (1987) believes that white-collar
offenders use their occupation as an opportunity, but Spark (1994) goes a step further
and argues that in addition to using one's job, if there is a complicated group
structure or financial dictatorship then that is an added opportunity.

'"
v.

I1r:md ch:1rgcs :md other non-fraud offences

Kom and McCorkle ( 1959) pointed out that "the earliest and still the most common
way of classifying criminals is in terms of the legal title identifying the criminal act"
(p.l42). The categories of fraud charges used most frequently by the MFG were:
a.

obtaining property by deception;

b.

obtaining financial advantage by deception;

c.

theft; and

d.

forgery.

One of the issues in the literature concerns the question of whether white-collar
offenders are specialists or genemlists (like street offenders) in the types of crimes

they commit. Using official New Zealand data, Thomas (1992) reported that many
fraud offenders reoffend; more specifically, 34.1% were later reconvicted for the

same offence, and 68.2% reconvicted for fraud or any other crime (p.l25). Benson
and Moore (1992) concluded that white-collar offenders were a lot less involved in
crime than street offenders. White-collar offenders were reported by Wheeler eta!.
(1988) as having a surprisingly high number of prior arrests and convictions, but
were still lower in that regard than common criminals. Weisburd et al. (1990) found
that more than one in seven securities fraud offenders had a prior felony conviction,
as did more than a quarter of those convicted of credit fraud, false claims, and mail
fraud. Even with the more elite population of white-collar offenders such as doctors,
lawyers, accountants, office managers and owners of substantial capital, there was
evidence "of criminal careers ... within a highly restricted population of elite whitecollar offenders" (p.347). They reported that a nontrivial "proportion of white-collar

147

offenders were !Ound to be repeat offenders and some had serious and lengthy

criminal records" (p.343). The same authors suggest that white-collar ofTcndcrs do
not specialise in white-collar crime.

vi.

Relationship to the victim

The offender-victim relationship is of importance as far as both patterns in criminal
behaviour and implications for its detection and prevention arc concerned. It is also
significant in sentencing because the violation of trust (a basic feature of many

deception white-collar crimes) is an aggravating factor {Thomas, 1979). Regarding
the type of victim, Wheeler et al. (1988:338) claimed that "common crimes victimise
individuals.

In contrast, the majority of federal white collar offences involves

victimisation of organisations ... they are also likely to use an organisational fonn for
their commission".

vii.

Number of accomplices

For some deception offences to take place, more than one offender is needed because
of a need for collusion. An example might be a bank manager and a real-estate agent
operating a deception ploy, whereby the bank manager approves housing loans for
properties he/she knows have been overvalued and is paid secret commissions by the
real estate agent. Furthennore, an important question of interest to both police,
detectives and the judiciary is whether an offender has been operating alone to
commit a fraud or with accomplices, At the sentencing stage, hrwing accomplices is
an aggravating factor as it often points to more planning being involved (Thomas,
1979). Wheeler eta!. (1988), the only researcher in this area to have looked at this

14R

variable, found thut "only about nineteen percent of the common crimes involve Jive

'
or more person<; in addition to the defendant, while more than one-third of the white
collar of!Cnces have as many participants" (p.J39). It should be noted here, that any
of the categories listed under "motives" in the ROP model could involve an offender
with or without accomplices.

viii.

How the fraud was discovered

Fraud is often carefully concealed and it would be of interest to know how it comes

to light (e.g., who becomes suspicious and reports the matter to the police or
someone else). Infonnation about this variable was also considered in order to gauge
the apparent involvement of auditors in fraud detection.

ix.

Motivation

One of the essential components of the proposed ROP model is a crime-prone person
with a motive for committing fraud. Offenders commit their crimes for many and

various reasons. Business failures, drug addiction, gambling and particular lifestyles
needing large amounts of money are important factors in understanding why
someone might commit fraud. Other possible motivations might be revenge, greed

and megalomania. Cressey (1986,1980) discounted gambling, alcohol or spending
beyond one's means as causes of embezzlement, and reported that one of the
offenders studied was willing to do anything to give his wife and children what they
needed. For Cressey, "ascribing bad motives to behaviour docs not explain that
behaviour" ( 1980:121 ). According to Thomas (1992: 125), family needs is more of an
acceptable justification coming from women rather than men. As criminologists arc

not tired of telling us, drug addiction is·a major cause of various criminalnffcnccs in
society. Benson and Moore (1992:263-264) indirectly tested for this variah!c and
found that "neither white-collar nor common offenders are likely to have drinking
problcms ...only 6% of white-collar criminals are reported to have used illegal drugs,
compared to almost

half of the

common criminals".

Knowledge

about

vice(s)/motivation(s) of an offender helps to construct the offender profile and to
develop a model to explain the ;·~asons why major fraud is committed. Some of the
vices identified for testing were: gambling, drugs, greed, to pay penonal bills, to pay
business bills, and lifestyle (e.g., leading a double life or othetwisc living beyond
one's means in order to maintain a particular self-image).

x.

Pre-trial status of the offed.der

The decision to grant a defendant bail or remand them in custody indicates how the
courts view a defendant (i.e., whether they pose a serious risk they may abscond, or
whether they will commit another serious crime), a factor that can be expected to
impact on sentence choice and severity.

xi.

Legally represented by a private lawyer or by a court-appointed lawyer

This is to identify if the offender had the resources available to finance his/her legal
defence.

!:=ill

xii.

Scn·rity of sentence

A lot has been \VTiltcn about white collar-crime offenders not receiving a fair

punishment tOr their crime. Bologntl ( 1993) claims tht~t U.S. fraud oflCnders believe
that "if you are going to be a financial crook be a big onc... [since] the greater the
offence t~gainst the ct~pital, the less the punishment imposed by the sentencing judge"
(p.7). information about the type and severity of sentence imposed was collected
because it is relevant to a discussion of deterrence theory . The severity of the
sentence is looked at where applicable.

xiii.

Amount of money involved in the fraud

Information on this factor was collected in order to throw some light on sentencing
decisions, as it largely determines perceptions of hann done, i.e., perceptions of
offence seriousness. Furthermore, it could be argued that the greater the money
involved, the better the position the offender is in to bargain his plea with the police,
who might be also interested in recovering some of the money involved in a spate of
deception offences, so that the victims can recover some of their losses. Finally, that
victims have recovered part or the total of their financial losses is a mitigating factor
that the judiciary would normally take into account (Thomas, 1979). Information
about this variable would also be useful

in gauging the scale of the frauds

investigated by the MFG.

xiv.

Type of irregularity

As already mentioned above, one of the aims of the research is to test Locbbeckc et
al.'s fraud risk assessment model which differentiates between "defalcation" and

lSI

"mmmgemcnt fraud". Information on this !Uctor was also collected bccuuse dilfcrcnt
types of irregularities have different implications for auditors, as !Ur as their duty to
detect and report such illegal acts is concerned.

xv.

Fraud-facilitating conditions (i.e., fraud indicators)

Information was collcctect on this factor because of its potential importance

~or

auditors. In addition, "conditions" is one of the components of the ROP model (0)
and ofLoebbecke et al.'s (1989) model being tested by this research.

xvi.

Ratiomliisations

Possessing rationalisations (i.e., neutralising verbalisations) is a necessary
component for fraud to take place.

As Cressey {1986) pointed out, it is an

individual's ability to rationalise and justifY perpetrating the offence(s) that makes
fraud possible. Qualitative data about the offenders' rationalisations was extracted
from sworn written statements made to the MFG detectives investigating.

3.0

THE MFG CASES USED IN THIS STUDY

Representative case summaries nre provided below, with the ROP model
components present being indicated, in order to provide the reader with an idea of
the type of r.nses studied. Cases where the facts are similar arc not repeated. Due to a
confidentiality agreement signed by the author, the cases crc presented without any
identifYing details about the offender or the victhn(s). The decision whether an
·.~ffender had certain characteristics e.g., low self-control and his/her type of
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motivation (e.g.,, greed) was arrived at allcr careful examination of all the
information in the MFG tile.

Case one involved a fraud of $1,785,000 committed by a member of middle
management in a finance company. The male offender had sole responsibility over
computer assets, recording, and investments at a time when the company's bank lost
the original authorised signature card with a specimen of the two signatories (Person
and Opportunity). He was t:ngaged to get married and needed money (Motive:

financial problem). Exploiting his company's weak internal controls, he submitted
one card with one signatory only. He redeemed clients' Commercial Bills without
their eonst:nt, paid them the interest due and paid the remainder into his personal
account. He used the money to buy a house and a car for himself and his fiancee.
After his first "success" he became both over-confident and more greedy and
proceeded to commit more frauds. He justified the frauds on the basis that he would
one day pay it back (Rationalisation). Realising he would not be able to pay back the
money after all, one day he left his fiancee a note admitting having defrauded his
company. She, in tum, infonned the police.

The second case was for $1,600,000. The offender, was a director who was an
undischarged bankrupt and a career conman (Person) who without adequate
screeniilg of applicants for management positions deceived his two co-directors into
signing blank cheques (Opportunity). He opened eight bank accounts in the names of
each of the other directors with overdraft facilities of $200,000. He then debited each
account with $200,000 and credited his own account with that sum of money. As far

1:"i.l

as he was conecmed, he was entitled to whatever money he could gel
(Rationalisation). A fellow co-director suspected the fraud and the police were called

in.

The third case involved a female accountant who committed n [mud of $2,300,000.
She banked a client's bank cheque into the practice's trust account.

The bank

incorrectly credited the account with three zeros too many (Opporfllnily). Once the
offender became aware of this, seeing no reason why she should not appropriate the
money for herself and perceiving a low risk of being prosecuted (she felt that the
bank did not really need the money- Rationalisation), the account was debited and
the money sent off to various friends and the offender's spouse. The bank soon
realised a mistake had been made and contacted the offender. She claimed that she
had assumed the money had come from an inheritance she had been expecting.

Case four was for $174,211. A 30-ycar old single male finance manager, with low
self-control needed money to pay university fees for his brother as well as to help his
sister who was living overseas (Motivated crime-prone person). He was responsible
for investing $1.5 million to maintain a minimum working capital. He exploited the

company's weak internal controls (Opportunity) to falsifY payment vouchers and to
appropriate the money from his employer's bank account. He justified defrauding
his employer on the grounds L~at "nobody would get hurt" (Rationalisation). He was
found out by the external auditor.

Case five involved a fraud of $345,000. Perceiving a low risk of being apprehended
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(Opportunity), a crime-prone 40-year old married male solicitor (Person} deceived

17 clients (from convcyancin~ and divorce cltscs) into investing money in u company
supposedly !Or better returns. l-Ie did not inlbrm his clients that he owncd the
company concerned. He then misappropriated the invcstmcnls. He covered up the
frauds by making it appear that the clients had loaned their money to him. His
justification was that he had the clients' authority since there were only "technical
deficiencies" in their trust accounts' (Rationalisation). He was found out when a
client died and the beneficiaries asked for their money held in the trust account,

Case six involved a fraud of $1,381,304. The offender was a 37-year old male
solicitor who had a serious financial problem because he could not meet interest
payments on a loan he had taken out to build a medical clinic (Person with a motive).
Since he had access to his clients' land titles and their money in his trust accounts
and in the absence of capable guardians (Opporl!lnity), he raised the money he so
urgently needed via false accounting. He rationalised the frauds in terms of "merely
borrowing money" from clients with the intention of paying them back later when
his investments would yield a significant profit (Rationalisation). He was found out
when a client insisted on withdrawing his money from the trust account.

Case seven concerned a fraud of $280,000. A 40-year old opportunist married male
solicitor, (Person) had access to clients' trust accounts and perceived a low risk of
being found out if he committed fraud against his clients (Opporlrlnity). He invested
his clients' monies under an alias and used some of the money to purch11sc pcrsonll!
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property. He justified the fmmls on the grounds that he was "only borrowing money
from clients" and intended to pay the money back into their accounts at a later stage
(Rationalisation). He was found out when a client asked for the money in her trust
account, became suspicious and contacted the Law Institute.

Case eight was for $886,769. In this case the offender a 50-year old consultant
accountant, a professional conman who in the past had used three different aliases
and was a compulsive gambler and a liar, purported to be a qualified accountant
(Person with a motive). He was employed by a company (with weak internal controls
to prevent fraud) as a consultant and was entrusted to requisition cheques as required
(Opportunily). The offender would write up requisition forms, attach supporting
documentation and write up the cheque details in erasable ink. Once the cheques
were signed he would alter the payee and amount. The changes made were not
obvious on the cheque. He forged a total of 341 cheques thinking of himself as a
professional fraudster who was entitled to whatever he could get away with
(Rationalisation). He was found out by an auditor.

Case nine was for $100,327. This fraud was committed by a 42-year old male bank
manager who perceived a low risk of being found out and being greedy for money
(Person with a motive) took advantage of weak internal controls (Opportunity). He

approved unsecured loans to two business partners above and beyond what he was
authorised by the bank to approve. They had promised him a senior position in their
company in the near future as well as a financial reward in rctum for his "services" to
them. To cover up the unsecured loans, he also approved loans to fictitious
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customers. 'l11c money was paid into a number of account~ opened under assumed
names. There was a need to avoid the excessive unsecured loans from being included

by the bank's computerised internal control system on a list of loans that
management would review regularly. That he did by using money from the fictitious
accounts to reduce the balance of the unsecured loans. As far as he was concerned,
what he was doing was justified as a means to an end (Rationalisation). He was
found out by the bank's auditors.

Case 10 involved a fraud of $136,161 which was committed by a member of middle
management, a 40-yenr old married male. He was a compulsive gambler with a
propensity to lie and a financial problem (Crime-prone person with a motive). He

was in charge of accounts payable and had access to the computer system
(Opportunity). He used the lack of segregation of duties to create fictitious

accounts/files. He then made unauthorised alterations or deletions to document
which allowed him to generate seven cheques made payable to himself. He
subsequently negotiated the cheques in his personal account. His justification for
what he did was that he "really needed the money" (Rationalisations).

Case 11, was a $10,860,000 fraud committed by a finance broker. Two credit union
members had taken out a ioan for a business venture, but due to financial difficulties
they could not pay it back. They found an Australi:m living in Asia (a megalomaniac
male, dreamer and schemer who loved "flaunting himself' in the business world as a
high-flier, a motivated crime-prone person) who was willing to buy the business and
re-finance the loans but required in excess of $10 million. The credit union rules,
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however, prohibited such large amounts being loaned to one individual. Exploiting
weak internal controls (Opportuniry), he made 20 fictitious names and addresses and
provided false or overstated properties as security. The purpose for the large amount
being borrowed was to pay off existing loans with other financial institutions. At the
suggestion of the external auditor, an upper manager of the credit union obtained
sworn valuations and discovered that the mortgaged properties were worth only $4
million rather than $14.1 million. He justified the frauds on the basis that they were
necessary for the project to succeed and save the company (Rationalisation).

Case 12, involved a $1,250,000 fraud committed by a 47~year old grandmother
accountant who had been dismissed by her previous employer for committing fraud.
Acting out of greed (Motivated crime-prone person) she exploited weak internal
controls. A lack of segregation of duties allowed her to be both in charge of
personnel records as well as responsible for paying salaries (Opportunity). She
defrauded her employer of the stated amount via fraudulent transactions. Using a
variety of methods to cover up her frauds, she misappropriated cheques issued by her
employer who was a foreign government and had them paid into her own account.
She did this by getting subordinates to sign "pay cash" cheques or by forging
cheques to alter the amount stated to a larger amount and have the difference paid
into her account. She also misappropriated bills (meant to pay employees' salaries)
upon their maturity by adding "or pay cash". She believed she had a very good
chance of getting away with her frauds (Rationolisati011). With a salary of only
$27,000 and employment of 10 odd years the offender managed to own four houses
in her name, buy another two for family members, pay school fees for grandchildren
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and to hold cash deposits of$! million. II is unknown why a number of her assistants
or c\'l.'ll upper management co-operated with her and banked the cheques or even

authorised the alterations. No charges were laid against those people. She wa~ found
out by the bank when she tried to have a bill paid into her own account which had
already been paid. When interviewed by the police, she appeared naive and used the
language barrier as an excuse not to communicate.

Case 13 was a fraud of$1,700,000. In this case, a megalomaniac 42-year old male

solicitor with low self-control (Crime-prone person) needed money to finance his
excessive property investments (Motive). He had access to clients' accounts and was
in charge of making mortgage payments while his wife was in charge of the
disbursement~·

of interest payments (Opportunity). Acting out of greed, he misled

and manipulated the partner in charge of the law firm he worked at to use the term
deposits for his own benefit. He had control over bank accounts and informed the
bank that any transactions (mortgage payments) that were meant to go through that
account

sho~ld

go to his personal account. To cover up his fraudulent activities, he

would transfer money from one of his accollilts to replace the stolen money from the

c1!:~;nts'

accounts. He exploited loose controls and took letters supposedly to deliver

personally to clients, but they never reached their destination. He believed he would
be able to pay back the money one day and that he would not be found out
(Rationalisation). An aged client whose trust account he had misappropriated died

and the beneficiary of the estate asked for the money in the account.

Case 14 was a fraud of $1,063,900. This case involved a 55-year old married male
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bank manager with low self-control (Crime-prone person) who was at liberty to
redeem clients' bills upon maturity (Opporfllnify). Acting out of greed (Motive) and
believing he could avoid being found out (Rationali.l·atirm), he used three
commercinl bills owned by a friend and his associate for personal usc. He paid off
the bills and bought property. To cover up the frauds he transferred money from one
of his accounts to replace the stolen money. The friend who had invested the money
was receiving the interest earned from the bills for nearly a year, but became
suspicious when he decided he wanted to redeem one of the investments and another
bank manager could not determine its existence.

Case 15 involved a fraud of $1,141,104. A 37-year old professional conman,
practising as finance consultant (Crime-prone motivated person). He believed he was
justified in defrauding people because that was his job (Rationalisation). He used II
aliases to open 16 separate bank accounts in three banks and utilised the serviced
offices and business name of some reputable accounting practices around Melbourne
(he created the Opportunity) in order to commit frauds as follows:

i.

He scrutinised share registers to find personal details of large shareholders,
assumed their identity and, using a series of false documents, he changed
address and amended the share register accordingly.

ii.

Following the alteration to the share register, he informed the share registry
that due to the change in address the original share certificate was lost and a
new one was issut:d to him.

iii.

Upon receipt of the duplicate share script, the shares were sold to innocent
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shareholders and he managed to obtain $432,000 which he banked in his
personal account.

He was found out as a result of one company's practice of confirming a "change of
address" with the shareholders. In addition to this fraud, he was charged with
involvement in a fraud in 1990. The details of that fraud are as follows: He used an
alias to negotiate the purchase of two life insurance companies supposedly on behalf
of a U.S. investor. He deceived the bank into drawing cheques in favour of creditors
of the company that sold one of the life insurance companies and had part of the
money paid into various accounts he had opened under a number of false names. He
used $65 million ofthe $150 million funds held by the bank on behalf of one of the
insurance companies to deceive the parent company to settle the deal on the pretext
that the money was from the bank of New York. He then instructed the bank to draw
bank cheques of nearly $10 million payable to a particular company which he
owned. He cashed those cheques and the same month he received the money he
distributed it to various persons. He seemed to have been shifting from state to state
and defrauding innocent people.

Case 16 was a fraud of $17,173. In this case a 38-year old male director and
principal shareholder indifferent to the consequences of his behaviour, had a
financial problem but continued living beyond his means (Crime-prone motivated
person). He used cheques from an account that had been closed by the bank six

months earlier to pay his daughter's school and tuition fees, pay the mechanic, and
go on holidays. His justification was that he was "doing it for the family" and since
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he was able to i~-suc cheques to people who did not question him and his integrity
(Opportunity), he was "entitled to whatever he could get" (Rationa/isatiun). lie was

found out when one of the victims alerted the police.

Case 17 was a $417,500 fraud committed by a director and principal shareholder. A
35-year old single male career conman (Crime-prone motivated person) who had no
need to justify committing fraud to himself (i.e., no need for rationalisation), set up
a corporate hospitality for sporting events to victimise gullible individuals
(Opportunity) by selling sporting entertainment packages to companies in Sydney

and Melbourne. There were four packages organised over one month period which
he sold to a number of companies. He was found out when staff of the relevant
companies arrived for the event and as there were no such tickets they complained.
The offender left the country before the events occurred. He was brought back and
convicted.

Case 18 involved $340,000. This froud was committed by middle management. The
company's fleet cars were to be sold at public auction or traded-in against the
purchase of a new vehicle (Opportunity). The transport office would obtain three
quotations from various dealers and submit a requisition for a new vehicle. In
collusion and acting out of greed, three single male employees in their 30's and of
low self-control (Crime-prone persons) authorised documentation, drew and signed
cheques, advertised and sold the trade-ins to family members or innocent purchasers.
New vehicles were purchased for family members but paid for by the company.
Their justification was that "nobody would get hurt" by the frauds (Rationalisation).
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They were found out by the internal auditor.

Case 19 wns !Or $65,000. In this case, u single 40-ycar old male bank manager of
low self-control (Crime-prone person) acted out of greed and exploited weak internal
controls (Opportunity) to lend two individuals a total of $900,000. The amount was
in excess of the amount of money he was authorised to lend. He did not verify that
the valuations the two borrowers provided were not false. He was paid a secret

commission of $65,000. His justification was that he was "not harming any people
but the bank" (Rationalisation). He was found out when another bank who knew the
low credit rating of the two

offender~

infonned the bank manager's superiors. No

case could be brought against the borrowers due to limited evidence, even though

once that case was completed another banking institution was conned into the same
thing by the two borrowers and once again the bank manager was the one charged
for the secret commission.

Case 20 involved a fraud of$108,580,000 which was committed by a bank manager.
He was 38-year old single male with low self-control (Crime-prone person) who was
conned by two individuals who had cQnned another bank, whose company (X
Group) wanted to build a retirement village. The offender circumvented the bnnk's
weak internal controls (Opportunity) over a three-year period and continued refinancing the loans to the two individuals even though he knew it was a bad loan and
that he had exceeded his authority. His justification was that "it was for a good
purpose". (Rationalisation). It was later determined that he was the designated
manager of X Group. When the bank promoted the o!Tcnder because it felt he wns
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doing very well, he continued to provide assistance to thl: person who took his
position and even reconciled his old accounts; he was always very helpful and never
took holidays. He was found out when a colleague suspected the fraud.

Case 21 was for $4,500,000. A 57-year old married male chief executive officer of a
multinational company had weak self-control (Crime-prone person). He had been
with the company for over 30 years and nobody dared question him. Acting out of
greed, and believing he was entitled to the money (Rationa!islJiion), he renovated his
house using company frauds. Exploiting the company's wt:ak internal controls
(Opportunity), he instructed one of the managers to charge $4.5 million of
renovations to various company stores. However, he was not aware that the Chief
Accountant also renovated his house and some of the expenses were hidden into his
··expenses. The disgruntled accountant as well as one of the builders who realised
what was going on infonned the police. The offender's justification was that ·.the
company owed him the luxury he sought to have (Rationalisation).

Case 22 involved a fraud of $3,700,000. A 46-year old male general manager with
low self-contrul (Crime-prone person) colluded with the marketing manager

(Opportunity) and approved invoices twice to a particular supplier who maintained
two sets of books for tax purposes, The general manager was acting out of greed and
justified the fraud as "a means to an end" (Rationalisation). One set was paid into the
computerised accounting system of the supplier and the other into his personal
manual system. The marketing manager was only doing it to keep her job and the
general manager was receiving Gecret commissions.
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Case 23 was for a $60,000,000 fraud eommittctl by a Trust manager. He was a 37year old mule with low self-control (Crime-prone person) who was approached by
two overseas promotional managers to invest money overseas. He agreed to collude
with them to defraud the company (Opportunity). His justification was that "the
potential reward was worth it" (Rationalisation). The trust sent some money and a
high return was received. However, they did not know that the interest received was
from the money sent, so they kept on sending more funds and continued to receive
interest that was really part of their original investment principal instead of from
earnings.

Case 24 involved a $500,000 fraud committed by a general manager of an insurance
company. In the late 1980's in Australia if someone set up an agency for insurance
policies he would receive I 00% of the total insurance for the first year back as a
commission as soon as the first monthly premium was received by the insurance
company (Opportunity). Exploiting this practice, a 40-year old male with low selfcontrol, who had a serious financial problem (Crime-prone person) set up an agency
and got a list of his friends to draw the first premiwn cheque for an insurance policy
he was supposed to take up. As soon as the insurance company received the first
payment they returned it as 100% commission back to the three agents. 80% was to

be returned to the policy holder as a loan and the 20% was for administration costs.
The agents were to obtain as security a list of assets owned by the policy holders in
case they ceased paying the insurance policy, TI1e offender refunded the money to
the policy holders and received the total commission from which he built his house,

tt;S

His justification was that he was "not doing anybody any harm" (Rationalisations).
In two months all policies ceased and when the insurance company tried to recover
the insured assets, it realised they did not exist. The insurance company auditors had
not checked the internal controls in this case, and nobody in the company ever
checked the securities held.

4.0

FINDINGS

4.1

A comparison of fraud indicators present in the ROP model and in
Loebbecke eta!. (1989)

Loebbecke et al.'s (1989) paper does not provide details of the definition of
"d(;:faleation" and "management fraud" used. The definitions used, however, have
been provided to the author (personal contact). Defalcation is employee fraud,
embezzlement, and larceny. Management fraud is deliberate fraud committed by
management that injures investors and creditors through materially misleading
financial statements. The class of perpetrators is management.

It should also be noted that misappropriation of trust accounts by lawyers and
accountants was classified as a defalcation not a management fraud.
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Table 3:

Clussif1cation of the Filly Cases into Irregularities by Deceptive
Action
All cases

Type oflrrcguhtrity
. No

%of50

Defalcations

No
%of30
-----

2

Management
Fraud
% of20
No

·---

Assets overvalued or
incorrectly valued

2

4

Transactions/events not
recorded

I

2

Expenses recorded
incorrectly

5

10

Liabilities understated

I

2

Misappropriation of
funds

20

40

13

Theft of cash receipts

26

52

Falsified and altered
records

33

66

Totals

88

36

52

Average per occurrence

1.8

1.2

2.6

7
I

5

4

20

I

5

43

7

35

7

23

19

95

13

43

20

100

I

3

Table 3 shows that, using the same classification as Loebbeeke et al. (1989), in order
to commit the irregularity a perpetrator curried out more than one deceptive action~.
This explains why N "' 88 and not 50. For all perpetrators, the average number of
deceptive acts for the 50 cases reviewed is 1.8 Loebbeeke et al. also reported an
average of 1.8 acts. The average for defalcations and management fraud is 1.2 and
2.6 respectively compared to Loebbecke ct a!. conesponding figures of 1.4 and 2.0.
Again, in agreement with Locbbeeke's findings, largely the same deceptive uctions
underlined both defalcation and management fraud. However, "assets overvalued or
5 Unlike Loebbccke cl al.'s study, "rcv~nuc or other credits recognised impwpcrly", •·,p"clous nccounting
judgement made", or "tmnsncllons in the wrong period" and "disclosures omitted or 111is!cilding" were not
contained in !he irregularities included in the sample ofMFG c:1scs.
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incorrectly valued" only featured in defalcations, while "transactions/events not
recorded only featured in management fraud".

The fact that the findings obtained in the present study are very similar to those
reported by Loebbecke et al. is interesting given that their study was based on a
survey of auditors whereas the findings of the present study have been obtained from
prosecution briefs of major fraud cases.

The implications of this observation for auditors are that: (a) the modus operandi of
serious fraud offenders is very much the same whether they operate in Australia or
United States and (b) upon discovering evidence of a deceptive action an auditor
should assume that it is not an isolated event underpinning an irregularity (see Table

4).

Table 4 provides infonnation about the incidence of different types of deceptive
action by type ofirregulari~.

.
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Table 4:

Classification of Number of Charges for the Fifty MFG Cases into
Irregularities Committed by Deceptive Action

Type of Irregularity

All cases

Defalcations

No

%or so

12

24.0

I

2.0

26

52.0

2

4.0

Misappropriation of funds

330

660.0

220

Theft of cash receipts

603

1206.0

Falsified and altered records

568

.,1542

Assets overvalued or
incorrectly valued
Transactions/events not
recorded
Expenses recorded
incorrectly
Liabilities understated

Totals
Average per occurrence

%

No

12

orJo

Management
Fraud
% (}[20

No

40.0
I

5.0

21

105.0

2

10.0

733.3

110

550.0

112

373.3

491

2455.0

1136.0

68

226.7

500

2500.0

3084.0

417

1390.0

1125

5625.0

30.8

5

16.7

13.9

56.3

With few exceptions the fraud offenders studied are prolific serial offenders. A
review of Table 4 reveals that the offenders averaged 30.8 irregularities each. More
specifically, the average number of charges for defalcations was 13.9 and 56.3 for
management fraud. However, these averages are inflated by the presence of one
management fraud offender who was charged with 340 counts of falsifying and
altering records and with as many theft offences. Similarly, another offender w~s
charged with 91 counts of misappropriating funds. Excluding those two offenders
the average number of irregularities per occurrence of major fraud is 17.7. The
implication of this finding is that upon discovering evidence for an irregulnrity tlll
auditor should assume that many more have also been perpetrated.
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4.2

Fraud indic;ltors

4.2.1

Testing the ;lpplicnbility of the ROI' model

It needs to be ncknowlcdged that using the MFG cases to test the applicability of the
ROI' model provides a useful but limited test of the models. The reliSon for this is that
the MFG cliSes involved fraud convictions; in otherwords, they involved a person with
a crime-prone personality who exploited opportunities to perpetrate fmud, This is a
limitation of the methodology used.

Table 5 provides support for the ROP model. Examination of the Opportunity
indicators shows the importance of a nwnber of both "situational factors" and
"company characteristics" predicted by the model liS facilitating the conunission of
fraud. Regarding the situational factors, the great majority (80%) of the offenders
perceived a low risk of being apprehended. This finding provides empirical support for
deterrence theory (Walker, 1980) according to whieh a potential offender is
discouraged through fear of consequences from committing a particular crime if he/she
perceives a high risk of being apprehended and expects a severe enough sentence upon
conviction. It should be noted here that, on the bliSis of their statements during the
police interviews as well as on the basis of lengthy discussions the present author had
with MFG investigators, the majority of the offenders studied perceived a low risk of
being apprehended and the issue of the likely penalty if convicted did not seem to have
concerned them.
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In support of Clurk·c ( 191!0) rnul Cohen and Felson ( 1979), Table 5 also shows that the

'

absence of cupablc guardians is another significant situational factor. A closer look at
the cases concerned, revealed that as long as the Law Institute of Victoria failed to
audit regularly solicitors' trust accounts, it allowed enough solicitors (in ten cases) to
perceive a low risk of being found out and to defraud their clients by stealing from
their trust accounts. Similarly, so long as there were no regional managers to inspect
the work of bank managers, it made it easier for five of them to defraud their own bank
whether by colluding with outsiders (see below) or to steal money from their clients.
Of course, both solicitors and bank managers, like accountants in private practice,
enjoy the trust of their clients and the existence of gullible people is another situational
factor that made fraud possible in 34% of the cases.

In addition to situational factors, the opporwnity component of the ROP mode!
includes "company characteristics". Table 5 shows that the ROP model correctly
predicted the importance of lack of adequate control procedures (90%) that prevent
fraud. This supports the KPMG (1996, 1995a, 1995b, 1993a, 1993b) fraud surveys
which found that poor internal control was the one factor that underpinned most frauds
both in Austmlia and in 17 other countries. In addition to a lack of adequate control
procedures, the ROP model correctly predicted the importance of non-control factors
(64%) that provide opportunities for fraud to be committed. Such factors include, for
example, inability to judge the quality of perfonnancc; lack of access to information;
ignorance, apathy or incapacity, and lack of audit tmil.

Further support for the ROP model is the finding that 36% of the offenders belonged to
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criminogenic occupational/corporntc culture which appears to condone solicitors or

accountants who "borrow" money from their

client~'

trust accounts or bank managers

who authorise tmsccurcd loans or loans far in excess of the amounts they arc authorised

to approve for clients they know well and trust. Weak internal controls may well mean
that collusion between a number of company employees is possible. There was a total
of six (12%) such cases. Three separate bank managers conspired with outsiders: two
approved loans for "trusted" clients on the basis ofinfonnation they knew to be untrue,
and one approved excessive loans to a company in return for secret commissions. In
another case, an employee of a disposal company paid secret conunissions to the

operator of a rubbish tip for lower rates per truck load. There were two cases of
collusion within a company: three employees in a ministry conspired to steal cars that
should have been traded in when new ones were purchased, and the manager of a credit
corporation who sent all printing work to the same company and in return was being
paid secret coiillllissions.

Regarding the person component of the ROP model, Table 5 provides support for both
its constituent parts "motive" and "crime-prone personality". About the latter, it can be
seen that while 30% were professional, unscrupulous deceivers, the motive in 40% of
the cases was a financial problem. There was only one case involving the restoration of
social identity and one in order to obtain personal justice respectively. In further
support of the ROP model, Table 5 also shows that the most frequent characteristics of
a crime-prone

p~rson

who has perpetrated fraud are a propensity for lying {92%) and

weak self-control (62%), egocentricity (34%), someone having a strong sense they arc
entitled to whatever money they can get by deceiving others (28%) and low self-
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esteem (20%). As would be predicted using the ROP model, the cases studied involved
a variety of motivrs. The two main motives were: being a professional fraur.lstcr (30%)
and sheer greed in the case or opportunistic o!Tenders (24%).

A category of predator, professional conmcn (N-=15) had no moral scruples and
therefore felt no guilt for committing the crime but justified committing the offence

usm:.;· a variety of rulionalisations (in Cressey's,

,,

1986, tenn neutra/ising

verbalisations). The most frequently used rationalisations were: "I can make better use
of the ~.oney than the company", "deceiving is what I do fora living"/ "I'm entitled to
whatever money I can get" (30%); "the end justifies the means" and so forth (16%);

''nobody will ger hurt" and so forth (12%) and "I am only borrowing the money and
will pay it back" (12%).

The study's results regarding rationalisations. provide support for one o( the ROP
model's basic premises, namely that its three components {R, 0, P) are necessary for
fraud to occur. The same results also cast serious doubt on the Loebbecke eta!. model
since, as has already been pointed out, one of its components- attitudes - comprises a
set of company characteristics that come under the opportunity cv:nponent of ROP. In
other words, Loebbecke et al.'s model has nothing to say about mtionalisations. This
major omission may well be due to the fact that they only used data from audit partners
and had no data on fraud offenders. Table 5 also shows that the following indicators
had a frequency of over 50%: propensity for lying (92%), lack of adequate control
procedures that prevent fraud (90%); perception of low risk of being apprehended
(80%); non-control factors providing opportunity for fraud to be committed (64%)

and weak self-control (62%).
Table 5:

Indicators and Frequency of Occurrence by the ROP molcl's three
Components

Indicators

Number of cases
with component

% of cases with
components in the
MFG cases

N=SO

Opporfllllities*
Situational Factors•
Perception of low risk of being
apprehended

40

80

Absence of capable guardians

18

36

Existence of gullible people willing to
trust strangers with their money

17

34

Perception of lenient sentence

4

8

Collusion opportunities

2

4

Lack of adequate control procedures that
prevent fraud

45

90

Non-control factors providing
opportunities for fraud to be committed

32

64

Criminogenic corporate culture

18

36

Collusion opportunities

4

8

Inadequate screening of applicants for
management positions

3

6

15

30

'

Company Characteristics*

Ratio11alisatio11s
Deceiving is what I do for a living; I am
entitled to whatever money I can get /I
can make better use of the money than the
company

!l
!·I
r;,, ...

·c-
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The end justifies the means/ It's for a good
pmpose/lt's to: save the company/pay the
staffll'm doing it for the family

8

Nobody will get hurtll am not really
hurting anybody/the bank won't miss the
money

6

I am only borrowing the money and will
pay it back

6

12

I just need the money, there's no other
W'Y

4

8

3

6

I can get away with it

3

6

The potential reward i~ worth it

I

2

I

2

I

2

I, too, have a right to enjoy my life

I

2

Others do it too

I

2

16

"

12

.

.

It's OK to borrow from client's accounts
because he/she does not really need the
money

The company owes me
I've deceived no one; these are only
technical deficiencies

.

Perso11
Motive

Predator/career serial fraud
offender/unscrupulous deceiver

15

Opportunist acting out of greed in
professional occupation

12

Serial fraud as response to unshareable

30

"

'

24

5

financial pressure on the family

.

10

Serial fraud to solve a financial problem
of a personal nature

4

Serial fraud to assist loved one5 with a
financial problem

4

8

Serial fraud due to a vice

3

6

Isolated fraud as response to unsharcable
financial pressure on one's self

2

4

8

"

'
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Isolated fraud as response to unshurcable
financial pressure on tl1e family

2

4

Isolated fraud to restore social identity

I

2

I

2

Fraud under an nsswncd professional
identity

.10

Fraud as personal justice

I

"

2

Crime-prone personality"

\\

46

92

Weak superego/self-control

31

62

Egocentricity

17

34

A strong sense of entitlement lo whatever
one can get by deceiving others

14

28

Low self-esteem

10

20

Oversensitivity to monetary gain

9

18

Being indifferent to the consequences of
one's behaviour

7

14

Lack of anxiety, remorse and empathy

6

12

Impulsiveness

5

10

Authoritarian

5

\0

Inability to postpone gratification

I

2

Not being attached to other people

I

2

Propensity for lying

'

•

It is possible for an indicator to be present in more than one category, e.g.,
egocentric and authoritarian.
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Table 6:

Frequency with which one, two or all three of the Components in the
ROP model were Present in the MFG Cases when Fraud Indicators
were Present and Relevant

Where indicators were
present and relevant
AI! three components present
Totals
Percentage of cases
Average No. of indicators

No of
cases

50

Person

Rationalisations

Opportunity

50

183

202

1.0

3.7

4.0

100%

-

Two components present
Totals

-

-

-

-

,J"

Percentage of cases
Average No. ofindieators

-

One component present
Totals
"

•

Percentage of cases
Average No. of indicators
No components present
Totals
Total of all material
management fraud cases
Average No. of indicators

50

50

183

202

1.0

3.7

4.0

In support of the ROP model, table 6 shows that 100% of the MFG cases had a!! three
components of the ROP model's components present when fraud indicators were
present and relevant. Examination of Table 6 also shows that the average number of
fraud indicators when all three ROP components were present was 1.0 for
rationalisations, 3.7 for opportunity and 4.0 for person.
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11te MFG study shows the importance of all three components of the ROP model in
understanding the aetiology of fraud and demonstrates the model's applicability to the
MFG cases, as had been predicted. Regarding crime opportunity, as Gottfrcdson and
Hirschi (1990: 12~ 13) would have predicted, it is particularly important where: the
offence produces inunediate rather than delayed gratification; committing the crime is
easy in terms of the mental and physical effort required; and, finally, in situations

where the perceived risk of being fotu1d out is minimal. In other words, in most cases,
situational circwnstances (e.g., strong internal controls) could mute or counteract the

effects of a person's low self-control. However, the findings in Tables 5 and 6

emphasise that it is the interaction of both self-control and crime opportunity that
largely explains the genesis offraud. Of the two factors, however, and contrary to what
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) and Grasmick eta!. (1993) would have predicted, a
' I

crime-prone person with a motive and the necessary rationalisations is a better
predictor of fraud than opportunity for fraud.

Finally, careful interrogation of the 11FG data indicates that whether someone in a
position of financial trust will commit fraud appears to vary to some extent
independently of self-control or opportunity. The motivation for crime appears to

influence the extent to which people perceive situations as constituting criminal
P.

opportunitY as well as the extent to which low self-control produces crimes, given the
opportunity.

Without ignoring the limitations of the MFG cases studied, the policy implication of
the findings in Tables 5 and 6 is that the ROP model can be used by auditors to

enhance their li-aud-dctcction ability by alerting them to particular chamctcristics of
individuals tmd companies tlmt arc nssociated with fraud. The successful test of the
ROP model highlights the importance of the auditor utilising infonnation contained in
all three of the model's components when planning the audit.

When considering the applicability of Loebbecke et al's model to the MFG cases (see ..
Table 7) and comparing it with the results in Tables 5 and 6, it should he noted that, as
already pointed out, their model fails to account for offenders' rationalisations since
their attitude component refers to a list of company characteristics that is part of
opportunity in the ROP model.

4.2.2 Testing the applicability of the Loebbecke et al. model

In order to test the applicability of the Loebbecke et al. model to the MFG cases, fraud
indicators were categorised as: (1) conditions; (2) motives; and (3) attitudes to
determine if the Loebbecke et a!. model holds true in the 50 major fraud cases.
Loebbecke et al. assert that for material management fraud to occur, al! three
components have to exist. If any one of the requirements is absent, then it would be
deemed highly unlikely that a material irregularity has taken place or is likely to do
so (1989:4).

Loebbecke et al.'s fraud-risk assessment model was tested as foltows. First, the fraud
indicators present in the major fraud eases were checked against Loebbecke's
reported indicators (see Table 7 below for details). Second, an assessment was made
of the degree to which all three comprnents of Loebbecke et al.'s model (i.e.,
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conditions, motivations ami allitmlcs) were present in the cases examined
(sec Table 8 below).

Table 7:

Indicators ond their Frequency of Occurrence by Locbbecke et al.'s three
Components
Number of cases with
component

Indicators

-

%of cases with
component In the SO
cases

Conditions:
Weak internal control

45

90

Difficult to audit transactions

36

72

Conflict of interest

35

70

Dominated decisions

32

64

Major transactions

31

62

Inexperienced management

24

48

Related party

18

36

Significant judgements

10

20

Decentraliscd organisation

5

10

Assets subject to misappropriation

4

8

High management turnover

3

6

New client

I

2

Rapid growth

I

2

II

22

Inadequate profits

9

18

Significant contmctual commitments

7

14

Emphasis on earnings projections

4

8

Motivation:
lndustty decline

.

180

Attitude:
Dishonest management

37

7:1

Lies or evasiveness

21

42

Aggressive attitutlc toward financial
reporting

14

28

Personality anomalies

3

6

Prior year irregularities

2

4

Poor reputation

2

4

Emphasis on earnings projections

2

4

Table 7 shows that 6 out of the 24 indicators listed (weak internal controls, dishonest
management, difficult to audit transactions, conflict of interest, domiuated decisions,

and major transactions) had a frequency of greater than 50%. Comparing and
contrasting the frequencies in Table 7 with Loebbecke et al.'s results (their Table 9,
pp.IS-19), it emerges that:

i. In support of Loebbecke et a\., the following red flags occurred with high
frequency in both studies: dominated decisions; weak internal controls; conflict
of interest, and difficult to audit transactions.
ii. In support of Loebbecke et al, high management turnover occurred with low
frequency in both studies.
iii. The following three red flags occurred with high frequency in Loebbecke et al.
but did so with very low frequency in the present study: the company is in a
period of rapid growth; significant contractual agreements, and industry
decline. It could be argued, of course, that, excluding "industry decline", the
other two red flags would not be relevant in cases where accountants and

solicitors steal lhun trust runds.

'"'

Regarding the extent to which all three of Locbbcckc ct al. ·~· components

Wt'rC

present in the cases studied (sec Table 8), it was found that, contrary to what the

Loebbeckc ct al.'s model predicts, in only 36% of the cases reviewed were all three
components present; in other words, in the majority of the cases (64%) fraud

occurred despite the fact that all three components were not present. In 52% of the
cases, two of the indicators were present. In most cases, the presence of any two

components is sufficient for management fraud and defalcations to occur. It can be
seen that of the three components depicted, the average number of conditions-related
indicators is higher than for motivations and attitude ones, irrespective ofthe number
of components present. This finding emphasises the importance of the opportunity
component of the ROP model in the aetiology offraud and has implications for fraud
prevention.
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Tllhlc 8:

Frequency with which one, two or all three of the Component~ in
Locbbcckc ct al.'s Modd were Present in the MFO Cases when Fraud
Indicators were Present and Relevant.

Where indicators were present
and relevant
All three components present

No. of

18
(36%)

Totals

Percentage of cases
Average No. ofindicators

Two components present
Totals

'

Percentage of cases
Av!lrage No. of indicators
One component present
Totals
Percentage of cnses
Average No. of indicators
No components present

Conditions

Motivations

Attitude

94

27

30

5.2

1.5

1.7

124

4

47

4,8

.2

1.8

27

-

4

4.5

-

.7

cases

26
(52%)

6
(12%)

Total cases

0

0

0

0

Total of all material management
fraud cases

50

245

31

81

Average No. of indicators

-

4.9

.6

1.6

An examination of Table 8 also shows that 88% of the cases looked at had two or
Utree indicators present, i.e., conditions, motives and attitudes or a combination of
two.' Therefore, in their efforts to as5ess whether there is fraud, auditors can utilise
both infonnation about profiles of fraud offenders as wei! as about the type and
frequency of fraud indicators present since, as Loebbeckc ct a\. (1989) found tl1al as
~he

'1,'

number of indicators increased the chance of fraud increased. As far as

IR:\

Locbbcckc ct a I.'s assessment model of irregularities li; concerned, the findings of the
'

Major Fraud
component~

C.rl:l~Jl

stud.Y cuntmdict one of its basic premises, that all three

need to be present for un irrcgulurity to occur. In 64% of the cases only

one or two of the indicators were present.

5.0

CHARACTERISTICS OF MA.JOH FRAUD OFFENDEltS

5.1

A profile of major fraud offenders

The majority of offenders studied shared

~orne

characteristics one would normally

have expected them to have by virtue of the fact that they needed to be in
occupational positions where they could, alone or with accomplices, effect major
fraud. To hold such positions, they almost invariably had to be professionals with
tertiary qualifications and over 30 years of age. As expected, the great majority were
male (92%), married/defacto (63%) and aged 31-45 inclusive {65%). As far as their
occupation is concerned, 24% were company directors, 20% were solicitors,
accountants made up 18%, office/bank managers 18%, finance managers 8%,
6

··bookkeepers 4%, sharetraders 4%, brokers 2% and other 2%. These findings support
similar results reported by Wheeler et al. {1988).

Rather interestingly, it was also found that most of them had acted alone in
perpetrating their fraudulent acts against two or more people they knew well and
only committed deception offences, in other words, they were specialists and not
versatile.

6Th!s is the CIISC of the IISSIImcd !dcnlily person who pmcliccd as a_~olicilor.
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These gcnl!rul dmractcristics comprise the lirst of two components of the prolilc
constructed. The second is the taxonomy of offenders and circumstances (i.e., a set.
of typologies, categories and sub·categorics) discussed in section 5.3 bdow. The two
components are meant to be used in tandem by auditors.

The majority (91 %) of the offenders examined were convicted under state legislation
(Crimes Act, 1958 (Vic)), with 44% convicted _of 10 fraud charges or less while a
significant proportion (39%) were convicted of20 or' more charges. Approximately
half (51%) of the cases involved one or two victims, but in 26% of the cases the
offender defrauded 10 or more separate victims. The presence of one or two victims

in a prosecution does not, of course, mean the offender only committed one or two
frauds, because a single victim may have been repeatedly defrauded.

As far as the treatment of the perpetrators by the courts is concerned, most offenders
(73%) pleaded guilty, were granted bail (85%), all were legally represented at the
trial and most (89%) were represented by a private lawyer. Slightly over half (52%)

of the cases were tried by a higher court, namely the county or supreme court.
Overall, the MFG had a high conviction rate (84%). As far as sentencing by the
courts is concerned, the majority of the offenders studied were imprisoned (68%),
14% were given a good behaviour bond, 11% a suspended term of imprisonment,
4% a fine and, finally, 3% were given a community-based order. Of those who were

lll!'i

sent to prison, the mt~urity were sentenced to live years or lcss

1

•

Cross-tubulations of the muin variables lOr which dat.1 were l'olll:(,'\d in the MFG
study yielded the following findings: accountants were more likely to be scnt!lnccd
to a longer {more t!mn five years) !l.."nn of imprisonment than other occupational
categories (Chi-square= 6.82105, p = 0.009)*. The most likely explanation for that
is to be found in the fact that accountants were convicted of more fraud charges ami
not because they defrauded a larger amount of money. Because an offender was
convicted of more than one charge against the same victim, it is

bette~

to talk about

victimisation per fraud. It was found to be one in over one-third (36%) of the cases,
two vietimisations (15%), 3-10 vietimisations (23%) and over 10 victimisations in
26% of the frauds. One rather prolific offender was convicted of 98 charges. There
was some limited evidence that those with a relatively "small" number of
victimisations per fraud (i.e.,< I 0 victims) were more likely to plead not guilty.

In support of U.S. research, most (70%) of the offenders did not have prior criminal
convictions while about one-third (30%) were also charged with a non-fraud (mainly
theft) offence. Company directors and accountants were more likely (though not
statistically significant) to have a prior criminal record. There was some indication
that those who had a criminal record were more likely to perpetrate frauds netting a

7 The Chi·squ~rc test of association when denting With frequencies was used to test the stutistical
significance of the relationship between pairs of characlcdstics pertaining to the offence, the offender, the
victim. and the imposition of sentences by the courts. In~~~ the reponed results the significance [eve[ (p) is
with one degree of freedom (ldf) :md for a two-tnilcd test In some instances, small numbers in the celts of
the frequency tables hns meant thnt, even though a relationship between two variables was significant at
least nt p ~ 0.05, 1hc result was dismissed in order to comply with the requirements of the chi-square test
(e.g., having less th!lll 2(1% of the cells in a table with frequencies of less than 5). S11ch ca.o;cs nrc indicated

lfl(i

"larger" amount of money (more thlln $500,000) tlmn were lirsl ufkndcrs and tim\
lirst oiTcndcrs generally acted more out of greed and wen: more likely to plead
guilty.

Of the professional groups involved, accountants and solicitors (unlike bank
managers or company directors) were the rr.ost prolific in terms of the number of
deception offences they were charged with (Chi-square "' 3.65350, p = 0.05). In
contrast to bank ffi[lJlagers and company directors, the rest of the occupational
categories (e.g., accountants, solicitors, finance managers) were significantly more
likely to perpetrate their fraud offences without accomplices (Chi-square = 11.72959,
p = 0.0006)*. As a rule, accountants and company directors were significantly more
likt:ly (Chi-square "' 12.82184, p "' 0.0003) than other occupational categories to
have "specialised" in such deception offences as obtaining property or financial
advantage by deception.

Regarding the relationship with the victim, in 25% of the cases the victim was the
employer, a client/customer (61%), a fellow company director (6%) or a stranger
(6%), but only 2% were employees of the offender,

Most of the offenders (70%) perpetrated the fraud(s) acting alone and of those that
had accomplices, the tendency was to have one only accomplice.

Unlike conventional offenders, most (87%) of the offenders studied were not
"·"O:L

with nn •.

'"
versatile, us Gottfrcdson and I lir~.chi ( 1990) would have predicted, but sp~cialists,
i.e., ihcy pcrpctratctl only particular deception offences, hardly changing thcit modus

operandi. The specialist lfaudstcrs {i.e., those commilling only dcccplinn offences)
were significantly more likely than their versatile counterparts to have a criminal

record (Chi-squ;;rc "'5.45185, p = 0.0195)\ and were significantly more likely to he
imprisoned (Chi-square= 3.47222, p = 0.0624).

The fraud came to be investigated because a victim suspected the offender (40%), or

because of the work of an auditor (13%) or as a result of a bank (14%) or a

colleague/fellow co-director II%, a client (II%) or the Law Institute of Victoria

(9%) or, finally, the police (2%) becoming suspicious/acting on infonnation
received. While half of the solicitors involved were suspected by the Law Institute of
Victoria, accountants and company directors were significantly more likely than all
the other occupational categories to be suspected of having perpetrated fraud by one
of their victims (Chi-square "' 7.07087, p = 0.007).

These inter-relationships indicates a need to desegregate major fraud offenders. Tiw
findings suggest that, at a general level, such offenders differ from common
offenders in a number of significant ways, such as in being employed, specialists and
first offenders. However, the way they go about committing their crimes, how many
offences of the same kind they commit, whether they act alone, whether they plead
guilty and what sentence they receive, appear to be related. In combination with the
taxonomy of fraud offenders described below, these findings go some way towards
painting the picture ofthe major fraud offender. In this sense the research can be said

'""
to have succeeded in r"Jiiling such oflCndcrs. This knowledge could he used to alert
auditors to potential management fraud risks and their likely modus opcran,Ji ugainst
the backdrop of fraud-prone companies and areas within companies detailed ir. the

next chapter.

5.2

Criminal typologies

The criminological literature cont&ins a number of criminal typologies. The main
concern has been with typologies of male juvenile delinquents (see Gibbons, 1975)
and pri~on inmates (sec Schrag, 1961 ). Typologies of white-collar offenders has been

a neglected topic in criminology. In considering the typologies yielded by the MFG
study it should be remembered that they are aetiological ones, i.e., they identify the

types of persons in positions of financial trust who perpetrated fraud and the
circumstances under which fraud is done.

5.3

A taxonomy/typologies of major fraud cases

Close examination of the 50 cases and the interviews with the detectives yielded the
following taxonomy of major fraud cases described next. The taxonomy {see Table
9) shows that if a profile of fraud offenders is to be useful in fraud detection, it needs
to accommod<J.te a broad range of ca!cgories and, in some cases, sub-categories of
cases, which result from the combination of particular types of offenders committing
different types of fmud under different circumstances!. The fact is that many
professionals of the age group and with the types of pressures mentioned below do

8 According to Gibbons ( 1975), the malo criteria a typology must satisty in order to be useful Me: clarity
and objc;:tivity: mutual exclusiveness; and comprehensiveness nnd parsimoay (p.l4J).
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not resort to fraud. Consequently, if a profile of fraud offenders docs not include
in!Ornmtion on particular combinations nf diflCrcnt types of profCssilmals,
cornmilling di riC rent types of irregularities under dif!Crcnt circum:;tanccs, then it will
not be of much usc to an auditor. In other words, the taxonomy of types of !i'aur.l
ofl'cndcrs and circumstances reported below can be thought of a~ enriching the
sketch broad outline of a person who is likely to be a fraud risk, and is therefore
likely to be of use to an auditor.

The predator/professional fraud offender. For example, an accountant with a
record for committing fraud against a previous employer also defrauds his/her latest
employer of a much larger amount of money. Another type of predator gets a
position in a company in order to commit the fraud. In other words, the offender has
the opportunity, is crime-prone due to the absence of a strong self-control as
evidenced by his/her previous criminal activity of a similar nature, and justifies the
fraudulent activity in tenns of "I can make better use of the money than the
company". Another example is where a rareer fraud offender (with a record for
identifying, selecting major shareholders, asswning their identity, and selling their
shares) sets up a company to defraud a banlc Here we have a crime-prone individual
who creates the opportunity for fraud, commits deception offences and justifies the
crime as "This is what I do for a living''. Another example is where one individual
who, after defrauding a company in his own country, flew to Australia to repeat his
scheme here. Again, we have a predator who sets up a company purporting to offer a
service for a fee, collects a lot of money from clients and then simply disappears and,
like serial killers, sees nothing morally wrong with what he does. Eight cases were
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perpetrated by predator, professional offenders who, like some of the other
categories. stup 'uf!Cnding when caught.

An opportunist

profe~sional

with low selr • control and without a previous

record for deception who is in a position of trust. The second

li>:'ge~·t

identified is where a person with a predisposition to commit fraud as a

category
r~su!t

of

having low self-control, perceives an opportunity to acquire additional money.
Acting out of greed, he/she exploits it alone or with one or more accomplices, in the
belief they will get away with it. For example, a bank manager steals a friend's
commercial bills and converts them to money. The opportunity lies in the fact that
people trust him with their money, the crime-proneness stems from a lack of a strong
conscience and, finally, the fraudulent activity is rationalised in tenns of "It's easy
money to pay off bills and buy property" and avoid being found out. Another
example is where, motivated by greed, an insurance company manager in collusion
with two outsiders exploits weak internal controls to commit a iong series of frauds
against the company. A weak conscience predisposes him to exploit the opportunity
provided by the weak internal controls and the frauds are justified in tenns of "If I
can make money and get away with it, why not?". In another case (motivated by
greed since his financial position is good), a solicitor induces a client to invest in a
company. The client is not aware the company is owned by the solicitor who then
proceeds to misappropriate the investment. The fraud is rationalised as "the client
does not really need the money". A total of 12 cases belong to this category and
involved first·offenders whose low self-control and greed led them to exploit
opportunities for fraud.
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Fraud under un assumed professional identity. Irrespective of whether living a
fantasy or not, au individual presents himself as qualified to practice law and enjoys
the status and salary that comes with the job until unmasked (one single case).

Isolated fraud in response to unshareable financial pressure on the family.
C...gnisant of his family's financial circumstances and need 10r money, one of the
parents in a position of financial trust and of low internal control avails himself of an
opportunity, commits an isolated offence, and then ceases the criminal activity (two
cases).

Serial fraud in response to unshareable financial pressure on the family. Also
cognisant of hts family's dire financial circumstances and need for money, a crimeprone professional commits fraud, gets over-confident that he can get away with it,
and commits more frauds. Having satisfied the financial need of the family his real
motive now for continuing to commit fraud offences is sheer greed (five cases).

Fraud as personal justice.

A disgruntled, vindictive ex-employee exploits an

opportunity and commits a fraud to get back what he believes the company owes him

(one case).

Isolated fraud as response to unshareablc financial pressure on one's self.
Motivated by a need to resolve financial difficulty of a personal nature (i.e., not a
family need and not a business need) an individual with weak self-control seizes an
opportunity and commits fraud but does not become a serial offender (two cases).
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Serial fraud. Motivated by a wish to snlvc a linunciul problem of a personal nature,
a person (e.g., an overoptimistic lawyer driven by greed) commits fraud by
exploiting an opportunity in the belief that there will be an upturn in the economy,
his/her investments will improve and he/she will thus be able to pay the money back
into his/her clients' trust accounts (four cases).

Serial fraud due to a vice. Motivated by a need to solve a serious financial problem
due to big losses at the gambling <able, a compulsive gambler commits fraud time
and time again, as he sinks deeper into financial trouble, and stops when discovered
(two cases). One case involved a 40-year old male (Mr. L), married with three
children, was the manager of the accounts payable of a company. He worked there
over 20 years but had a gambling habit. In 1993, th<! manager of business systems
had difficulty reconciling an account. He found that seven cheques drawn on the
company's name of $136,161 had unlawfully been paid into Mr L's account. Mr L
then admitted that in his role as manager, he was able to access the computer system,
create fictitious accounts/files, and make unauthorised alterations and/or deletions to
this infonnation. This unauthorised activity allowed Mr L to generate seven cheques
of various amounts drawn on the company's account and payable to his personal
account. He did this to feed his compulsive gambling habit.

A third case in this typology is the case of a married woman living with her
unemployed husband who was socialising in an extravagant manner with her lover.
She bought him expensive gifts including a house. The lover was not aware how Mrs

[4)_1

X obtained the funds. l-Ie just thought she was wealthy. She worked for an insurance
company uml once a lite for a cur accident was completed she would re-opcn it, usc
someone'$ passwonl 10 put an invoice in, use a thin! person's password to approve it
and draw a cheque to herself or her husband. She would then retrieve the cheque
from the printer which was on another floor in the same building. No one found out
for some months until the intcmal auditor noticed some inconsistencies.

Fraud to restore social identity. A megalomaniac type of individual who cannot
not endure the status incongruity brought about by some disastrous business
investri1ents, believes he can commit the crime and not get caught and exploits an
opportunity to commit an isolated fraud to ensure his social identity docs not suffer
(one case).

Serial fraud by an unscrupulous deceiver. A first-offender psychopathic
megalomaniac high flier of low integrity commits frauds against close friends,
clients and business partners repeatedly, without having any qualms about it. A total
of seven cases belonged to this category. For an example see case description No. 14
above.

Serial fraud to assist loved ones wifh a financial problem. An example is where a
finance manager falsifies payment vouchers IUld misappropriates money from his
employer's bank account. He use3 the money to pay university fees for his brother
and to assist his sister who lives overseas. He justifies the frauds in tenns of"nobody
will get hurt" (four cases).
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Interestingly, the cases examined did not include a
fraud

a~

cJL~c

of someone committing

a challenge to the system, as a thrill, even though such cases have been

reported in the litcmturc.

Table 9:

Number of Cases per Typology
Typology

No. of
cases

%

of cases

N=SO

Predator/career serial fraud offender!
unscrupulous deceiver

15

30

Opportnnist acting out of greed, first offender in
professional occupation

12

24

Serial fraud as response to unshareable financial
pressure on the family

5

10

Serial fraud to solve a financial problem of a
personal nature

4

8

Serial fraud to assist loved ones with a financial
problem

4

8

Serial fraud due to a vice

3

6

Isolated fraud as response to unshareable
financial pressure on one's self

2

4

Isolated fraud as response to unshareable
financial pressure on the family

2

4

Isolated fraud to restore social identity

I

2

Freud under an assumed professional identity

I

2

Freud as personal justice

I

2

Table 9 shows that where fraud is committed, there is a significant likelihood that it
is not an isolated event. The explanation for this finding is that the offender(s) will
only stop when found out, irrespective of whether the offender(s) is/are without a
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criminal record or of the prctlator/carccr kintl; the former type of offender linds more
frauds need to be committed to cover the money missing while the latter feel no
remorse about stealing as much money as possible. It needs to be borne in mind,
however, that the frauds studied were frauds which had been discovered. lbcreforc,
caution is needed in extrapolating this finding tu all fraud. Table 9 also shows the
heterogeneity of both the type of persons committing major fraud as wc!l as the
circumstances under which they offended. It can be seen that the largest category
(30%) is the predator career fraud offender and the second largest (24%) the

opportunist unscrupulous first offender, with low self-control, in a professional
occupation and holding a position of financial tmst, commits fraud alone or with
accomplices, motivated by greed. The third largest category (10%) involves cases
where in response to unshareable pressure on the family, a person with low selfcontrol exploits an opportunity and embarks on a spree of frauds against people
he/she knows well. We see that the predator career fraud offender comprises a large
proportion of such offenders whose frauds could be reduced significantly by means
of better vetting of job applicants by employers. However, it needs to be emphasised
that even if a person in a position of financjal trust does not have a criminal record, it
does not mean that he/she is not crime-prone. lberefore, in selecting candidates for

such positions, one could administer them written tests of degrees of self control (see
Grasmick et al., 1993) in order to identify those who are fraud risks. Finally, what
the typologies identified make clear is that an effective preventative measure against
fraud is undoubtedly strong internal controls.

In summary, the categories of people in positions of trust who commit fraud
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comprise a variety that includes: over-optimistic opportunists; the vindictive type;
professional conmen who arc likely to have a criminal record; people who commit
an isolated of!Cncc (and others who become greedy and commit a number of
offences) to solve a serious financial problem of a
nature;

per.~onal

or family or business

unscrupulous high fliers, and investors or compulsive gamblers whose

excessive optimism that "things will soon improve" ]cads them into committing a
spate of deception offences. Fraud is made possible by the existence of the three
components depicted in the ROP model, namely a motivated crime-prone individual,
opportunity and rationalisations. The classification offered above should be treated
with caution since: (1) there is some degree of overlap between some of the
categories of offenders (e.g., a married compulsive gambler has a financial problem
which impacts on his family); (2) the offenders were not interviewed; and (3)
because of the sample of cases studied. The typologies offered do, nevertheless,
support the view that major fraud offenders comprise a range of categories of
offenders who perpetrate their crime{s) under a broad range of circumstances, for a
diversity of motives and use ditferent modus operandi.

Cressey (1986) considers rationalisations the most vital component of an explanation
for why people commit fraud. Cressey interviewed imprisoned embezzlers in the
U.S. about their rationalisations. No interviews were conducted with any of the
imprisoned major fraud offenders included in the MFG study due to time constraints
and Jack of necessary resources. Therefore, infonnation about such offenders'
rationalisations was extracted from sworn written statements made to the MFG
detectives investigating. This means that what is reported about rationalisations (sec
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Figure 3 in Chapter 7) must be treated with caution. Offcndem made their sworn
statements, which were subsequently used in evidence during the trial, presumably
acting on advice from their lawyer. It is possible thnt how they rationalised their
fraudulent activity in the course of police interviews may be different from how they
really justified the fraud(s) to themselves at the time. With this limitation in mind, it
is interesting to note that the st•!dy identified more rationalisations (see Figure 3)
than had been listed in Figure I on the basis of the literature discussion in Chapter 3.

Table 10 shows the different types and frequency of rationalisations used by the
MFG offenders. The most frequently used rationalisation was "I am entitled to
whatever money I can get" and so forth (30%) that characterised predator, career
offenders. The most common rationalisations in this study are almost identical to
those reported by Cressey (1986) in the U.S.

In considering the rationalisations listed in Table 10, it needs to be remembered that

in classifying the rationalisations as articulated by the offenders, an attempt was
macie to convey the essence of the justification used as they would often give a long
an~wer to the question "why did you do

it?". It should also be remembered that an

apparent belief that the risk involved was low and the offender could avoid being
found out was common to the majority of cases. However, in only three cases was
that belief actually spelled out by the offenders.
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Fr:md Offenders' Rationalisutions
R:1tionalisations

No, of Cases
N=SO

/o of cases

0

Deceiving is what l do for a living, lam entitled to
whatever money ! can get. I can make better use of
th" monev than he coffinanv.

15

30

Tite end justifies the mcanslll's for a good purpose/
It's to: save the company/pay the staffn'm doing
it for the family.

8

16

Nobody will get hurtll am not really hurting
anybody/the bank won't miss the money.

6

12

I am only borrowing the money and will pay it
back.

6

12

IjiL'lt need the money, there's no other way.

4

8

It's okay to borrow from client's accounts because
he/she does not really need the money.

J

6

I can get away with it.

J

6

The potential reward is worth it.

I

2

The company owes me.

I

2

I've deceived no one; these are only technical
deficiencies in the accounts

I

2

I, toO, have a right to enjoy my life.

I

2

Others do it too.

I

2

Table 10 shows that while a proportion of offenders justifies the fraud as a means to
an end, others did it as merely "borrowing" from clients' accounts or in order, for
example, to prevent bankruptcy, or "borrowing" from their employer or clients in
order to pay personal debts. Those offenders indicated that they intended to pay back
the money when their business picked up, when they won sufficient fwtds through
gambling or when the investments they had made using the money returned n
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sullicicnt profit. In considering the mtionulisutions listed in Table 10, the reader
should note that they definitely existed uficr un offender was apprehended by the
police. Future research should investigate the existence of rationalisations before an
offender is apprehended and whether they predict fraud. To understand fraud
victimisation further, future research should study more systematically the
rationalisations used by different typologies of fraud offenders and explore the
different styles of interpersonal interaction learned by fraud offenders in childhood
and adolescence and/or as part of their socialisation into particular subcultures in the
workplace or elsewhere.

6.0

HOW DETECTIVES CLASSIFY FRAUD OFFENDERS

Common sense would dictate that because police detectives often encounter the
worst side of human nature in dealing with criminals, they would be biased when
attributing motives to serious offenders and to assume they are rational decision
makers with malicious intent. At the same time, however, one could argue th11t
because of their extensive experience in questioning and otherwise investigating
major fraud offenders, the detectives involwd are in a position to give a reliable
opinion regarding the reasons why someone committed fmud. In the opinion, then,
of the 13 police detectives responsible for investigating the cases examined and
preparing the briefs, the most common motives are: (I) sheer greed (46%)

9

;

(2)

9 ens~ 21, discussed in section 2.2.1, has now been finalised by the courts in Victoria and been made public.
The CEO involved, received a 4 year jail sentence, including n minimum lcrm of two and one-half years,
despite lhe foct thai !te bas repaid $3.453 mlllion of lhc funds misappropriated. Juslicc Eames while
delivering !he scnlcnce emphasised the factlhat the person in queslion was "motivated by gn:cd" and while he
"cngngcd in fmud npon the company" h~ expressed concerns lotlic rcsl ofthcmcmlx:11< -:>fstaiJofthe problem
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megalomania, i.e., continuing to enjoy a very expensive

lifc~tylc

as fitr as holidays,

houses, cars, clothes and parties arc concerned beyond one's limmcial mc<Jns in order
to keep up appearances for one's peers (23%); (3) financial problems (personal or
business) 26%; and, finally, (4) vices (i.e., gambling or double life (5%)).
Comparing and contrasting the detectives' classification of the offenders' motives

with the distribution of typologies identified (see Table 7 above), we see that a
"fin'ancial problem" of one kind or another features in 31% of the fanner and 34% of
the latter. This finding is of some interest since we might expect police detectives,
who spend a signihcant part of their working Jives investigating serious crimes, to
have a jaundiced view of offenders due to the insularity and isolation of their job
(Worden, 1993). Finally, it comes as no surprise to find that the detectives'
perception of the offenders' motives differs significantly from the offenders' ovm
rationalisations for committing the crimes concerned (see Table 8).

7.0

MFG CASE RESULTS AND THE ROP FRAUD MODEL

The findings provide support for the validity of the eight assumptions of the ROP
model identified in Chapter 4. The findings obtained indicate that heterogeneity is a
basic characteristic of fraud offenders and their crimes. In addition, crime-proneness
(in the form of low self-control) is an essential component of fraud offenders and a
broad variety of motives underpins the aetiology of fraud; while financial pressure is

ofthell(PhesanL, 1997:1 and8).
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the most frequent motive, correlates of ll·aud exist at different levels of analysis and
supplement one another. Finally, there nrc individual differences in how a crime
opportunity and a rationalisation is constructed.

The results highlight the importance of the three components of the ROP model • a
motivated crime-prone person (P), crime opportunity (0), and rationalisations (R) in the aetiology of fraud. Considering first crime-proneness as an attribute of the
offenders, the findings confinn the crucial importance of low self-control. More
specifically, the results reported add some support to the following components of
self-control proposed by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990:89) and as re-defined and
measured by Grasmick et al. (1993):

i.

impulsiveness: this is evident in those cases where an offender exploits an
opportunity that presents itself and commits fraud without any reservations;

ii.

risk-seeking: many of the offenders appear to have perpetrated their frauds in
a way that betrays a tendency to be adventuresome;

iii.

preference for simple tasks: many of the offenders exhibited a preference for
easy gratification of their desire for money; and

iv. being self-centred: a large number of the offenders can be described as selfcentred, insensitive to the suffering and needs of those they victimised.
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8.11

lliSCUSSION OF RESULTS

The results of this study show that the research into the MFG offenders achieved its
seven designated aims. The results obtained show the validity of all eight
assumptions of the ROP model. More specifically, the data analysis confirmed the
importance of all three components of the ROP model in understanding why people
in a position of financial trust commit fraud. When comparing the fraud indicators
present in the ROP model with those in Loebbecke et a!. (1989) it was interesting to
find that the modus operandi of serious fmud offenders is very much the same
whether they opemte in Australia or in the U.S.

While results of the study support Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) emphasis on
crime opportunity and low self-control, no support was found for their claim that
fmud offenders are versatile or that crime opportunity is a better predictor of fraud
than a crime- prone person with a motive.

All eight asswnptions of the ROP model appear to be valid. The two-component
profile of the serious fraud offender that emerges from the study and which includes
the taxonomy of cases is a lot more detailed than has hitherto been reported in the
litemture. To illustrate, Robertson (1996:294), for example, claims, white-collar
offenders have these characteristics:

Likely to be married, probably not tattooed, educated beyond high school,
range in age from teens to over 60, employment tenure from I to 20 or more
years, not likely to be divorced, member of a church, no arrest record,
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socially con!Orming, usually act alone.

Auditors need more details of such a profile in order to improve their fraud detection
ability. The profile of fraud o!Tendcrs reported in this thesis has been developed from
data pertaining to actual major fraud offenders prosecuted by the police. Offenders
and their crimes exist in a context. A profile that focused solely on features of the
individual and ignored the interaction between a particular individual offender and
particular circwnstances and conditions (such as type of opportunity, type of victim)
would not have much utility for auditors. The present research indicates that, at a
general level, a fraud offender is one who: (I) is likely to be a male first offender;
(2) aged 31-45; (3) occupies a position of trust; (4) acting alone and mainly out of
greed, breaches that trust and commits a spate of deception offences defrauding a
nwnber of victims; (5) is in a position to bargain with those that prosecute him (see

Katz, 1978); and (6) ends up going to prison for a relatively short period of time. The
fmdings pertaining to demographic characteristics and lifestyle, criminal history,
modus operandi and "distorted stories" of the major fraud offenders examined,
indicate that a criminal profile incorporating all this information is possible. The
profile constructed comprises infonnation at a general level and an account of 12
SPeCific offender typologies, The auditor, of course, needs to look for the most
frequent factors associated with fraud. With this need in mind, the two-component
profile constructed in the MFO study wi1! assist auditors to enhance their frauddetection ability, but not if it is used by itself. This is because what the general
profile describes could be any professional in a position of financial trust. Rather, it
ought to be used in combination with: (I) the knowledge concerning the inter-
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relationship found llctwccn offence, offender and victim characteristics; aml (2) the
fraud-detection model reported in the next chapter.

i:'
Contrary to what Gottfredson an'd Hirschi's (1990) Genera{ Theory of Crime
predicts, most major fraud offenders are not immersed in crime in the sense of being
recidivist career offenders. It is possible, of course, that an offender has been
perpetrating fraud and/or other offences for much longer but managed not to come to
police attention. Future research should aim to identify and interview major fraud
offenders whose crimes remain part of the dark figure of white-collar crime.

The findings, however, support Gottfredson and Hirschi's theory to some extent in so
far as the offenders in this study evidenced low self-control and exploited
opportunities available to them. Future research should interview fraud offenders in
order to explore the different styles of interpersonal interaction learned by such
individuals in childhood and adolescence and/or as part of their socialisation into
particular subcultures in the workplace or elsewhere. Such data would throw some
light on the question of how it is possible for fraud offenders to be insensitive to the
needs and suffering of those they victimise in order to explain the use of different
rationalisations by them. Future research should also explore personality differences
wnongst fraud offenders (e.g., in tenns ofEysenck's three scales-see Chapter 2) to
add to our understanding of their offending. The offender-circumstances typologies
identified by the MFG study need to be explored further in an attempt to produce
"social profiles" of the offenders. Regarding the career/professional fraud offender,
future research should examine the possibility that, as a profiler would predicl, the
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way such ofiCndcrs carry llUt their crimes on one occasion has some chnwctcristic
similarity to the way they carry out their crimes on other occasions. Finally, thc1c is
a need to investigate further the relationship betwce11 a person's characteristics

~nd

their fraud. Initially, one could focus on simple one-to-one relationships. It might
then be possible to build on such simple relationships and generate canonical
equations which provide an objective way of 11nalysing the relationship between two
sets of variables such as a person's characteristics and his/her actions (see Canter,

1995:345).

The offenders did not, as the general theory of crime would have predicted, engage

in a variety of criminal acts but stuck to fraud. It becomes apparent that the offenders
studied comprise a number of typologies of major fraud offenders, many of whom
experienced situational pressures (e.g., high personal debts, financial losses) and who
rationalised their offending to make it acceptable to them and thus to continue to
perceive themselves as successful professionals in their fields. Also, it should not be
forgotten that solicitors, accountants and bank managers, operate in an occupational
culture that values wealth and corporate success, considers failure quite
unacceptable, and, at the same time, provides opportunities for major fraud.

Whether the sentences imposed by the courts on such offenders (mostly five years'
imprisonment or less) serve the purpose of individual and/or general deterrence is
impossible to say on the basis of the research carried out. However, an examination
of voluntary statements made to the police by the offenders indicates that a term of
imprisonment of five years or less is unlikely to be a deterrent because: (I) they

·'I
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limcy their chances of not being apprehended; (2) if charged, believe they "can beat
the charges" against them; and {3 J even if they arc incarcerated they know they
would be unlikely to serve their full sentence. Without a perception by serious fraud
offenders that there is a high risk of being detected and that the likely penalty upon
conviction will be severe, a court would not be justified in imposing a very severe
sentence on an inCividual offender in order to discourage him/her and/or other
potential offenders from committing the same crime (Braithwaite, 1989).

The two-component offender profile yielded by the data analysis is that the
commission of fraud is not a random process and that a number of individuals who
share a number of demographic characteristics (gender, age, marital status,
occupation) and criminal justice features experience pressures to raise money for
themselves, or their companies, or their loved ones. Since by virtue of their
occupational position, they have the opportunity and the knowhow, they often do
not require accomplices, and proceed to commit a number of deception offences
following a characteristic modus operandi. Furthermore, they rationalise their
behaviour in ways that neutralises any guilt they may feel as a result of their frauds.
A sizeable minority of the offenders are best thought of as predators.

It is not claimed that armed with the criminal profiling results obtained, auditors can
identify an offender ru~d significantly increase their fraud-detection effectiveness.
This is simply because, on the basis of existing knowledge in this area, it is just not
possible to predict accurately who in a company will commit or has been committing
fraud. Without ignoring its limitations, what the research reported in this chapter can

,'i
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do is to increase the fraud awareness of auditors ami point'tn:~omc indicator~, i.e.,
\.-'

red !lags, which should ulert auditors to au in~reasi~· pos,sibility of fruud. Together
with empirically obtained knowlcdge··.about other sets of red flags pointing to
vulnerable types ofindustries/companics as well as vulnerable areas within particular
types of industries/companies, the red flags inherent in the offender profile provided
above can be used to alert an auditor to a greater likelihood of fraud and thus negate
an auditor's sense of complacency.

The findings obtained in the study reported in this chapter suggest that auditors
played but a rather limited role in the detection of the frauds involved. The eclectic
fraud detection model proposed in this thesis {see Chapter 6) shows how auditors can
improve their fraud detection ability. Future research should expand the twocomponent profile of major fraud offenders constructed by the research, using indepth psychological interviews with such offenders. Given that most frauds involve
financial pressure on an individual and that factor plays such an important part ia
contributing to fraud taking place, a simple income-expenditure assessment of
professional people in positions oftrust should help to identify potential/actual major
frauds. Future research should also consider fraud by a variety of officially-known

and self-reported

offend~:rs

in order to identify the factors that best explain their

specific nature and prevalence.
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CONCLUSION

'Without forgetting i'.s limitations, the MFG study has tested ami demonstrated the
applicability of the ROP model and its three components.

It is the first time a

comprehensive model of the aetioh:gy of fraud (in tenns of the components that are
necessary for fraud to occur) has been proposed and tested successfully. As already
stated, Loebbeckc et al. 's model has nothing to say about rationalisations and one of
its basic premises has been shown to be wrong. As far as it has been possible to

ascertain, the ROP model is the only one which accounts for the broad range of

persons who perpetrate fraud and the circumstances under which they do it. Future
research should test the ROP model with a larger and more representative sample of

fraud cases involving people in positions of financial trust. The fraud indicators
identified for 0 and P can be used by auditom to enhance their fraud-detection
ability.

A profile of major fraud offenders would be useful to auditors if used in conjunction
with other relevant knowledge about fraud risk such as different industries and
financial areas. The findings of this study show that the modus operandi (deceptive
action) of serious fraud offenders is very much the same whether they operate in
Austtalia or in the U.S. and that the offenders are very prolific.

Tabulation of data concerning fraud indicators shows that the presence of any two of
Loebbecke et al.'s (1989) three components is usually sufficient for fraud to occur.
This finding is contrary to a basic premise by Loebbecke et al. that for fraud to occur

i;

i,'
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all three components {CMA) of their model must he present.

Reflecting the importance of opportunity, most of the offenders (94%) victimised
someone they knew. Approximately one-third of the offenders had a criminal record,
and that was especially the case with managing directors. This finding points to the
importance of screening applicants for position of financial trust through background
checks, to reduce the risk of fraud victimisation. The finding that about one-third of
the offenders had accomplices means that for such offenders the decision to commit
fraud follows group discussion, a factor catered for in the ROP model.

The findings show that it is not appropriate to talk about major fraud offenders as a
homogeneous population. Future research should explore further patterns identified
between offence, offender, victim and criminal justice characteristics with a larger
sample of offenders in order to replicate the two-component criminal profile reported
above and, also, to measure fraud offenders' level of self-control using the instrument
developed by Grasmick et al. (1993). The next chapter reports a broad range of
empirical findings from a survey of Australian auditors' experience in detecting
material irregularities including fraud.

CIIAI'TI.:R 6
A SURVI<:Y OF AUDITORS' DETECTION OF MATERIAL
IRREGULARITI!t~S.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chaptrr describes the methodology used for and discusses the results of a postal
survey of auditors concerning both their experiences with detecting a broad range of
irregularities (including employee and management fraud) provided in AUS2l0 .A.ARF
(1995a) which could have a material impact on the financial statement as well as their
sensitivity to red flags. Findings, which supplement the MFG study, are also reported
regarding the perpetrators of the material irregularities and their motives, as perceived
by the auditors. The aims of the swvey were to test the eclectic fraud detection model
and Loebbecke et al.'s fraud assessment model. Findings are also discussed pertaining
to both fraud-reporting by auditors as well as the extent to which auditing finns are
utilising specialist fraud investigators, namely fraud auditors and forensic accountants.
Finally, the results of the survey are discussed in the context of the edeetic fraud
detection model.
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INTROUUCTION
I·

Despite the importance of auditors' detecting and reporting material irregularities, there
is not a great deal of infonnation in the professional or academic literature about these
matters. No work has been undertaken of such a magnitude in Australia. Australian
auditors' experience in encountering irregularities and their knowledge about the

perpetrators and the aetiology of irregularities generally was obtained by means of a
self-administered structured questionnaire1• The questionnaire collected data on

auditors' experience in detecting a broad range of irregularities, namely: management
fraud, employee fraud, other illegal acts, other acts, intentional but not fraudulent or
other illegal misstatements, and errors (see AUS 210 (AARF, 199Sa, para. 05)).

2.0

RESEARCH METHOD

2.1

The questionnaire

The questionnaire was modelled on the one used by Loebbecke et al. (1989). As a
result their findings can be compared, despite the fact that each study used a different
sample of auditors. A copy of the questionnaire is shown in Appendix I.

1According to Moses and KnUon (1981:257·259), compared to other rcsen:rch methods, mall surveys bnvc
some advantages that include the following: they arc cheaper, take less time to do, and mvold such sources
of error as interviewer bias. Snch surveys, however, face the difficulty of a low response rate,
gencraliz:abllity of the findings, not knowing that a respondent completed the qncslionnnirc alone, and that
the researcher is in no position to probe the respondent's answers further (sec also Judd, Smith and Kidder,
1991:216).
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BefOre the questionnaire was sent to auditors, it wa~ piloted in July I 995 by

administering it to five auditors known personally to the author. In order to make the
questionnaire more easily comprehensible, the following suggestions by the

respondents were incorporated in the revised version used in the study: to provide a
definition of the tenns "code of conduct/cthics/proctice"; to define each type of

irregularity addressed and to illustrate by providing an example of one; instead of the
industry classification U'led in Loebbecke e! al. (1989), to list the one used by the
Australian Bureau of Statistics (1993); instead of

Loe~becke

et al.'s list of fraud

indicators, to we the list in AUP16 (AARF, 1993- <!pplicable at the time); instead of
Loebbecke et al.'s terminology of "occurred", "relevant", and "apparent" when

referring to red flags, to use "applicable to the engagement", "relevant to the
irregularity", and "alerted[the auditors] at the plaruting stage" respectively. Finally, on
the basis of suggestions by those respondents, three questions were rephrased to make
their meaning clearer.

The questionnaire comprised tlrree parts. Part I collected sununary infonnation about
each of the irregularities which the re.spondent had experienced during the last five
years. This information was collected to increase our knowledge about auditors'
experien.:.e with material and immaterial irregularities, their nature and frequency of
occwrence, as well as whether they had a material impact on the financial statements
of the clients involved.
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Respondents were provided with a delinition of: (I) irregularities ami (2) code of
corporate cunduc/lo ensure consistency. Respondents were asked about the following:

a management frnud 1 (to provide a description); the number of times that irregularity

was encountered; the industry the client operated in; what alerted the auditor to the
irrcgula;!ty; whether there were effective internal controls in place; whether a code of
conduct existed and, finally, whether there was a material financial impact on the
accounts. They were asked to repeat the exercise for five more types of irregularities,
namely:
employee fraud;
other illegal acts;
other acts which contravene the constitution of an entity including noncompliance with trust deeds or memorandum and articles of association;
intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements; and
errors which are unintentional mistakes.

The info[Il).ation collected on the different types of irregularities was expected to throw
some light on both the types of industries that are prone to particular frauds as well as
on the question whether having a code of conduct or effective internal controls assists
in combating fraud.

2 In lhc SUI"'cy of auditors' Cllpericnoc wllh. detecting irregularities reported in !his chapter mnn~gcmem nnd
employee froud were lre3ted ns two Clltcgorics of fmud to ennblc n oompruison of the results obtained with
Locbbcclt:c ct al.'s {1989) r.ndings Md Ute Kl'MG ( 199Su) fmud sul"/ey.
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Part II requested information about one material irregularity selected by the

respondent.
The respondents were asked to:
describe how the irregularity was committed;
who was involved;
the industry and the status of the cliene;
audit areas affected by the irregularity;

how long the audit firm had been an auditor of that client when the irregularity

\\

was discovered;

\.

)):

over what time period that particular irregularity had been committed;
the audit procedures first indicating the irregularity;
•

whether the presence of a fraud auditor or forensic accoW'Itant on an audit team
would have assisted in discovering it earlier than it had been;
a profile of the perpetrator; and

to v.hom the material irregularity was reported.

The respondents were in no position to provide data on offenders' mtionalisations (R)"

or crime- proneness and motives (P). Therefore it was not possible to test the ROP
model.

3 The Industry dc.!lgnat!on used Is th~ one found in lhc Austra111lll DIU'CIIu ofStn11st!r;s (1993) Austrollan and New
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Part II also· provided participants with a list of red flags that comprised those
. mentioned in AUP 16 (AARF, 1993t. With reference to one particular material
irregularity they had encountered themselves in the last twelve months, they were
asked to tick the indicator{s) applicable to the engagement and relevant to the
irregularity and whether it alerted the auditor during the planning phase.

The

categories "applicable ... ", "relevant ... " and "whether alerted ... " were independent
but not mutually exclusive.

In Part Ill, the respondents were asked to provide demographic data about the

respondent and his/her experience, which included:
state of residence;

gender;
current position;
•

number of years of experience as an auditor;
position in the partnership;

•

number of years in current position;
approximate number of engagements worked on;
industry specialisation;

Z4a/and S1arukud lndu.str/al Cltmlficalicn, hence it is slightly different to Locbbcl:ke et al.'s
4 Since the stlldy was concerned with Au;tml!nn auditors' expc:riC;ice in ftnud deted!on l! wns considered
appropriate Louse the fmud indicators {red nngs)prcvided in the Auslnll!an Auditing SUUldnnl {MRF, l99J)which
ore the same as inA US 210 (AARF, l995a) mther than th~ ones provided by Locbbcl:ke ctul. (l9S9).ln comparing
the diff<:rent red /lags, however, It bccnmc uppnrcnt that the Au;tmlinn list of fmud Indicators is n lot more
comprehensive (it covers the EDP = as well) than the one u,;cd by Loebbeckc ct ul.

II
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size of employer (e.g., Big Six- applicable at the time);
whether the audit finn provides forensic and fmud auditors and their

qualifications; and

number of times a fraud auditor/forensic accountant had been required by the
respondents themselves or their client in the last 12 months.

2.2

The respondents

The respondents were external and internal auditors as well as public sector auditors.
They were accessed as follows: first contact was made with the managing audit partner
in several large, medium and small firms to seek their cooperation in the study. Initial
contact was made with 117 partlers in the Big Six, medium tier finns, and small

practices in Australia in the middle of September 1995. The practices were selected
from the yellow pages and telephone contact was made to identify the partner in charge
of audit in a particular practice. Personalised letters were sent to the 117 partners

stating the research being carried out and soliciting their finn's participation. A followup telephone call was made two weeks later. A total of 76 partners (65% of finns
initiaUy approached) agreed to participate. At the end of October 1995 they were
provided with 433 questionnaires to distribute to their staff. The letter to the partners
made mention of the fact that the Major Fraud Group of the Victoria Police was
actively supporting the research into fraud and a Jetter to that effect by the then
Commander of the MFG, Allen Bowles, was attached to the questionnaire (see
Appendix 1).
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In order to avoid duplication of data, it was agreed with the participating partners that
they would distribute only one questionnaire per fraud investigated. Partners were also
asked to distribute questionnaires only to those who had some experience in fraud
detection, or worked on a fraud investigation. Where finns employed fraud auditors or
forensic accountants they were asked to distribute a questioiUlaire to them as welL
In addition to financial auditors, the Western Australian and Victorian Auditor

General's offices were approached to participate in the research. The Western

Australian Auditor General expressed some interest and he asked for 13 questionnaires
to distribute as instructed. The Auclitor General of Victoria, however, initially

expressed an interest in participating in the study, but changed his mind after receiving
i)

'

copies of the questionnaire. Given that a lot of fraud is identified by the internal
auditors, 25 questionnaires were distributed at a meeting held by the Internal Auditors'
Association on fraud detection addressed by Commander Bowles.

A total of 125 questionnaires were returned during the period from the last week in
October until the middle of December 1995. Of those, 17 were blank. Thus, 108 (86%)
completed questionnaires were used for the data analysis. The low (23%) response mte
is probably due to the fact that: (1) as Loebbecke eta!. reported, it is rarely that auditors
detect a material irregularity (including management and employee fraud); (2} only one
questionnaire was distributed by the participating partners per fraud; and (3) mail
surveys generally have a low response mte.
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In the present study, the following incentives (discussed by Moses and Kalton, 1981)

were provided for the respondents to complete the questionnaire: a covering letter was,,
attached which explained the main aims of the survey and which, also, informed the
respondents that the research had the support of the MFG; a stamped addressed

envelope was provided; the respondents anonymity and confidentiality of the data was
assured; a follow-up letter was sent, and a gift voucher was offered, It should also be

noted in this context that the response mte "is not the only consideration in evaluating
the quality of data from a survey" (Judd et al,, 1991 :217). Even though the response
rate is low, since it rises above 20% the failing is not so critical as to make the survey
results oflittle value (Moses and Kalton, 1981 :268).

Of the 108 useable respondents, 87 (80.5%) completed all sections of the questionnaire
while the remaining 21 completed only parts I and III. Part II asked respondents to
discuss only material irregularities encountered by them in the last 12 months. It is
assumed that those who did not complete Part II either had not come across a material
irregularity in the last 12 months or might have felt that they were to give away too
much infonnation about their client if they did1• Part III of the questionnaire collected
demographic data about the respondents and their audit experience.

fl
Overall, it can be said that the survey had a reJatively high response rate rilost likely
due to the tact that partners solicited the respondents. The process by which the 108
$ Loebbeckc c1 al. (1989) IISSUIIied th!lt those auditorn who did not pnrticipatc in their survey did so bc:couse they had

(I
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respondents came to participate in the survey, and whose data fonn the basis of the
•• -_'.1

findings reported below, means that as a sample they can not be considered a random

.

(I

sample of auditors with experience in detecting irregularities, including man~~emcnt
and employee fraud. At the same time, however, it is clear from discussions with
riUmerous partners that fraud-detection is such a specialist field that the proportion 'Or
,fraud-experienced auditors in accmmting fmns is very small.

Most respondents resided in Victoria (40%), QLD. (17%), N.S.W. (15%), S.A. (15%),
W.A. (8%), ACT (3%) and TAS (2%). The majority (85%) were males. While 39%
held manager positions, 28% were partners, 13% seniors, 12% supervisors and 8%
assistant n1anagers, (see Appendix II for full

details~

Regarding their position at the time of the survey, most {82%) were financial auditors,
7% public sector auditors, 7% fraud auditors and 4% internal auditors. Forty-two per
cent had been auditors for II years or more, 38% had been in their position for over
three years and there was no one with under three years' experience, About three
quarters (73%) were working for one of the Big Six firms.

About half (52%) had worked on more than 50 engagements and about two-thirds
(67%) had specialised in auditing more than three different industries. The following
are some interesting characteristics of the auditors who participated in the survey and

nut encountered nn im:gulnrily (p.7).

\'
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should be borne in mind when interpreting the

finding.~

reported below:

Respondents' Fraud Experience

Table 1:

Average audit experience (in years)
Average years in current position
Average number of engagements worked on
Average number of engagements where an irregularity had
been encmmtered

Average number of engagements where a material
irregularity bad been encountered
Engagements where an irregularity had been encountered as
a% of all en a ements wod:ed on b the res ondents

.
10
3
I 06

5
39

19%

The participants in the present study, are slightly yotmger in age, with fewer years'
experience in audit and with less experience in encountering irregularities, compared to
those in Loebbecke et al. (1989). The reason for these differences is that Loebbe<:ke et
al. surveyed only partners whereas in the present study partners made up 28% of the
respondents.

As already mentioned, the sample of auditors who took part in the survey did so

because they had experience in detecting irregularities, including management fraud
and defalcations. Furthennore, the auditors concerned are a heterogeneous sample by
virtue of the fact that they belonged to different firms, had different lengths of audit
experience, and held different positions. The nature of the sample, therefore, limits the
extent to which the findings obtained can be generalised to auditors in general. Unlike
the auditors in Loebbecke eta!. (1989) and Pincus (1989), however, the respondents in
the present study did not come from one single finn. Hence, it is argued that the
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research findings can be cautiously generalised to auditors experienced in detecting
irregularities (including management fraud and defalcations) more justifiably than in

the cnse ofLocbbeckc et al. (1989) and Pincus (1990).

3.0

SURVEY RESUJ~TS

3.1

Part I of Survey: Irregularities Encountered by Auditors and Discussion
of Findings

3.1.1

Respondents' expcrit!ncc with irregularities

Number oflrregularities Encountered by the Respondents
'

Table2:

Number.'.lf

Irregulur".tics
cncountc'i·cd

Number of respondents who
had encounterd

Number or respondents who
l1ad encountered material
irregut~-itics

immaterial irregularities
%

0

19.6

I
2

20.6

,,

43.1

Total

100%

16.7

Number

20
21
17
44
102

%

Number

34.0

36

34.9

37

13.2

14
19
106

17.9

100%

Table 2 shows that auditors are much more likely to encounter an inunaterial than a
material irregularity. More specifically, 66% of the respondents had come across at
least one material irregularity while 80.4% had encountered immaterial irregularities
during the last five years. Table 2 also shows that a significant proportion of thr
auditors concerned had encountered 3 or more immaterial irregularities within the
last five years. By comparison, Loebbccke et al. {1989) found that 40% of the 277
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audit partners who participated in their survey had not encountered a material
irregularity of any kind and, of those, only II% had done so on man: than five
occasions (p.8). In the present study of those who had encountered a material
irregularity, 8.9% had done so on five or more occasions. The results obtained
support Loebbecke ct al. (1989) who also found that for many auditors encountering

a material irregularity is a rare event. One could, therefore, argue that it is not
reasonable to expect the average au-liter to be proficient in detecting such

irregularities as fraud when he( she) does not seem to have the necessary experience.
According to Loebbecke et al. (1989:3), experience in fraud detection is one of the

attributes needed since fraud detection is without doubt a "multi*attribute, high-level
judgement task that requires knowledge, experience and reasoning" (Loebbecke et

a!., 1989:3).

When asked to provide detailed infonnation in respect of specific irregularities, the
108 respondents indicated they had come across 768 incidents of irregularities
during the past five years which comprised: 305 management fraud (39.7%), 185 .'
(24.1%) employee fraud, 146 (19%) other illegal acts, 32 (4.2%) other acts, 52

(~\8%) intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements and, finally, 48
(6.2%) errors. These are the irregularities the respondents chose to discuss. It is
possible, of course, that there might have been some irregularities they did not want
to divulge or did not remember well enough to discuss in Part I of the survey.
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3.1.2 Management fraud
Management frnud was defined in the questionnaire as an act which involves the usc
6

of deception to obtain an illegal advantage by managemcnt • The respondents had
encountered a total of305 cases of management fraud during the last five years (i.e.,

39.7% of the total irregularities encountered by those surveyed) and provided
detailed information on 153 (50.1%) of them.

Table 3:

Types of Management Fraud Encountered

Tvnc ofmamt~>emcn.t fraud
Window dressin
Misannronriation of funds
Cash s ent without a roval

Maninulation of reconciliations
Kickbacks
Conflict of interest

Other
Theft of e ui men\
Overstatement of

Number of cases

31
27
14
14
12
II

0

/o of cases

20.2
17.6

8
8

9.2
9.2
7.8
7.2
6.7
5.2
5.2

8
6
4

5.2
3.9
2.6

lSl

w""

10

sales/revenue/debtors

Overstatement of stock
Pavroll fraud

Theft of stock
Total

Regarding the type of management fraud encountered by auditors, Table 3 shows
that the most frequently encountered management frauds in the present study were
6 This term is not specifically defined in AUS 210 (AARF, 199511, parn.O~) 11hioh only defines frnud as "1u1 net
which Involves the usc of deception to obtain Ill\ ilkg~~lndVM\llgc" ll.lld, since it is "mMagemcnt", it was added by
the author lhnt it oughllo be commi!lcd by manogcmcnt. The some definition of"mnnagcmcnt frnud" wns used by
Loebbccke ct nl. (1989) [personal communic:Uion], nwncly "the motcriol, intentional mis.slolcmcnl nf financial
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window dressing and misappropriation of assets. Locbbcckc et a!. (1989) reported
that assets overvalued or incorrectly valued was the highest ranking management

fraud, which is similar to window dressing.

Concerning the industry classification used in the present study, it should be noted
that the respondents provided a long list of industries in which their clients operated

in, responding to Part I of the questionnaire. A number of industries did not belong
to any of the categories listed in Table 4 and subsequent tables which are based on
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (1993) classification. Such categories included,
for example: Fuel distribution, aviation, international service provider, "various",

and subsidiary company. Such categories were assigned to the no industry category
because they were very few in number to show separately in the analysis and did not
come under any of the ABS classification. In other words, the no industry category is
a miscellaneous category. To this category it was also added "fund mansgement and
trusts" which the respondents had listed on its own as a separate category worthy of

attention, despite the fact that it would be listed under Financial Services.

Table 4 indicates that most management fraud occurs in the manufacturing and
construction industries. This may be because there are more companies in these two
industries than in most others. In manufacturing it often takes the form of window
dressing, overstatement of stock, theft of cash and equipment, payro!l fraud and cash

statemento; to dcfmud U5cr.;".
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spent without approval. In construction, management frau!l involves window

dressing, misappropriation of funds, cash spent without approval and kickbacks.

Table 4:

Type of Industry by Type of Management Fraud and Ways of Being
Alerted and their Incidence

Industry

'lo of

mnaGement

Types of management
frauds commUted

Main ways ofbclng

Window dressing;
overstatement of stock;
theft of cash and
equipment; payroll fraud;
cash spent without
approval

Analytical and
management reviews,

alerted

fuud
Manufa~:turing

16.3

(N=25)

stocktake,

whistleblower

13.1

Window dressing;
misappropriation of funds;
cash spent without
approval; kickbacks;
overstatement of stocks

Tests of controls
and/or management
review

12.4

Window dressing;
misappropriation of funds;
cash spent without
approval; kickbacks

Analytical;
management review;
substative testing;
and/or knowledge of
client

8.5

Misappropriation of
funds; kickbacks

Substative and tests of
controls and/or
management review

6.5

Misappropriation of funds

Management review
and/or tests of controls

Accommodation, Cafes and
Restaurants
(No9)

5.9

Conflict of interest;
manipulation of
reconciliations

Management review;
tests of controls/
substantive testing

, Retail Trade

5.2

Window dressing

Substantive testing;
co-worker

No industry
(N=20)

Construction
(N=19)

Government
Administration
and Defence
(N=IJ)

Finance and
Insurance
(N=IO)

(N=S)
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5.2

Window dressing

Health and
Community
Services (N=7)

4.6

Misappropriation of funds

Property and

3.9

Misappropriation of funds

Financial analysis;
tests of controls and/or
management review

3.4

Cash spent without
approval

Tests of controls;
management or

Wholesale
Trade (N"'8)

Services(N=6)

analytical review

(N=S)

Transportation

2.6

Window dressing

After balance date

review; analytical nnd

and Storage
(N=4)

Communication
Services (N"<l)

Anonymous caller;

substantive testing

Business
Personal and
Other Services

Tests of controls
and/or anonymous
caller

managcmllnl review

2.6

Manipulation of
reconciliations;
misappropriation of funds

Tests of controls;

substantive testing;
and/or management

review
2.6

Misappropriation of
funds; conflict of interest;
manipulation of
reconciliations

Substantive and tests
of controls and/or
management review

Mining (N=4)

2.6

Cash spent without
approval;
misappropriation of funds;
conflict of interest

Tests of controls
and/or analytical and
management review

Electricity, Gas
and Water
Supply (N=3)

1,9

Mis~ppropriation

Cultural and
Recreational
Services (N=2)

1.4

Cash spent without
approval

Tests of controls
and/or management or
analytical review

Agriculture,
Forestry and
Fishing (N=2)

1.3

Theft of equipment;
window; window dressing

Review of asset
register

Education
(N=4)

of
funds; window dressing;
manipulation of
reconciliations

Fin~ncial

analysis

and/or tests of controls
and/or management
review
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Table 4 also shows that there is no relationship between the type ofindustry, the type
of fraud and which audit procedurc(s) alertcd 7 the auditors. Table 4 docs, however,

show that management review and tests of controls are two audit procedures most
likely to detect such fraud.

Manufacturing also had the highest incidence of management fraud in the KPMG

(1995a) fraud survey and in the Loebbecke et al. study, The other industries with a
relatively high incidence of management fraud in the present study were
construction, government administration and defence as well as finance and

insurance. In Kl'MG (1995a), the financial services and the mining industries
reported the second and third highest average fraud per occurrence respectively,

whereas in Loebbecke et al.'s study they were merchandising and Banking.

The industries with the !owes! incidence of management fraud in Australia are
cultural and recreational services, electricity, gas and water supply, agriculture,
personal and other services.

Close scrutiny of the data on which Table 4, is based found that the four most
common types of managcmrnt fraud across the different industries in order of
7 ]I should be noted that the auditors' responses rcg~rding the different wnys they were nlc~cd (o the odstcncc of
different lm:guhuitios me presented below ilS they were sl.ntcd, I.e., where two such wnys overlap (e.g., ·~ub5tnntivc
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prevalence were

misr~ppropriation

of funds, window dressing, cash spent without

approval, and manipulation of reconciliations. In contrast, the KPMG ( 1995a) survey
reported thm, out of 14 types of management fraud, the four most common were:
expense account (16%), purchase for personal use (15%), theft of inventory/plant
(13%), and conflict of interest (11%). The difference in prevalent fraud types
between the present study and KPMG (1995a) is probably attributable to their
different sample of companies and sample ofrespondcnts

1

•

Cross-tabulating the type of management fraud with whether the fraud had a material
impact on the accounts, it was found that window dressing (24%), manipulation of

reconciliations (21 %), misappropriation of funds (16%) and overstatement of stock
(12%) were the main types of management fraud that had a material impact on the
accounts.

The present study found that auditors were more likely to be alerted to the possible
existence of management fraud as a result of management review (14 out of 18),
followed by tests of controls, which featured in 12 out of the 18 industry categories
listed, and, finally, substantive testing in 7 out of 18 industry categories (see Table

4). This is different than Loebbecke et al,, who highlighted the utility of substantive
testing.
testing" and "uudit tc~t cfb~lanccs") no attempt lllls been made to merge or reclassify the two tenns.
8 In the KPMG survey the respondents comprised the following Clltcgorlcs; chief financial officer (36%), chief
l:llectlllve officer/ mlll!aglng director (24%), company secr=laly (II%), internal auditors (I 1%), other (tO%), gcncml
mDil.!lgcr (4%), chlcf opemting officcr(2%), lll!d bend of security (2%). As already sl!!ted, most (82o/o) rcspo>1donts in
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Further analysis of the data investigated whether a company belonging to a particular
industry category lacked: (I) an effective system of internal control and (2) a code of
conduct as well as (3) whether the management fraud impacted materially on the

accounts (see Table 5). The Spearman's rank correlation coefficient test was carried
out to test whether there is a statistically significant relationship between (1), (2) and

(3). The same analysis was carried out for the other five types of irregularities
reported below.

As several of the categories reported in Table 5 have small sample sizes, caution
must be exercised in interpreting the results. With this caveat in mind, a significant
relationship was found between a company having an ineffective system of internal

control and lacking a code of conduct (p = 0.000) and between each of those features
and the management fraud having a material impact on the accounts (p

=

0.000).

These significant relationships lend support to the view that an ineffective system of
internal control (as was also found in the MFG study, see Chapter 5) and the absence
of a code of conduct do indeed facilitate the commission of management fraud.
Consequently, any steps taken to reduce fraud must include both improving internal
controls and implementation of a code of corporate conduct. These two fraudprevention steps were the two most frequently reported as having been taken in the
KPMG (l995a) survey.

tile present sludy were financi!!l auditor.;.
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Industries Involved in Management Fraud by Ineffective lntcmal
Controls, Without a Code of Conduct and the Management Fraud
Having a Material Financial Impact on the Accounts

Table 5:

Industry

With
ineffective
internal
control

Without
a code of
conduct

Material
lmJmct on
Accounts

%

N

%

N

80

16

60

12

40

8

100

2

100

2

so

I

Mining (N=I)

75

3

so

2

25

I

Manufacturing (N'='25)

64

16

76

19

56

14

100

3

66

2

0

0

Construction (N'='l9)

68

13

63

12

58

II

Wholesale Trade (N'='S)

63

75

6

63

so

4

so
so

4

Retail Trade (N=S)

s
s

Accommodations, Cafes and
Restaurants (N"'9)

J3

3

44

4

22

2

Transport and Storage (N=I)

75

3

25

I

100

4

Communication Services (N=I)

so

2

75

3

25

I

Finance and Insurance (N=IO)

80

8

60

6

s

Property and Business Services (N=6)

so

3

33

2

so
so

3

Government Administration a11d
Defence (n=l3)

69

9

46

6

31

4

Education (N=4)

so

2

0

0

so

2

100

7

14

I

100

7

Cultural and Recreational Services
(N=2)

so

I

0

0

so

I

Personal and Other Serviccs(N=S)

80

4

80

4

20

I

No industry designation (N'='20
Agriculture Forestry and Fishing (N"'2)

Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
(N=3)

Health and Community Services (N=7)

N

%

4
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3.1.3

Employee fraud

Employee fraud was the Eecond type of irregularity respondents were asked to
comment on 9• Employee fraud was defined in the questionnaire as an act which
involves the use of deception to obtain an illegal advantage by an employee. The
terms "employee fraud", "defalcations", "employee theft" and "embezzlement" are,
used as synonymous in the context of this thesis.

A total of 185 incidents of

employee fraud had been encountered by the I 08 respondents in the previous five

years. This was the second higl:v;:st category after management fraud, making up 24%

of the total number of irregularities discussed in this chapter. The respondents
provided infonnation on a total of93 (50.2%) cases.

Wrong expense claim was the most common example of employee fraud (as in
Loebbecke eta!.), followed by product theft and cheque forgery. This contrasts with
the KPMG (1995a) survey, wh;ch found that theft of inventory or plant was the most
common type of employee fraud, occurring almost twice as often as manipulation of
petty cash, the next most common fraud, In the present study employee fraud did not
include any assets overvalued or transactions not recorded, as in Loebbecke et a!.,
but did have a relutively high incidence of cheque forgery,

9 This lrnn is not specifit:~~lly defined !n AUS 210 (AARI', 1995") but it wus t:~~nsidcn:d uppropri•tc to di~inguish
between frnud C~Jmrnitted by mMagcrncnt nod employees to sec if lhcro is a difference in the types of fmud
CllmmiUcd. In Austmlln, un!ik~ In the U.S., lhls tcm1 is not commonly used in the profcssionallitcrotme hut it is
undmtood more clearly thml the tenn "defalcation" which is used in the U.S.
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Table 6:

Types of Employee Fraud Encountered

Type of employee
rraud

Number of cases

%of cases
I

Wrong expense claim

25

Stealing cash

24

25.8

Product theft

14

15.1

Cheque forgery

11

11.8

-

26.9

Payroll fraud

7

7.5

Lapping

6

6.5

Kickbacks

3

3.2

Other

3

3.2

Total

93

=

Table 7 indicates both the type of industries that are prone to employee fraud by the
type of such fraud to affect each industry as well as the ways the auditors were

alerted. It shows that manufacturing makes up the largest share of employee fraud
out of the 16 industry categories, followed by government administration and

defence and finance and insurance. In Loebbecke et al., banking and savings was the
most employee fraud*p~one industry,
,-,·.

'/

(;
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Table 7:

Type oflndustry by Employee Fraud and Ways ofBcing Alerted

Industry

%of

employee

Types of employee
fraud committed

Main ways
alerted

fraud

Manufacturing
(N=>20)

21.5

Cheque forgery,
payroll fraud, cash and
product theft, lapping

Reconciliation:;,
management
and/or analytical
review and/or
substantive testing
and whistleblower

Government
Administrntion
and Defence

12.9

Steal cash, lapping,
wrong expeilse cl~im

Management
review and/or
substantive/ tests

(N=12)

of controls and/or
reconciliations

Finance and
Insurance (N=IO)

10.7

Wrong expense claim,
steal cash

Reconciliations
and/or discussions
with management
and/or tests of
controls

No 1ndustry (N=7)

7.5

Steal cash and products

Tests of controls

and/or
management
review

Health and

6.5

Steal cash

Internal audit

Retail Trade
(N=5)

5.4

Wrong expense claim,
stealing cash, lapping

Reconciliations
and cash counts

Accommodation,
Cafes and
Restaurants (Noo5)

5.4

Stealing cash

Management
review and/or test
of controls

Personal and
Other Services
(N=5)

5.3

Wrong expense claim

Management
review, tests of
controls

Community
Services (N=6)
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4.3

Wrong expense claim

Management
review

Communication
Services(N=4)

4.3

Wrong expense claim

Tests of controls
and/or
whistleblowcr

Education (N=I)

4.3

Steal cash, cheque
forgery, payroll fraud,
kickbacks

Analytical review,
and/or discussion
with management

Electricity, Gas,
and Water Supply

3.2

Product theft

Whistleblowcr

3.2

Steal cash

Internal audit,
reconciliations

2.1

Cheque forgery, wrong
expense c!aim

Analytical and/or
management
review

Mining (N=2)

2.1

Product theft

Internal audit and
management
review and
wbistlcblower

Agriculture,
Forestry and
Fishing(N"'i)

1.3

Wrong expense claim

Tests of controls,
and/or discussions
with management

Transp:·;11 and
Storage (N=4)

(N~3)

Construction
(N~3)

Wholesale Trade
(N~2)

Table 7 also shows that management review and/or tests of controls was the audit
procedure most likely to detect employee fraud. However in Loebbecke ct a!. it was
substantive testing.

The next question addressed by the data analysis was the relationship, if any,
between a company lacking both an effective internal control system and a code of
conduct and whether the employee fraud had a material impact on the accoWlts (sec
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Table 8).
Table &:Industries Involved in Employee Fraud by Ineffective Internal Controls,
Without a Code of Conduct and the Employee Fmud !laving a Material
Financial Impact on the Ac::ounts
Industry

With
Ineffective
internal
control

%

N1 indus!

desivnation fN==7\

--~~~lture Forestcy and Fishing
Mi"i"' (N- 2l
Manufacturin > IN=-20)
~':~icity, Gas and Water Supply

r.onstruction I'N=3\
Wholesale Trade JN=2)
Retail Trade I'N==5)
Accommodation, Cafes and
____Restaurants ft..: ...,-5,
Transoort and Storaae IN-""4)
Com un"cationSeJV·c :I'N==4\
Finance and Insurance IN=-! 0)
Government Administration and
Defence fN-]2)
Education CN=--4)
Health and Communitv ~eJVi e.~ fN=fi'l
Personal a~d Other SeJVices fN"-'5)

WiiiiOUID
code of
conduct

N

_•;.

Material
Impact on
Accounts

N

'lo

71

5

71

5

2R

100

1

100

1

100

2
1

50
65
66

1

50

0

50

25

5

2

33

1
10
1

0

11

0

0

3

100
50

'1

3
I

5
4

80

4

40

2

100
50
20
60

1

50
75

2

0
0

66
71

4

10
16

0
0
1
2

0
0
0

0
0
0

100
100
00
80
25
50
60
92
50
66
80

2

2

6
11

2
4

4

50
50
60

3

10

2
3
3

N

1
3

Speannan's rank correlation coefficient tests carried out yielded a statistically
significant relationship between having an ineffl!ctive internal control system and
lacking a code of conduct (p = 0.000) as well between having an ineffective internal
control system and the employee fraud impacting materially on the accounts (p ==
0.001). Having no code of conduct was also positively related to whether the
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employee fraud impncl<::d materially on the accounts (p "' 0.008). The following
industries exemplify the relationships found: manufacturing, accommodation,
government administmtion and defence. A number of government departments

(government administration and defence; health and community services; education)
appear to be prone to employee fraud and to be lacking an eff::ctive system of

internal control and a code of conduct to a significant degree.

3.1.4 Other illegal acts
Other illegal acts refers to "acts which involve non-compliance with laws and

regulations which may, or may not result in misstatements including omissions of
amounts or other disclosures from an entity's accounting records or financial reports"
(AUS 210, AARF, 1995a, para. 05). This was the third highest irregularity (N=l43)
encountered by the participating auditors comprising 19% of the total 768
irregularities reported in the survey. The respondents provided detailed infonnation
on 31 (21.6%) other illegal acts.

It can be seen that the most common illegal act encountered by the respondents was
non-compliance with accounting standards, fo!lowed by breach of security and
insurance industry regulations.
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Table 9:

Types of Other Illegal Acts Encountered

Types of other illegal acts

Number
Of cases

%of cases

Non-compliance with accounting
standards

14

45.1

Breach of security and insurance

9

29.3

Fictitious stock and invoices

2

6.4

Lending on false information

I

3.2

Trust accounts regulations altered

I

3.2

Non lodgement of ASC documents

I

3.2

Money laudering

I

3.2

Non-maintenance of statutory registers

I

3.2

Other

I

3.2

Total

31

industry regulations

I

1(

=
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Table 10:

Type of industry by Other Illegal Acts and Ways of llcing Alerted

Industry

%of
olhcr
Illegal

Types of other illegal
acts committed

Main ways of being
Alerted

acts

Finance and
Insurance (N=JO)

32.3

Non compliance with
accounting standards

and breach of securities
and insurance
industries lel!islation

Manufacturing

I (N~S)
Property and
Business

16.2

accounting standards

12.9

Services(N=4)
Health and
Community
Services (Noo3)

No industry

9.6

9.6

6.5

IN•2l

Communication
Services (Noo2)
Retail Trade

6.3
3.3

IN•Il

Personal
Services {Noo})

Breach of securities and
insurance industries
legislation
Non compliance with
accounting standards

Substantive and/or
tests of controls

Audit tests of balances

Test of controls and
substantive testing

and breach of securities

(N~3)

Wholesale Trade

Non compliance with

Audit tests of balances
and/or statutory
records review and/or
tests of controls and
substantive testinl!

3.3

and industries
legislation
Non compliance with
accounting standards,
fictitious stock, non
maintenance of records
Non compliance with
accountinl! standards
Non lodgement of ASC
documents
Non compliance with
accountin standards
Trust account
violations

Substantive testing
and statutory records
review
Statutory records and
review
Statutory records
review
Statutory records
review
After balance date
review

As shown in Table 10, finance and insurance accounts for the largest proportion
(32%) of other illegal acts encountered, followed by manufacturing (16%). Auditors
were alerted to the existence of other illegal acts (most often non-compliance with

I
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accounting standards) mainly by substantive testing and/or a statutory records

review. As with the previous two types of irregularities, there docs not appear to be a
clear relationship between ways of being alerted and industry designation or type of

other iliegal acts.

Data analysis also addressed the question of whether there were adequate internal

controls in place and a code of conduct as well as whether the other illegal acts had a

material impact on the accounts.

Table 11:

Industries Involved in Other Illegal Acts by Ineffective Internal
Controls, Without a Code of Conduct, and the Other Illegal Acts
Having a Material Financial Impact on the Accounts

Industry

With

Without a

Mntcrlnl

lneff~clive

code of
conduct

impncton

Internal
control
%

No indust desi nation IN=3)
Retail Trade IN=!)
Manufacturin11 11\ """5)
Wholesale Trade rN=2)
Communication Services (N=2)
Finance and Insurance (N=IO)
Property and Business Services

66

100
60
100
100
30
50

Accounts

N

%

2

2
0

3
2

66
0
60
100
50
50
75

I

3
2
2

N

3

2
I

5
3

%

N

66
2
0
0
20 .~L
100
2
0
0
30
3
50
2

' {N.;,)

Health and Community Services

100

3

33

I

33

I

Personal and Other Services CN""'i)

100

I

100

I

0

0

. ;;,;3)
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In view of the small number of cases per industry in Table II, any conclusions
drawn need to be treated with caution. Speannan's rank correlation coefficient tests
carried out found a significant relationship between an industry category (finance

and insurance and property and business services) without a code of conduct and the
other illegal acts having a material impact on the accounts (p "'0.005).

3.1.5

Other acts

Other acts are defined in AUS 210 (AARF, 1995a, para. 05) as acts "which

contravene the constitution of an entity including non-compliance with trust deeds or
memorandum and articles of association". The respondents reported having come
across within the last five years a total of 32 other acts within the last five years

(comprising 4.1% of the irregularities reported in the survey} provided information
for about 15 (46.8%) ofthem.

Table 12:

Types of Other Acts Encountered
Types of other acts

Non comoliance with trust deed
Non compliance with memorandum and
articles
.
Incorrect accountin treatment
Non com liance with a licable le islation
Unintentional non com liance with trust deed
Other
Total

Number of
cases

6
3
2

2
I
I
15

o/o of cases
40
20
13
13
7
7
l.OO%
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Table 13:

Type of Industry by Type of Other Acts uml Ways of Being Alerted

Industry

%of
other
acts

No industry (N=6)

19

Types of other acts
committed

Main ways of being
alerted

Non compliance
with trust account,
non compliance
with memorandum

Review of records
and/or financial
statement review

and articles of
association,
unintentional non
compliance with
trust deed

Finance and

16

Non-compliance
with memorandum
and articles

3

Non compliance
with memorandum

Insurance (N=5)

Mining (N=l)

and articles

Audit procedures:
solicitor's
representations and
checklist

Audit procedures:
solicitor's

representation and
checklist

Manufacturing
(N=l)

3

Non compliance
with legislation

Review of financial
statements and
records

Retail Trade (N=l)

3

Non compliance

Review of records

3

with trust deed
Non compliance
with legislation

Financial statement
review

Government
Administration
and Defence (N=l)

Table 13 shows that companies in the no industry category (which for the purpose of
Table 13 comprised mainly trusts and fund management and finance and insurance
industry) accounted for II out of the 15 other acts encountered. In view of the main
types of other nets in Table 13, it is to be expected that trusts and fund management
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would have a high incidence of such acts. In the main (in three of the six industries),

auditors were alerted to other acts as a result of a review of records.

Table 14:

lndwtries Involved in Other Acts by Ineffective Internal Controls,
Without a Code of Conduct and the Other Acts Having a Material
Financial Impact on the Accounts
lndu!lry

With incff,ctlvc

Internal control

No industry
designation (N=6)

Without a code of

Material impact
on accounts
%
N

%

N

conduct
%
N

50

3

16

I

16

I

0

100

I

0

0

"

Mining (N=l)

0

Manufacturing (N=l)

0

0

0

0

0

0

100

I

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

80

4

40

2

80

4

Retail Trade (N=l)
Goverrunent
Administration and

Defence (N=l)

Finance and Insurance
(N"5)

Statistical analysis of the relationship between the three factors shown in Table \4

found a significant relationship between a company belonging to a particular

industry category Jacking a code of conduct and an effective internal control system
and the other acts having a material impact on the accounts {p = 0.005 and p = 0.06
respectively). The statistical relationships found, however, should be treated with
caution due to the small sample size.
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3.1.6

Intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements

Intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements arc acts "which include
omissions of amounts or other disclosures from

liD

entity's accounting records or

financial reports" AUS 210 (AARF, l995a, para.OS). The auditors participating in

the survey had come across 52 such irregularities, comprising 6.7% of the total
irregularitie3 encountered. Respondents provided information on 26 (50%) cases.
Caution is, therefore, warranted in interpreting the figures given below due to small

numbers in each industry category. Table 15 shows that the most common
intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatement is "Accounts did not add

up", followed by overstatement of debtors.

Table 15:

TYpes of Intentional but
Misstatements Encountered

Types ofintentional but not fraudulent
or other illegal misstatements

Fraudulent

Numherof
cases

or

Other Illegal

%or cases

19.2

Accounts did not add u

5

Overstatement of debtors

4

15.4

Balance date window dressin

3

11.5

Falsifvin items

3

11.5

Other errors

3

11.5

Non disclosure

2
2
2
I
I

7.7
7.7
7.7

26

JOO%

Understatement of provisions
Non disclosure of contigent liabilities
Recognising sale in the wrong period
Unintentional omissions from the
Financial Statements

I

not

T"''

3.9
3.9
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Table 16 also shows that companies in the "No Industry" designation made up the
biggest share of intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements

(38.4%), followed by manufacturing (30.7%).

Table 16:

Type of Industry by Type of Intentional but Not Fraudulent or Other

Il!egal Misstatements, and Ways of Being Alerted
Industry

%or
otbCI'

Types or other illegal
acts committed

Main ways or being

alerted

illegal
acts

No industry

38.4

(N~IO)

Manufacturing

30.7

(N~8)

Retail Trade

debtors; accounts did
not add up;

7.7

rN~2!

Finance and
Insurance (N=2)

7.7

Construction

3.9

(N~!)

Government
Administration
and Defence
I rN~n
Health and
Community
Servicesi'N=J)
Agriculture
(N~t)

Accounts did not add
up; non disclosure of
contin~nt liabilities
Overstatement of

3.9

understfltement of
provisions; falsifying
items
Overstatement of
debtors
Balance date window
dressing; unintentional
omissions
Balance date window
dressing

Accounts did not add

"P
3.9

3.8

Falsifying items

Accounts did not add

"P

Review of financial
statements and/or
knowled~e of client

Review of financial
statements and records
and/or knowledge of
client and/or cut off
tests

Review of financial
stutcments and records
Review of financial
statements and/or
review of records
Review of accounting
records
Review of financial
statements and
knowledge of client
Review of financial
statements and/or cut
off tests
Review of financial
statements and/or
k ow led •e of client
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As shown in Table 16, a review of financial statements and/or accounting records is
the audit procedure most likely to identity the various types of intentional but not
fraudulent or other illegal misstatemenW in the industries concerned.

Table 17:

Industries Involved in Intentional but not Fraudulent or Other Illegal
Misstatements by Ineffective Internal Controls, Without a Code of
Conduct and the Intentional but not Fraudulent or Other Illegal
Misstatements Having a Material Financial Impact on the Accounts

Industry

With in effective

Intcmnl control

Without n code of
conduct

Material

Impact un
Accounts

%

N

%

N

%

N

No industry
desil!natio~ m=IO)

20

2

50

s

60

6

Agricultur~ ~~stry
and FishinQ --])-

100

I

100

I

0

0

Manufacturin!! rN~8l
Construction fN= n
Retail Trade rN=2)

50
100

37
100
0
0

3
I
0
0

37
100
50
50

3

so
so

4
I
I
I

100

I

100

I

100

I

100

I

0

0

0

0

Finance and Insurance

I
I
I

JN~2)

Government
Administration and
Defence IN"' I)
Health and Community
Services IN= I)

Spearman's rank correlation coefficient tests carried out reveal that the intentional
but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements have a material impact on the
accounts of those industry-category companies which lacked a code of conduct (p =
0.001).
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3.1.1

Errors

AUS 210, para. 05 (AARF, 1995a) defines errors as "unintentional mistakes in, or

omissions of amounts or other disclosures from financial reports". The respondents
provided information on 48 incidents of errors (6.25% of the total irregularities) they
had encountered in the last five years. Where possible, the findings obtained about
errors will be compared with similar findings reported by Entwistle and Lindsay
(1994) and Sender and Moray (1991).

Table 18:

Types of Errors Encountered

_Tvnes of errors
Financial_statement errors
Omitting_creditors
Omitting_disclosure
Related_Q_arty transaction errors
Non coam!iance with new AAS
Understate en\ of creditors' accounts
Understate ent of doubtful debts
Overstatement of stock
Overstatement of sales
Mistakes in estimates
Total

N!Unber of cases
13
8

5
5
4
3
3
3
2
2
48

%of Cases
27.1
16.6
10.4
10.4
8.3
6.4
6.4
6.4
4.0
4.0

Ul'""

Table 18 shows that the most common type of errors are financial statement errors,
related party transaction errors, and omitting creditors. Cross-tabulating the type of
error by industry (see Table 19) found that the companies that mninly fell into the
"No industry" category (i.e., unit trusts, fund manngement, marketing and
electronics) accounted for most of the errors, followed by manufacturing.
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Table 19:

Type of Industry by Type of Error and Ways of Being Alerted
Type of errors committed

Main ways of being

Review of financial
statements and records
and/or review of debtors
and/or detail review and
analysis

4.1

Financial statement errors;
omitted creditors; omitted
disclosure; related party;
understatement of doubtful
debts; non compliance with
new Australian Accounting
standards
Financial statement errors;
related party; mistakes in
estimates; omitting
creditors; non compliance
with new accounting
standards
Overstatement of sales;
understatement of doubtful
debts and financial
statement errors
Omitting disclosure

2.1

Financial statement errors

Agriculture (N=l)

2.1

Related party

Retail Trade
(N=I)

2.1

Financial statement errors

Accommodation
Cafes and
Restaurants fN"'l)
Personal and
~~~r) Services

2.1

Financial statement errors

2.1

Overstatement of sales

lmlustry

%of

alcrled

Error

No industry
(N=26)

54.2

Manufacturing
(N=ll)

22.9

Finance and
Insurance (N=4)

Construction
_lN=2)
Electricity, Gas
and Water Supply

8.3

_l!H'

Review of financial
statements, and/or detail
review and analysis

Review of aged trial
balance and/or cut off
tests and/or detail review
Review of financial
statements
Review of financial
statements and/or detail
review and anal sis
Review of financial
statements
Review of financial
statements and/or detail
review and anal sis
Review of financial
statements and/or detail
review ami analvsis
Review of financial
statements and cut off
tests

Auditors were most frequently alerted to the existence of errors as a result of a
review of financial statements, followed by detailed review and analysis of accounts.
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Table 20 shows that there is no clear relationship between the different audit

procedures whicli alerted the auditor and type of error or type of industry.

Table 20:

Industries Involved in Committing Errors by Ineffective Internal
Controls, Without a Code of Conduct, and thC Error Having a

Material Financial Impact on the Accounts

Industry

With ineffective
internal control

Without a code
ufconduct

.,

Material impact

Accounts

%

N

%

N

%

N

15

4

12

3

15

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

27

3

36

4

9

I

100

I

100

I

100

I

Construction (N"'2)

0

0

0

0

50

I

Retail Trade (N=l)

0

0

0

0

0

0

Accommodation, Cafes

0

0

0

0

0

0

Finance and Insurance
(N=4)

100

4

75

3

75

3

Personal and Other
Services (N=l)

too

I

100

I

100

I

No industry designation
(N=26)
Agriculture (N=l)
Manufacturing (N=ll)

Electricity, Gas and
Water Supply (N=l)

and Restaurants (N=l)

Spearman's rank correlation coefficient tests on the figures in Table 20 found a

significant relationship between a company having an ineffective internal control
system and lacking a cocie of conduct (p = 0.05) and an ineffective internal control
system and the error impacting materially on the accounts (p = 0.006).
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Entwistle and Lindsay (1994) concentrated on "large dollar-value misstt~tements and
found them to be concentrated in relatively few accounts and to have arisen primarily
from judgement error or biases". They also suggest that non-recurring transactions
such as cut-offs are more risky than recurring ones as far as errors made in financial
statements are concerned.

Entwistle and Lindsay found manufacturing to be an

error-prone industry with cut-off errors, and judgement errors or mechanical errors
being the main types. Th>;! present study found that the most frequently reported
errors were financial statement errors, or errors regarding related party transactions.
The auditors surveyed did not state how those errors were committed and whether,
for example, they were cut-off errors. Whilst substantive testing was the main
procedure signalling these errors in Entwistle and Lindsay's Canadian study, in the
present study it was client knowledge and review of financial statements.

Summarising the findings, Table 21 shows the relationship between a company
having an ineffective system of internal control and lacking a code of conduct and an
irregularity having a material impact on the ace counts of a company.

Table2l:

Type oflrregularity and the Relationship Between Jneffcctivc Internal
Controls, Without a Code of Conduct and the Irregularity Having a
Material Financial Impact on the Accounts
Wlllwut n code of can~ud

Ineffective
internal control

Management fraud
Employee fraud
Error

Without a code
of conduct

(p~.OOO)
(p~.OOO)
(p~.005)

Material impact on account
Management Fraud
Employee Fraud
Other illegal acts
Em'

(p~.OOO)
(p~.OOO)
(p~.OS3)
(p~.060)

(p~.oOO)
Management frnud
(p~.ooa)
Employee fraud
(p~.005)
Intentional acts
(p=.068)
Other illegal acts
Intentional but not froudulent
grother illegal misstatements (p-.001)

Two of the company characteristics in the ROP model arc lack of adequate control
procedures that prevent fraud and lack of code of conduct. The ROP model is an
integral part ofthc eclectic fraud detection model proposed. In support of the eclectic
fraud detection model, it can be seen that there is a significant probability of
companies that have an ineffective internal control system and without a code of
conduct, experiencing management and employee fraud and error. Furthennore, in
those companies with an ineffective internal control system the management fraud,
employee fraud, other illegal acts and errors impacted materially on the accounts.
Finally, in those companies lacking a code of corporate conduct, the management
fraud, employee fraud, other illegal acts, and other illegal misstatements had a
material impact on the accounts.
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Table 22:
Type of
lrn~ularl!y

Patterns in Auditors' Detection of Different Irregularities
lndustry(les)
wltll high
lnddence of
irrcgulnrhy

Manage-

Manufacturing,

meot fraud

Trust~;

Tllc fcrm(s) 111.1
Ukc!y to take

procedure(s)

Audit

Statistically
signlfkant

likely to alert

correlates of the

auditors to
irregularity
edstence

Irregularity

Impacting
materially on
company's
accounts

MisAppropriation of
funds; window
dressing

Management
review and/or
tests of controls

Manufacturing,
Government
Administration
and Defence,
Finance and
Insurance

Expenses
recorded
incorrectly

Management
review and/or
tests of controls

Lack ofeffe.:tivc
internal control
system, absence
of code of
conduct

Otbcr
HlegRI acts

Fimuu;eand
Insurance,
Manufacturing

Non·compliance
with accounting
standards, breach
of security and
insurance
industry
regulations

Substantive
testing
andfstatutory
records review

Absence of a
code of conduct

Otbtr acts

Trusts and Fund
Management,
Finance and
Insurance

Non-compliance
with trust
accounts

Review of
records

Lock of effective
internal contml
system, absence
of a code of
conduct

Other
Illegal
Mlntatc•
ments

Trusts and Fund
Management,
Manufacturing

Accounts did not
add up

Review of
financial
sllltcmcnts ~ndlor
review of
accounting
records

Absence of a
code of conduct

Errors

Trusts and Fund
Management, no
industry
category,
Manufocturing

Financial
statement errors

Review of
financial
statements

Lack of effective
internal control
system, absence
of a code of
conduct

and Fund

Management,
Construction
Employee
fraud

Lack of effective
internal control

syotem, absence
of a code of
conduct
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Table 22 shows the patterns identified in auditors' detection of the six types of

irregularities. Irregularity-prone companies are characterised by a lack of an effective
internal control system and the absence of a code of conduct. This finding is not
surprising when we remember that 76% of the companies where management fraud
had occurred had ineffective internal controls and 64% lacked a code of conduct.
Similarly, of the companies where employee fraud occurred 65% had ineffective
internal controls and 56% lacked a code of conduct. As already indicated, these two

company characteristics are significantly correlated. Furthermore, the material
impact of these deficiencies on the accounts is pervasive. These findings provide
support for the eclectic fraud detection model and attest to the importance of auditors
carrying out further tests if they are auditing a company with an ineffective internal
control system and lacking a code of conduct. The sunrey results suggest that these
two characteristics point to a higher probability that a material irregularity in the
accounts exists. This finding is in agreement with the conclusion reached in the
KPMG {1995a) survey that any steps taken by companies to reduce the possibility of
an irregularity (including fraud) that will impact materially on the accounts must
include improvement in internal control systems and the implementation of a code of
conduct.

4.0

CONSIDERATION OF LOEBBECKE'S ASSESSMENT MODEL

4.1

Usefulness of red flags

Part II of the sunrey addressed the usefulness of red flags in detecting material
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irregularities. Participants were asked to indicate how useful a list of red flags had
been to them concerning a material irregularity they had encountered in the la~t 12
months. More specifically, the respondents were asked whether a red flag had been
(1) applicable to the engagement, (2) relevant to the irregularity; and (3) whether it

had alerted them during the planni~g phase. It should be noted here that a small
number of respondents indicated that a particular red flag (see below) was relevant to
the irregularity but did not also indicate that it was applicable to the engagement, as
one would expect. It is for this reason that the figures in the columns 'Relevant...'

and 'Applica'Jle ... ' in a number of Tables below is not consistent. Part II of the
questimmaire was completed by 87 participants. As indicated in Chapter 3, and this
is borne out by the findings reported below, red flags are of doubtful usefulness if
used on their own to detect fraud. Tables 23-30 address the usefulness of eight
categories of red flags in detecting irregularities listed in Appendices I and 2 of
AUS210 (AARF, 199Sa). Using aggregate figures and not distinguishing between
the different fraud indicator categories, Tables 23-30 examine whether the auditor
was alerted during the planning stage to the possible existence of a particular
irregularity by a red flag he/she considered applicable to the engagement and/or
relevant to the irregularity.
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Table 23:

Business Environment

Hr~sl11css

Em'/ronmelll

(Rc<l Flog)
Appllcuh/e to

"'

(Red Flag)
Relevant to tile
Irregularity

engagement

(Red FlaK)
A luted ltU!

dur/rJJ: tl1e
planning
plune

Na87

N=B7

N"87

Nature of the business is susceptible to
misappropriation

29

24

8

Unduly influential circumstances

14

16

5

Pressure to meet forecasts

13

II

I

Weak management integrity

19

29

6

6

10

2

Survival of company dependant on
irrcgularity(ics)

2

5

3

Ineffective or non-existent code of

15

' 14

3

Transactious with related parties not nl
arm's length

7

10

3

Unusual transactions with comp:mics
registered in \!1)[ havens

I

2

-

10

6

-

116

127

lneffectivefnon-existenl regulation by

external parties

conduct

Liquidily pressure

Total

31

Table 23 shows the following four business environment fraud indicators feature to a
significant degree as both applicable to the engagement and relevant to the
irregularity: nature of the business is susceptible to misappropriation; weak
management integrity; and unduly influential circumstances; and ineffective or nonexistent code of conduct. Despite this, only a minority of those indicators alerted the
auditor during the planning stage to the existence of the irregularity.
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Table 24:

Internal Control

lnttrnnl Control Structure

(Red Hug)
ro
tile

Appllcnbl~

(Red Flag)
He/evan/to tire

(Red Flag)

Altrtedme

/rreg/1/arlty

drtrlng the
planning

87

N"'87

N"'87

18

24

9

Management override

25

33

13

Ineffective management

17

24

6

Lack of segregation of duties

25

42

\3

Weak internal controls

21

32

II

Excessive authority vested in a
senior officer

26

32

7

Poor systems

16

23

7

lnefiOctivc internal audit

21

14

4

169

224

70

engagement

phase
'
Organisation is dccentrnliscd
with~ut adequate monitoring

Total

N~

Auditing standards 10 emphasise the importance of internal controls. However, Table

24 shows that the auditors did not, in fact, pay particular attention to serious
weaknesses in internal controls. Consequently, less than half of those indicators

alerted them at the planning stage to the existence of an irregularity, despite the fact
that they were relevant to the irregularity.

10 Sec AUS402 (AARF, 199Sb). The criminogenic nature ar weak internal controls was confinncd by tbc
test of the ROP model in the MrG ~tudy.

succcs~rul
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T~ble

25:

Integrity/Competence of Management

lnlegrlty/Comp<'lence of Mmw;:eme11t

(Red Flag)

(Red Flog)

Applicable to

Relevallf to the
lrregularlly

tile

engagement

(R~d

Flat:)

Alerted me
during/he

planning
ph use

N~87

N~87

N~B7

21

23

7

5

2

I

17

17

5

High executive staff turnover

2

5

2

Significant/prolonged under·staffing of
the accounting department

8

5

2

Frequent chilllges of lawyers

-

-

-

The client has engaged in opinion

-

I

2

7

9

4

8

8

6

68

70

29

Domineering management
Complex corporate structure

Continuing failure to correct Internal
control weaknesses

shopping
The auditor's experience with

management indicates a degree of
dishonesty
Internal audit is improperly starTed

Total

The only two indicators pointing to a concern about the integrity/competence of

management were domineering management and continuing failure to correct
internal control weaknesses. The auditors' apparent insensitivity to the presence of
the other 7 indicators largely explains the finding in Table 25 that they were alerted
at the planning stage to the existence of an irregularity to a limited degree. Support
of the finding that indicators of management integrity/competence are not effective
red flags was reported by Bernardi (1994a). Pincus (1994, 1990), however, reported
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a contradictory finding on the same issue.

Table 26:

Unusual Pre~sures Within an Entity

UmiSIWI Presmres wltMn an entity

lnadequ~te

working capital

(Red Flag)
Applicable ta the

engagement

(Red Flag)
Relevallflo the
lrreg/1/ar/ty

N:o87

N-87

(Red Flag)
Alerted me

durlngtlte
p/ann/111:
pluue
N-87

10

6

7

Deteriomting quality ofeamings

11

11

4

A need for n rising profit

10

8

.I

A significant investment in an industry
noted for mpid change

6

7

3

Entity heavily dependent on a product
or a customer

4

7

2

11

10

5

3

3

.

55

52

26

Management displays an overly
aggressive attitude toward limmcial
reporting and forecasts

Pressure exerted on accounting
personnel to complete financial reports
in unusually short periods

Total

It can be seen in Table 26 that only two out of the seven indicators of unusual
pressures within an entity (Deteriorating quality of earnings, Pressure exerted on
accounting personnel to complete financial reports in unusually short periods) were
considered applicable to the engagement and relevant to irregularity. It should, also
be noted however, that with most of the other indicators there is an average match of
74%, i.e., in most cases they were both applicable and relevant. Suprisingly,
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however, only half of the indicators listed alerted the auditor at the planning stage to
the existence of an irregularity.

Table 27:

Unusual Occurrcncesrfransaction

Unumal Occurrerwesirransactlons

(Red Flag)

(Red Flag)

(Red Flag)

Applicable to

Rel<!l!antlo tile

Alened me

the

Irregularity

during the

engagement
N,.87

planning
plwse

N=87

N~B7

Unusual balance date transactions

13

12

2

Payments for services that appear
excessive in relation to services
provided

4

13

2

Payments for goods which appear to be
nboveibelow market price

5

12

3

Evidence of falsified documents

8

31

2

Lmgc cash payments

4

12

2

Payments made to local or overseas
officials

2

2

-

Problems with rcgulatozy authorities

-

2

-

Ignored advice by lc;::al adviser

-

2

-

Evidence of unduly lavish sl}'lcs by
officers or employees

4

14

2

Investigations by police

2

2

I

42

102

14

Total

Table 27 shows that, even such crucial information concerning evidence of falsified
documents that was relevant to the irregularity, did not alert the auditors to the
irregularity concerned at the planning phase. The same is also true, for example, of
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unusual balance date transactions and evidence of unduly lavish lifestyles by

company or employees. The auditors concerned, do not appear to have been aware of
the importance of such indicators and/or to have been vigilant about their
importance.

Table 28:

Unsatisfactory Records/Problems in Obtaining Sufficient Appropriate
Audit Evidence

Unsatisfactory Recortls!Probletm /11
Obtaining Sufficient Appropriate

(Red Flog)
Applicable to the

Relevant to lire

Audit Evldenu

engagement

lm:gular/ty

(Red Rag)
Alerted me
during/Ire
plorw/ng
phase

N"'87

N"'87

N=87

(Red Flag)

Inadequate accounting records

16

19

4

Inadequate documentation

14

29

8

Excessive number ufdiffircnccs
between accounting records and third
party confinnations

II

18

2

Evasive, unreasonable or unsatisfactory
responses by management to inquiries

20

20

7

New client without sufficient
information from predecessor auditor

6

4

2

Conflicting audit evidence and
inexplicable changes in operating
ratios.

7

8

2

Significantly fewer responses to
confirmation requests than expected

3

5

2

77

103

27

Total
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The auditors' lack of vigilance at the planning stage is further evidenced in Tublc 28.
It can be seen that they failed to be alerted to the irregularity in question by: evasive,

unreasonable or unsatisfactory responses by management to their inquiries;
inadequate accounting records, inadequate documentation; and excessive number of
differences between accounting records and third party confinnations.

Table 29:

Market Pressures
Market Pressures

(Red Flag)
Applicable /0 the
engagettll'n/

(Red Flag)

Reii!Vatlt to tire
Irregularity

(Red Flag)
Alerted me
durltrgthe

planning
N=87

Nc87

phase
N=B7

Declining industry

4

3

-

lndusuy subject te complex
legislation

2

I

I

Volatile industry with numerous
corporate takeovers

I

2

-

Total

7

6

I

Table 29 shows that evidence of a declining industry was overlooked by the
respondents at the planning stage even though such evidence would normally justify
an auditor to apply more reasonable care and skill by performing additional tests.
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Table 30:

Factors Relevant to an ED!' Environment

f'11CI"rJ Re/el'Q/1( fa an ED I'
Etwlronmelll

(Red Flag)
Applknble to
tile
engagement

(Red Nul:)
Relevant to tile

N-87

Nc87

/rre~tulurily

(Red Flail)

Alerted me
dnrlng tile
plamdng pllale
N-87

Minimal planning forth~ installation of
new hardware

2

I

I

Inadequate computer ski!ls amongst
relevant onti staff

7

5

I

Inappropriate hardware or software to

3

2

I

Poor physical or logical access controls

I

2

Inadequate or inappropriate file access

-

I

-

5

7

-

-

-

-,.,

crforrn im ortant functions

hiemr~lw
Lack of clear audit trail and tramaction

lo

Hardware f~ilures, including exc~ssive
amounts of"dov.THimc" and resultant
in ut backlo s

Software failures

-

-

Failure to restrict access to soltware and
documentation to authorised crsonncl
Program changes that are not documented,
app;oved and tested

2

4

4

I

-

Inappropriate data and program storage
mcdin
Inadequate detection procedures for
s stem viruses

-

-

-

I

I

-

I

I

-

I

I

I

27

26

4

Inadequate overall balancing of computer
transactions and data bases to the financial

-

~ccounts

Shared or non-specific ownership of datu

Total

Examination of Table 30 reveals that the respondents were not alerted to the
existence of an irregularity at the planning stage by such important features of the
EDP environment as lack of clear audit trail and lrausaction log as well as inadequate
computer skills amongst relevant entity staff, despite the fact that they were both

2(12

applicable to the engagement and relevant to the irregularity.

The findings reported in Tables 23-30 show that the following fraud indicators,
provided for in the eclectic fraud detection model, featured to a significant degree
both as applicable to the engagement and relevant to the irregularity: no code of
conduct; weak management integrity; weak internal controls; financial pressure on
management in the fonn of inadequate working capital (declining industry); Jack of
clear audit trail; and unduly lavish styles by company officers or employees.

Table 31 summarises Tables 23-30 and shows that only a minority of red flags
alerted auditors to thCl existence of a material irregularity. Out of a total of 561 red
flags that were considered applicable to the engagement, only 202 (36%) alerted the
auditor during the planning phase, Also, even though a total of 710 red flags were
relevant to the irregularity only 202 (28.4%) alerted the auditor at the planning
phase. In other words, the auditor was not alerted to the )XlSSible existence of the
irregularity concerned despite the fact that the majority of the red flags were
applicable to the engagement and relevant to the irregularity. Red flags belonging to
the unusual pressures within an entity, integrity/competence of management, and
internal control categories alerted the auditor to the possible existence of a material
irregularity to a greater degree at the planning phase than the other categories.
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TablcJl:

Applicability, Relevance und Whether the Auditor was Alerted by
Categor)HofRed Flag
<\

Red flag category

Red flag
applicable
to tile
engagement

Red flag
relevant to

'"'

irregularity

Red flat:
alerted an
auditor
during the
planning
phase

116
169
68

224

70

31
70
29

Unusual pressures within an
entity

55

52

26

Unusual
occurrence/transactions

42

102

14

Unsatisfactory records/
problems in obtaining
sufficient appropriate audit
evidence

77

103

27

7
27

6
26

4

561

710

202

Business environment
Internal control
Integrity/Competence of
management

Market pressures
Factors relevant to an EDP
environment
Total

127

1

Taking each of the eight red flag categories separately, Speam1an's rank correlation
coefficient tests were carried out to examine the relationship, if any, between a red

flag being applicable to the engagement, relevant to the irregularity and whether it
alerted the auditor during the planning stage. Table 32 shows the results of these
tests.
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Table 37.:

The Statistical Relationship Between Applicability and Relevance of
Red Flags and Whether the Auditor was Alerted by Them
Alerted

Relevant
AP

Bn•iness environment
Integrity/competence

(p~O.OO\)

ofm~nagcmcnt

(p-0.04)

Unusual pressures

{p-0.04)

Unusual occurrence/

transaction(p=O.OS}

Unsatisfactory records
Factors relevant to an EDP

(p=O.OJ)

environment

(p=O.Ol)

Internal control

REL

NS

Business environment
Integrity/competence
of management
Unusual pressures
Unusual occurrence/
Tronsaction
Unsatisfactory records

(p-0.008)

(p-O.OOl)
(p=O.Ol)
(p=0.04)

(p-0.04)

Internal_control
NS
Business environment (p-0.001)
Internal control
(p"'0.008)
Integrity/competence of
management
(p=0.007)
Unusual occurronce/
transaction
(p"'0.03)
Unsatisfactory records
(!l"'0.Q2

NS- Not stattsttcally stgmficant.

In interpreting the significance of the relationships depicted in Table 32 it should be
noted that no test was possible in the case of one red flag category, namely "market
pressures" (declining industry, industry subject to complex legislation, volatile
industry with numerous corporate takeovers) due toN"" 3. Also, as far as "factors
relevant to an EDP enviroruncnt" is concerned, only four examples of that particular
red flag were reported as ltaving alerted respondents and, consequently, no
correlation test was possible with whether that red flag was applicable to the
engagement or relevant to the irregularity. With the exception of internal control (p "'
.072), a statistically significant relationship was found between all the remaining five
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categories of red flags being considered both applicable to the engagement and

relevant to the irregularity and alerting the auditor to the existence of an irregularity.
However, it needs to be remembered that the respondents provided the data in

hindsight. The following conclusions can be drawn from Table 32:

i.

Deticiencies in internal control did not alert auditors to the existence of an
irregularity if those particular red flags were considered relevant to the

irregularity, but did so if they were considered applicable to the engagement.

ii.

The red flags pertaining to unusual pressures only alerted the auditors to
the existence of an irregularity if they were deemed applicable to the

engagement.
iii.

The red flags comprising the "factors relevant to an EDP environment"
category only alerted the auditors to the existence of an irregularity if they
had been considered applicable to the engagement.

Thus, it appears that the relationship between the applicability and relevance of a red
flag and whether the auditor was alerted by it depends on the particular category of
red flag.

,,,,
,,
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4.2

Testing Locbbcckc ct aJ.'s assessment model

Loc:bbecke and Willingham (1988) contrasted their model with the check list
approach and they concluded that it is a logical model designed to intcmalisc the
reasoning process to assess the likelihood of material management fraud.

,, /:'
\\
·,!

They classified fraud indicators into conditions, motives, and attitudes. These differ
slightly from Albrecht et al.'s (1995) and Cressey's (1986) classification as discussed
in Chapter 4. As already pointed out in Chapter 5, Locbbecke et al.'s model suffers
from one major deficiency: while the definition given of its "attitude" component
refers to justifications, ratioilllli::utions for committing crime, the list of examples
provided by Loebbecke et al. to illustrate this particular concept comprises company
characteristics which are examples of opportunity to commit the crime. Therefore,
Loebbecke et a!. 's attitudes can be included under their conditions component. The
Loebbecke et al. model is thus shown to comprise two components for it fails to
consider rationalisations.

Using Loebbecke et al.'s Table 9, the red flags in the present study were classified
into conditions, motives and attitudes (see Tables 33 and 34 below). It was necessary
to distinguish between defalcations and management fraud in order to test the
Locbbeckc ct al. fraud risk assessment model (see Tables 35·36 below).

There were 87 material irregularity cases discussed by the respondents in Part II of
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the survey. Using the definition of management fraud and defalcation in Loebbcckc
ct a\., it was found that 73 (84%) of them involved management that manipulated the
accounts in order to cover up another deception such as theft of cash, theft of

equipment etc. and that a minority 14 (16%) involved personnel below management
committing theft of cash or kickbacks (i.e., defalcations).

Comprehensive Listing of Indicators (Red Flags) Classified by
Assessment Component for the Management Fraud Cases (N=73)

Table 33:

Compoueut

Releva11t

Alerted

82

101

10

8
7

18
10

4

67

25

95
59
20

26

20

9

-

-

25
13

23
11

14

9

6

47
13
4
35
15

85
11

Applicable

Primarv Conditions

Dominated decisions
Ma'or transactions
Related

'"

Weak internal and EDP controls
Difficult to audit transactions
Nature of business susceptible to
misaooronriation
Weak internal audit
Hardware and software failures

48

-

3
31
16

7

Primarv Motivations

Industrv Decline
Emohasis on eamin!!s nroiections
Inadeouatc refits

1
0

Primorv Attitude

Dishonest mana cmcnt
Em hasis on camin s ro'ections *
Personalitv anomalies
Lies or evasiveness
Failure to correct internal control
weaknes

14

48
15

17

1
2
10
5
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ToL1l Prima

Indicators fcxcludin'

*

Secondar Conditions
Hi h manarremcnt turnover
Deccntraliscd omanisation

Assets subiect to misaoorooriation
Inexoerienced manauement
Conflict of interest
Raoid industrv change
Understaffed accounting dcoartment

Ineffective/ absent external regulation
Non-existent/ineffective code of
contact

Seconda

411

525

149

2

5
22
2
19

2

15
6
13
5
7
7
6
14

8
I

6

6
3
3
2

8

2

13

3

9

8
9

Motivation

Ranid indu~trv chanuc "'

7
10

8

4

4

3
5
2

67
6

95

31

8

3

I

I

Disn:soectful at!itude

-

2

-

Conflict of interest "'

5

8

3

Minimal plmming for installation of

2

I

I

I

I

-

98

117

42

509

642

191

Sensitive ooeratinl! results
Adverse ]ega[ circumstances

Secondarv Attitude
Weak internal and EDP controls*
Poor renutation
Undue oressure on auditor

hardware and software

Inadequate detection procedures for
svstem viruses
Total Secondary indicators
(excluding+)

Total Pri~~ry and Secondary
indicators cxcludin *\

•Indicators are present in preceding category. According to Locbbccke (personal
communication), it is possible for an indicator to be in more than one category. For
example, conflict of interest creates the situation conducive to committing fraud and
it also indicates an attitude on the part of person entering into the conflict.
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Data analysis also examined whether the indicators were applicable, relevant or
alerted the auditor at the planning stage

11

in order to dctcnninc the auditor's

sensitivity to red flags, as was done by Loebbccke et al.

Table 34:

Comprehensiw Listing of Indicators (Red Flags) Classified by
Assessment Component for the Defalcation Cases (N=\4)
Applicable

Component

Relevallt

Alerted

Primar Conditions
Domina! d Decisions

4

3

Maier Transactions

-

I

-

-

Related Partv

-

-

14

19

Weak internal and EDP controls
Difficult to audit transactions
Nature of business susceptible to
misa ro riation
Weak internal audit
Hardwa and software failures

2

2

3

4

4

3
I
I

3

2

I

-

-

-

Primal Motivations
Indus! Decline

2

2

Em basis on eaminrrs ro'cctions

0

-

Inade ua e nrofits

I

-

-

4

8

0

-

Attitude
Dishonest mana emcnt
Emphasis on eaminrrs ro·ections*
Persona!ihl anomalies
Lies or ovasivcness
Failure to correct internal control
weakness
Total Prima Indicators rcxcludin

-

Prima

-

.,

II As slated ctl!licr, plllllning is nssumcd to be o continuous proross.

-

-

3

4

-

2

2

-

39

48

7
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Sr!condar Conditions
Hi11h mana<>ement turnover
Decentralised or<>anisation

-

-

-

3

I
I

-

Assets subiect to misannronriation

-

2
2

Inexnerienccd mana"emcnt

4

5

Conflict of interest

-

-

Ranl.d industrv chan11e

-.Uf-;~erstaffed accountin!! denanment
ln~ffective/ absent external re!!ulation
Non-existent/ineffective code of
contact
Secondarv Motivation
Ranid industrv chanoe

*

Sensitive oneratinP results
Adverse ]ega] circumstances

-

-

-

4

2
2
I

-

-

-

I

-

I

Secondarv Allitude

Weak internal and EDP controls *
Poor renutation
Undue nressure on auditor
Disresnectful attitude
Conflict of interest*

Minimal planning for installation of

14

19
I

3
I

-

4

-

-

-

-

-

I

-

hardware and software

Inadequate detection procedures for
svstem viruses
~otal Seco~~ary indicators

excludin

*

Total Pri~;;' and Sec,.~ndary
indicators excludino *
•Indicators are present m precedmg category,

JJ

20

52

61

"

I

-

,,

4
II

It is evident from Tables 33 and 34 that auditors were somewhat insensitive to the

red flags when distinguishing between management and defalcation cases. For the
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management fraud cases there were 642 traud indicators which were relevant and

509 which were applicable to the 73 mana,gement fra•Jd cases but only 191 (29.8%)
and 37.5% respectively alerted the auditors at the planning stage. Similarly, for the
defalcation cases there were 68

·~levant

and 52 applicable fraud indicators but only

17% and 21.1% respectively alerted the auditors at the planning stage. If auditors are
not paying due attention to these indicators at the planning stage where the risk

assessment is determined, it is a cause for concern. In support.,cf these findings,
Loebbecke et a!., too, found that their model performed significantly poorer for

defalcations than for management fraud (p.25).

Tables 35 and 36 provide an analysis of Loebbccke et al.'s assessment model for
both management fraud and defalcation cases respectively and its applicability in the
87 material irregularity cases reported by the auditors in the survey. The second and
third columns indicate the number and percentage of cases of material irregularity
where the indicator was applicable to the engagement 12 • The fourth column shows
the number of these cases where the indicator was relevant to the irregularity. The
fifth column shows the percent of cases where pursuing that particular indicator

would not have directed the auditor to the fraud (i.e., Type I error%). The sixth
column gives the number of cases where the indicator was applicable, relevant, and
also alerted the auditor during planning. The final column indicates the percent of
12 No% is provided for the columns Applicublc and Rdcvnnl, and Applicoblc Rclcvnnl nnd Alcr1cd so thn! tho

I
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cases where the indicator was applicable and relevant, but would have been missed
by the auditor during the planning because

it did not alert him/her (i.e., Type II

error%).

Table 35: Analysis of Applicability, Relevance and WhctiJcr the Auditors Were Alerted by
the Indicators for the 73 Management Frauds Described by Them

AP

Primary
Indicators

%

AP
&

REL

Type
I
Error

REL,

AP,
&

Type
II
Error

%

AL

%

Conditions

82

llzil

82

0.0

30

63.0

8
7
67

10.9

9.6
91.8

8
7
67

0.0
0.0

o.o

4
3
4

50.0
57.1
94.0

Difficult to audit
transactions

48

65.8

48

0.0

16

66.6

Nature of business
vulnerable to
misaoorooriation
Weak internal audit
Hardware and
software failures
Total

25

34.2

20

20.0

7

6.0

26
0

35.6
0

.

20
0

23.0
0

9
0

55

..,

252

4.2

:u

J.l~O

Dominated
decisions
Maior transactions
Related
Weak internal and
EDP Controls

26l

Motivation
Industrv decline
Emphasis on
earnings
nroicctions
fnadeauate nrafits

0

25

34.2

13

17.8

23
II

8.0
15.4

14
I

39.1
90.9

9

12.3

6

33.3

0

10.0

figures for Type I I!Ild Type II error resp<ll:!ivoly OWl be expressed as n %, as done by locblx:cko el nl. (1989).
l3The roason !here is more lhllll lOO% in some condilions is because cneb condition includes more lhnn one red
flog nnd in some cases more Lhnn one red flog per case was npplicnblc.

II
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Total

Atlitude
Dishonest
mammement
Emphasis on
earnings
ro"ections"'
Personality
anomalies
Lies or evasiveness
Failure to correct
internal control
weakness
Total
Total Primary
Indicators
(excluding"')

4'l

2-1.4

40

14.9

.15

62.5

47

64.4

47

0

17

63.8

13

17.8

11

15.3

1

90.9

4

5,5

4

0

2

50.0

35
15

47.9
20.5

35
15

0
0

10

71.4
66.6

J.1A

3.1..2

J.l.2

• .l.J.

"""

:Jlll

2

2.7

2

15

20.5

6

...
LJ!

5

:!5

J2l

li&.&
6lU

0

2

0

15

0

8

46.6

8.2

2

66.6

1

50.0

13

17.8

13

0

6

53.8

5
7

6.8
9.6

5
7

0
0

3
3

40.0
57.1

7

9.6

6

14.2

2

66.6

6

8.2

2

66.6

Secondary
Indicators
Conditions

High management
turnover
Decentralised
orl!anisation
Assets subject to
misro riation
Inexperienced
manall:ement
Conflict of interest
Rapid industry
chanl!e
Understaffed
accounting
de artment
Ineffective/absent
external rcll:ulation

'

.

6

0 ··.\i•
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3

76.9

8.0

30

56.5

7

0

3

.57.1

13.7

8

20.0

5

37.5

4

5.5

4

2

50.0

Total
Attitude

ll

9.6

,.

0

,_,

lO

41.4

Weak internal and
EDP controls *

67

91.8

67

0.0

4

94.0

Poor rcoutation

6

8.2

6

0

3

50.0

undue pressure on
auditor

0

0

0

0

0

0

Disrespectful
attitude
Conflict of interest

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

6.8

5

0

2

2.7

I

50.0

3
I

40.0

Minimal planning
for insta!lation of
hardware and
software
Inadequate
detection
procedures for
svstem viruses

I

1.4

I

0

0

0

8.l
9.8

J.S.8

80

1.2

u

116.3

8.4

8ll

9.2

4!

ru

482

5.3

1M

6.5.51

NonexistcntlinclTcctivc
code of cont11ct
Total
Motivation
Rapid industry
change*

Sensitive operating
results
Adverse legal
circumstances

Total
Total Secondary
Indicators
fexcludin1! lr)

14

19.1

13

7.1

75

.lJA

69

7

9.6

10

..

Total Primary
ill!l
22.i
and Secondary
Indicators
(excludinl!: *)
*IndiCators are present m precedmg category

.

0
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Table 36:

Analysis of Applicability, Relevance and Whether the Auditors Were
Alerted by the Indicators for the 14 Defalcations Described by Them

Primary Indicators

AP

AP&
REL

%

Type
I
Error
%

AP,
REL,
& AL

Type
II
Error
%

25
0
0

2
0
0

33.3

0

3

Conditions
Dominated decisions
Major transactions
Related party
Weak internal and EDP
Controls
Difficult to audit transactions
Nature of business vulnerable
to misappropriation
Weak internal audit
Hardware and software
failures
Total

4
0
0
14

28.6
0
0
100

2
4

14.3

2

0

0

100

28.6

4

0

I

75.0

2

0

33.3
0

I
0

50.0

0

21.4
0

l1

ill

25

H

z

7,2.Q

3

3

0
0
14

0
0
78.5

0

Motivation
Industry decline
Emphasis on earnings
projections
Inadequate profits
Total

Attitude
Dishonest management
Emphasis on earnings
projections •
Personality anomalies
Lies or evasiveness
Failure to correct internal
control weakness
Total
Total Primary Indicators
(excluding •)

2

14.3

2

0

0

0
0

0
0

100

0
I

7.1

0

100

0

0

l

!L2

2

n~

Q

l9.Q

4

28.6
\4.3

4

0
100

0

100

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

21.4

3

0

0

100

2

14.3

2

0

0

100

I\
41

.l.P

9

_1_8,2

0

IO_Q

J.~,~

3.(!

g._~

7

?0•. ~

2

0
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Secontlar lml/calllrs
Co11dilion.·

Hi h man

•ement turnover

0

0
21.4
0

0
2
0

Decentralised or •anisation

3

Assets subject to
misa ro riation

0

lnexoerienced manac:ement

4
0
0
4

28.6
0
0
28.5

4
0
0
2

Ine!Tective/absent external
re ulation

0

0

Non-existent/ineffective code
of conduct

I

Conflict of interest
Raoid industrY change
Understaffed accounting
d_epartment

Total

0

33.3
0

0
I
0

0

50.0
0

0
0

0
0

100
0
0

0

so

0
0

0

0

0

0

7.1

I

0

0

100

12

9.5

9

25

1

88.8

0

0
0
0

0
0

0
0
0

0
0

0

0
0

0
0
0
0

100

Motivation
Raoid industry change "

Sensitive

era tin results

Adverse ]ega] circumstances

Total
Attitude
Weak internal and EDP
controls*
Poor re utation

0
0
0

0

0
0

14

100

14

0

3

78.6

I

I

I

0

0

0
0
0

0
0

0

0
0

0

0

0
0

0

0

0

0

Undue rcssure on auditor
Disresoectful attitude

0

Conflict of interest •

0

Minimal planning for

0

7.1
0
0
0
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Total

L'i

.1.5.3

l5

0

jJ

5.8

10

23.1

4
2

7J.3

Total Secondary Indicators
fexclndin *
Total Primary and
Secondary Indicators
(cxcludinl! *)

~·

JJ.9

46

14.8

'

80.4

0

installation of hardware and
software
Inadequate detection
_procedure fors stem viruses

80.0

I
277
" Indicators arc present in preceding cutcgory

Several observations can be made from Tables 35 and 36. As far as the management
fmud cases arc concerned, two primary indicators that were applicable to the
engagement for I J:l%

14

and 92% of the cases were dominated decisions ami weak

internal and EDP controls respectively (Locbbccke ct al's. equivalent ligures arc 75%
and 90% respectively). Also Tables 35 and 36 reveals that Locbbeckc et al.'s model

performs better for management fraud than for defalcation cases, thus supporting

t.IJ.eir findings. Table 37 shows the utility of both primary and secondary indicators in
alerting auditors to the existence of management fraud in both surveys.

Table 37:

Significance of Primary and Secondary Fraud Indicators in Alerting
Auditors to the Existence of Management Fraud(%).
Primary
(prCiCOI
study)

Primnry
(Loebbotke
d nt.)

Sctondnry
(present
study)

Sccond~ry

(Lotbbecke et al.)

%

%

%

%

Applicable

37

40

8

24

Relevant

95

90

90

75

Alerted

31

92

46

94

Primary fraud indicators were apparent to the engagement and relevant to the
irregul.arit:( to

11

similar degree as in Loebbecke eta\. Yet, nt the planning stage, the

auditors in the present study were approximately three times less likely to be alerted

I
27R
to the existence of management fruud by primary indicator~; however, they were

more likely to be so alerted by secondary factors but still half as likely as the auditors
in the Locbbcckc ct ul. study.

In the present study it was found that most of the indicators (both primary and
secondary) alerted the auditors to management fraud at least 34% of the time while

weak internal and EDP controls did so only 6% of the time. It should be noted in this
context that indicators pointing to weak internal controls alerted auditors more to the
possible existence of management fraud (as shown in Table 31) than when combined
with weak EDP controls. In Loebbecke et al.'s (1989:20-23) study "most of the
indicators were apparent to the auditors during the planning at least 90% of the
time", while three secondary indicators, namely "conflict of interest, incentive
compensation and management's job threatened were lesser exceptions".

Another significant difference between the two studies concerns Type I and Type II
errors (see Table 38).

1

~ Sec ibid foomolc 13.
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Table 38: Type I and Type II Error in the Two Surveys
l'n.ltnt •tudy

l'rcnnt •tudy

Lntbbecke

Lotbbecke

(mAnu~cmcnt

(dcfalrotlD!Ii)

ol •••

ct al.
{ddalcatlnns)

(mana~em<nl

frond)

•

•

..

fraud)
%

Type I error

5.3

14.8

16.9

23.2

Type II error

65.9

80.4

7.8

17.1

Bearing in mind that Type II error is the converse of Type I error, what this

comparison shows is that, in management fraud cases, if the auditors in the present
study followed a particular fraud indicator they would not have identified the
management fraud in 5.3% of the cases (Type I error), while in 65.9% of the cases

where the indicator was applicable and relevant they would have missed it during the
planning stage because it did not alert them (Type II error), i.e., they would not have
missed it in 34.1 %. In defalcation cases, if the auditors in the present study foilowed
a particular fraud indicator, they would not have identified the defalcation in 14.8%
while in 80.4% of th': cases where the indicator was applicable and relevant they
would have missed it because it did not alert them (Type I! error), i.e., they would
not have missed it in 19.6% of the defalcation cases. Thus, where the indicator was
both applicable and relevant the Australian auditors would have identified it in
34. I% of management frauds and 19.6% of defalcations at the planning stage.

The Australian auditors were 3.18 times Jess likely than those in Loebbeckc ct al.
(1989) to have pursued a particular red flag that would not have directed them to the
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management fraud (Type I error). This is attributable to auditors in the present study

being 8.4 times Jess sensitive at the planning stage to fraud indicators that were
applicable to the engagement and relevant to the irregularity (Type II error).
Similarly, in the de!Ulcation cases the auditors in the present study were 4.7 times
less likely to have been alerted by a red flag at the planning stage that was applicable

to the engagement and relevant to the irregularity (Type l! error). One conclusion
that can be drawn from the comparison figures in Table 38 is that Loebbecke et al.'s

auditors were characterised by a "play-it-safe" approach in their audit work in
assessing the risk of management fraud or a defalcation being present. One possible

explanation for the findings is that Australian auditors do not take the same approach
to red flags as U.S. auditors. The Australian auditors surveyed appear to exercise
significantly less vigilance at the planning stage as far as fraud indicators arc
concerned in both management fraud and defalcation cases. Such a difference could
well be due to the difference in audit experiencl;! of the auditors in the two studies
and the different litigation environments1l.

A basic premise of the Loebbecke et al. (1989) fraud-risk assessment model is that
aU three components must be present for an irregularity to occur. More specifically,
they reported that the three components (conditions, motives, and attitudes) were
applicable and relevant in 86% of the management fraud cases and 78% were
IS The participants in Loebbcokc et al. (1989) h•d twice as much audit experience and comprised p~r1ncrs only.

The present study included 39% in manager positions and 28% partners. The remaining one· third were seniors
(13%), supervisors (12%) and Msistant managers (8%) ""d C811 be snid to ho•c hnd less nudit experience thnn
those surveyed by Locbbcckc ct nl.
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applicable, relevant and alerted. This prediction, however, has not been borne out in
the present' study. Tables 39 and 40 show that in only 22% of the management fraud

cases were all three components applicable and relevant and in only 8% of the
were all three components applicable, relevant, and alerted the auditor.

~'j

ca~cs

Table39:

Analysis of Indicators of73 Management Fraud Cases by Assessment Model Components Based on the Survey

AI! three components pres~nt:

22

l6

Average No. ofindit:ators
Two t:omponents present:

25

Average No. of indicators
One component present:

15

II

72

32

35

4.5

2.0

2.2

115

12

4.6

0.48

!.68

27

0

4

0

0.36

Average No. of indicators
No component present:
Total all m..,agement fraud cases:

Average No. of indicators

29

II

21

73

8

18

6

8

13

12

13

2.5

2.0

2.2

36

;

16

0.6

2.0

17

3

4

1.3

0.2

0.~

"

63

214
2.9

81

0.6

1.1

73

33

6S
0.9

0.3

0.5

Table40:

Analysis of Indicators of 14 Defalcation Cases by Assessment Model Components Based on the Survey

~

*

'

u

14

2

4

0

0

0

"

2

57

8

'

z

~

All three components present:

.

.g

u

u

~

0

'0
0
0

Average No. of indicators
Two components present:
Average No. of indicators
One component present:
Average No. of indicators
No component present:
Total all defalcation cases:
Average No. of indicators

29

3

0

5

1.5

0

2.5

14

0

1.75

0

0.13
86

4
14

2

17

0

6

1.2

0

0.42

0.3

·I·g
'

0

~

"

"'

\
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As seen in Tables 39 and 40, there arc a riumbcr of ca~cs where conditions were not

"

both applicable and relevant in Panel A and not both applicable, relevant and alerted

in Panel 13. In other words, if a condition was applicable but not relevant or vice
versa the case would have appeared in the no-component-present category. In
comparing Tables 39 and 40 with Locbbccke et al.'s Table II it is evident that there

are significant differences

Out of the 73 management fraud cases only 16 (22%), contained indicators in all 3

components of the assessment model. Of those ca~es in Panel B of the management
fraud cases where the indicator also alerted the auditor, the percentage is 8% (in the

Major Fraud Group cases it was 36% (see Chapter 5)). Loebbecke et al.'s figures
were 66 (86%) and 78% respectively.

From Table 39 Panel A it can be seen that the average number of indicators for the
management fraud cases was 2.9, .6 and 1.1 for conditions, motives and attitudes
respectively, where only applicable and relevant were considered. Where alerted is
also considered, the number of indicators is .9, .3 and .5 from Panel B. These are
very different to what Loebbecke eta!. found and which were 3.6, 2.9 and 2.9 for
Panel A and 3.4, 2.6 and 2.6 for Panel B. The major reason for the difference is
because Australian auditors noted that the indicators were relevant to the irregularity
but were not applicable in the engagement, or did not alert them, As already stilted,
the difference found may well be due to the fact that the Australian auditors did not
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have us mw:h experience in detecting irregularities as their U.S. counterpurts.

It is nevertheless evident, however, that, as also shown in Tables 35 and 36, on the
basis of Tables 39 and 40 Loebbecke ct al.'s fraud-risk assessment model perfonns

weaker in defalcations than management fraud.

5.0

SURVEY PART II: CORRELATES OF FRAUD PRONENESS

In order to expand the discussion in Section.4 above by utilising the data from Part II
of the survey, attention will next focus on: (I) identifying fraud-prone industries,

audit areas, and audit procedures indicating the presence of material irregularities;

(2) profiling the offenders and to compare the picture that emerges with that yielded
by the MFG study and reported in Chapter 5; and (3) expanding the Loebbecke
model by revising the eclectic fraud detection model developed in Chapter 4 so as to
incorporate the findings from the survey of auditors and to examine its applicability.
To do this, it is imperative that one studies both the irregularity and the offender.
Table 41 indica!es that in the majority of cases the material irregularity' involved
";:,

theft of cash.

I
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Tnblc4l:

How the Irregularity wus Committed

Type or Irregularity

N

%

Thcfi of cash

46

52.9

Window dressing

15

17.3

Errors in financial statement

6

6.9

Kickbacks

4

4.6

Stock theft

4

4.6

Payroll fraud

4

4.6

Kiting

3

3.5

Conflict of interest

I

1.1

Breach of Parliamentary Rule

I

1.1

Insurance Fraud

I

1.1

Forging cheques

I

1.1

Tax a'Joidance

I

1.1

87

100%

Total

:·J

•

Loebbecke et al. (1989:11) found that management fraud "typica!ly is committed by
top management (including directors) and deifalcations are typically committed by

persons at all levels in the organisation, although not directors to any great extent."
Loebbecke et al, also indicated that in "many" instances there was collusion.

,.
'

,., '-'·

.rf

I!

2H7

Tuhlc 42:

Position Held by the Offender

Posilion Held

/'.;'

Upper management

21

24.1

Others below management

13

14.9

Directors

12

13.8

Other management in collusion with others

13

14.9

Chief accountant

7

8.0

Directors in collusion with others

6

6.9\

6

6.9

Top management

..

Chief financial officer

I}

%

.,

5

5.7
II

2.4

Chief executive officer

2

Shareholders

2

2.4

87

100%

Total

'

'

I

'•)

""
,.

(\

\")

--,.;

""

<'-

,,,..

•

Table43:

Who was Involved by Type oflrregularity

-

~j
Directors

•

Shareholders

2

Upper Management

'

3

9

Others Top Management

'

10

Others Below Management

1

2

3

2

2

CEO
CFO

3

Chief Accountant

2

Directors in Collusion

2

I'-'

21

1

2-1.1

6

1

6.9

13

1

l-!.9

2

I "
! 5.7

;
2

4

!3.8

12

7

s.o

6

69

l3

lH

wi!hO!he!"

Other Management in Collusion
with Others

6

3

Total N

4

6

Total%

4.6

6.9

1.1

46

4

52.9

4.6

15

1.1

1.1

17.3

3

1.1

3.5

4.6

1.1

I
'

100

Ill

Cross·tabulnting the type of fraud committed ami the company staff n:sponsiblc for it
(see Table 43), reveals that of the management fraud committed by directors, 66%
involved theft of cash and the rest window dressing.

These results support the

Loebbecke ct al. finding. On the other hand, while upper management commiucd
43% theft of cash, the remainder included mainly window dressing, payroll fraud,

stock theft, and kiting. Others below management also concentrated on theft of cash
(77%) and kickbacks (15%). Directors were mainly involved in theft of cash (62%)
and window dressing (25%). Finally, where management colluded with other staff or
a third party, window dressing (46%) predominated.

Cross-tabulating the type of fraud and the nmnber of accomplices, (see Table 44) it

was found that theft of cash was usually committed alone (58%) or in collusion with
one to two more people (35%). Whereas for window dressing, an equal percentage

was committed alone (27%) or with one more person (27%). Tax avoidance, forging
cheques, breaching parliamentary regulations and kiting were frauds committed
without an accomplice. These findings should be considered with the knowledge that
in 52% of irregularities detected the perpetrator acted alone, 21% with one
accomplice, 13% with two, and 15% with three or more accomplices. For
comparison purposes, in the MFG study it was found that the great majority (70%)
of the offenders had no accomplices.

290
Table 44:

Number of Accomplices by Type of irregularity

"

N or Accomplices

Type of Irregularity

0

I

Payroll fraud

2

Error in limmdal statement

2

Ta'< avoidance

I

Theft of cash

25

Kickbacks
Forging che

"'

2

3

4

Total
N

%

I

I
I

'4

5.2

I

8

7

2

I

I

Window dressing
Breach of parliamentary
rules

'
I

Kiting

I

Stock theft

3

Total N
%

1.3

'

43

55.8

I

'I

5.2

I

I

1.3

2

13

16.8

I

1.3

I

Insurance fraud

'

2

I

I

40

16

10

5!.9

20.8

12.9

2

""

5.2

I

9

1.3

I

1.3

'

5.2

77

11.8

100

Note; The totals for certain types of irregularities do not match the corresponding figures in Tables 41 and 43
because when crosstabuloting with number of accomplices !here wen: mi,ing values, i.e., a few auditors

responded to one but not to the other question.

Ten of the 87 respondents provided no Information on whether

there were n~ompliccs.

Next, attention is turned to the profiling issue in order to test the applicability of the
eclectic freud detection model of which the ROP model is an integral prut

,.,
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A Statistical Prolilc of Perpetrators Encountered by Auditors

Table 45:

N

%

79

90.8

8

9.2

87

100%

13

!4.9

53

60.9

16

18.4

5

5.8

87

100%

HighSchool

33

37.9

Tertiary

25

28.7

Professional

28

32.2

I

1.2

87

100%

78

89.7

Single

5

5.7

Divorced

3

3.4

Separated

I

1.2

87

100%

Gender:

Male
Female

Age Group:

25-35 years of age

36-45
46-50
50+

..

Education Standard:

Other

Marital Status:
Married
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As would

b~

predicted using the eclectic fraud detection model, Table 45 shows that

most perpetrators encountered by the n:spondcnts were males aged 36-45, married,
and with post high school education. While the pir.ture of the perpetrators painted by
the auditors surveyed is no different from that which emerged in the MFG study, the
MFG offenders included more members of professional groups such as lawyers. This
difference is attributable to the different ways by which the MFG comes to
investigate a case of fraud. Interestingly, the type of person described by the auditors
as having committed material irregularities is no different from the average common
criminal (Farrington, 1993).

Table 46:

Sources of Financial Pressure on the Perpetrators
Motives

Lifestyle
Gambling
Personal financi;:! problems
Greed
Drugs and alcohol
Combination of the above

N

%

35
12

40.2

II

19

12.6
10.3
1.2
21.9

87

100%

9
I

13.8

Table 46 provides further evidence for the ROP and the eclectic fraud detection
model proposed. The results shown suppon the findings reported in Chapter 5, i.e.,
that financial pressure due to one cause or another underpins fraud offences by
people in positions of financial trust within companies. The type of person depicted
in Table 46, characterised by a hedonistic and erratic lifestyle that renders them

I
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prone to otlCnding, is in accordance with what one would have predicted un the

ba~is

of either Freud's psychoanalytic theory (in terms of a weak superego) or Eysenck's
theory of crime and delinquency (in terms of antisocial personality disorder

attributes) discussed in Chapter 2 and contained in the ROP model.

Table 47:

Auditors' Description of the Perpetrator's Characteristics

Cilaractcristics

Authoritarian
Extrovert
Loner
Normal
Outgoing
Unknown
Ambitious
Complainer
Introvert

N

%

" 34
14
!0
8
7
"4
4
3
3
87

39.1
16.1
11.5
9.2
8.1
4.6
4.6
3.4
3.4
100%

Regarding the auditors' perceptions of the perpetrators' personality traits16, Table 47
shows that authoritarianism is the most frequently reported type of personality. It is

not, however, clear how this trait

IS

involved in the aetiology of fraud, Furthermore,

it is not being claimed here that the auditors' perceptions of the perpetrators'

authoritarianism would be borne out if n psychologist administered them a proper
personality test. The auditors' descriptions of the perpetrators of the irregularitles
need to be treated with caution because of their subjectivity and in view of the fact
that these assessments were made after the fraud was identified. It would have been

16 Such infQmwtion wnsnoL lncludod in the prosocutlon briefs surveyed in tho MFG study.
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interesting to know if such assessments had been made at the planning stage of the
audit whether they would have alerted the auditor. It would be safe, however, to
sumtisc that even if an auditor assumed that someone was an authoritarian person it
would not alert him/her at the planning stage to carry out additional audit procedures.
This assumption is made based on the red flag findings reported above.

The next issue is the industry in which the fraud was committed. Table 48 shows that
more than half (56%) of the irregularities were committed against a public company

and that most of them occurred in the manufacturing industry. Loebbecke et al.
found "significantly more instances of management fraud in Manufacturing,
Transportation, High Technology and Communication Companies and fewer in
Educatibn and other institutions, which is consistent with their likely ownership
character" (p.l 0). The fmding that Manufacturing is proned to management fraud is
consistent with the results of the KPMG surveys.
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Table 48:

Industry and Status of the Company Where the -Material Irregularity
was Committed

N

%

49
38

56
44

87

100%

dcsi nation

N

%

No industry designation
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Mining
Manufacturing

7
6
3
22
3
7
8
2
3
2
2
8
3
7
2
2

8.0
6.9
3.5
25.2
3.5
8.0
9.2
2.3
3.5
2.3
2.3
9.2
3.5
8.0
2.3
2.3

Type of company
Public comp;my
Private comoanv

lndust

Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
Construction
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Accommodation, Cafes, and Restaurants
Transport and Storage
Communication Services
Finance and Insurance

Government Administration and Defence
Health and Community Services
Cultural and Recreation Services
Personal and Other Services

87

C)

100%

.....
Table 49:

Industry Category by Type ofirregularity Committed

I

J
Payro!l Fraud
Error in Financial
Statement

~-

H
o.-=

II

"-~

2
2

I ' I"

I I

2

6

Tax avoidance

Theft of cash

l

5

2

2

5

9

5

2

2

5

6,

Iu

46 1 sz.9

3

Kickbacks

4

1 4.6

I ' Iu
1 l 1.1

Forging cheques
Insurance fraud
Window dressing

2

'

6

Breach of
Parliamentary Regulations
Kiting

I

Stock theft

I
i

1

Conflict of interest

TotalN

7

6

3

22

3

Total%

8.0

6.9

3.5

25.2

3.5

7
8.0

8

2

3

2

2

s

3

7

9.2

2.3

3.5

2.3

2.3

9.~

3.5

s.o

I '
1

~-3

I

~.3

I

4

! .:.o

1
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Crosstahulating the type of fraud and the industry designation of the comp~ny
involved (see Table 49) it wus found that the types of fraud occurring in

manufacturing were mainly: theft of Cll.'lh {40%), window dressing (27%), errors in
financial statements (9%), payroll fraud (9%), whereas in finance and insurance it
was theft of cash (63%), window dressing (25%), insurance fraud (I 2%). Regarding
the difference between the types of frauds occurring in a public as opposed to a

private company, it was found that 58% of cash theft occurred in public companies as
opposed to 42% in private companies.

Also, private companies had a higher

incidence of payroll fraud (75%) whereas forging of cheques, conflict of interest,
insurance fraud, and purchase of equipment for self only occurred in private
companies.

An interesting question is whether a relationship exists between the type of
irregularity and the person detecting it.

Table 50:

Who Detected the Irregularity
N

%

Client
Auditor:

29

33.3

Manager
Senior
Super1isor
Partner
Assistant
Fraud Auditor
Whistleblowcr/ASC/ATO

17
17
10
7
4
2

19.5
19.5
11.5
8.! .
4.6 ,,
2.3

I

87

1.2

100%

I
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To a large extent, the finding in the present study (see Table 50) that auditors were

the ones who detected most of the irregularities reported on reflects the fact that
auditors were asked to answer questions about irregul!lritics they themselves had

encountered. Crosstabulating the type of fraud and the person detecting 'the fraud, it
was found that: the two authorities (ASC and ATO) identified theft of cash and stock
but, as stated earlier, the client was the most successful in identifying theft of cash
and kickbacks; the partner and manager were more successful in identifying theft of

cash and, finally, seniors appeared to identify more window dressing than partners

and managers 11 •

Another aspect is the audit area affected by the irregularity, which is reported in.

TableClu.

17 Bcrn~~tdl (1994a) found mll!lpgcrs more likely to detect fraud nnd he c~plllined it by saying that mnnllgcrs
have higher mom! development ond lll'C nottechnlcnlly focused like the seniors. Davidson {I 994) disagr=ed with
thb explilllalion, m~lntaining thnt mMogers nrc concerned with fcc constraints which have on impact an moral
development. However, more research is required to resolve the Issue whether mnnngcrsarc indeed chnrnetcrised
by a higher s\llge of morn] &:vc lopmcnL
18 The audit nrca dassifh:ation depicted in Table 48 is different from that used in Loobbccke ct nl. This is because it
was considered nppropriale to usc Schedule 5 clnssificntlon applicable in Australia nnd well known to the
partlclpllllts. As they nlso found, there were multiple audit areas involved. However, in the present study Provisions
nnd Cash were the main areas involved.
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Tnble51:

i'

Audit Area Affcdted
Audit Area

~·

,,((

c~h

Provisions
Inventories
Combination of2-3 accounts

__tL

~

35

40.2
28.7
3.5
27.6
100%

7,5
J

24
87

Since theft of cash is the most popular type of fraud being committed, it follows that
cash and provisions were mainly affected. As far as window dressing is concerned,
provisions was the account mainly affected.

Therefore, auditors need to pay

,--,

additional attention to these two audit areas because there is a higher audit (JSk.

,,

Table 52: Type oflrregularity by the Procedure Indicating the Irregularity

-;;

<~.·~

~

-- ,_

Pa)To!l Fraud

)

2

Error in Financial

3

4

4.6

6

6.9

Statement

Tax avoidance

1.1

Theft of cash

19

Kickbacks

3

4

6

9

5

2

46

52.9

4

4.6

Forging cheques

Ll

Insurance fraud
Window dressing

l

2

2

2

5

2

Breach of
parliamentary Rules
Conflictofinterest

I

I

Kiting
Stock theft

I

I

Total%

33.3

9.2

I

I
I

I

6.9

20.7

?I

Ll

15})

11.3

'·

Ll

I

l.i

3

3.5

4

•

-16

~~~~--~~-7-r~+-~~-+~~~~~·~~
Total N
29
8
10
6
18
9
7
87
I !.5

10.4

8.0

. 100

=

JOt
Regarding which audit procedure indicated the irregularity, Tables 52 and 53 reveal
.~at

33% of the irregularities were not discovered by the auditors. Whereas in

Loebbeeke et al. the corresponding figure was a low 7.4%. Substantive tests were
the most effective type of audit procedure to reveal the irregularity (Loebbeckc ct
al.'s equivalent percentage is 56.5%), which is consistent with Loebbecke et al.

Table 53:

The Audit Procedure that Detected a Particular Material Irregularity
Audit Procedure
Not discovered by the auditor
Substantive test of details
Study of internal controls
No procedure designation
Preliminary analytical procedures
Combination of audit procedures
Analytical test of specific account

N

%

29
18

33.3
20.7

10

11.5

9

10.4

8
7

9.2

6

6.9
IOn%

87

8.0

Crosstabulating the audit procedure indicating the irregularity by the type of fraud
involved (see Table 51), it was found that for the theft of cash 42% were not detected
by the auditor; the remainder were detected by means of substantive tests of details
(20%), study of internal control (13%), preliminary analytical procedures (8%) and a ··
combination of procedures for the rest. Substantive audit procedures were useful in
identifying window dressing. Errors in financial statements, tax avoidance, insurance
frauds and kiting were discovered by the auditor alone, whereas kickbacks and theft
of cash were primarily not discovered by the auditor. These lindings are in line with

I
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Locbbeckc ctlll.'s.

The next issue inquired by the survey is the length of time of the

client~auditor

wa~

discovered, as

relationship (i.e., the number of prior audits) when an irregularity

well as the duration the irregularity had been committed 17•

Table 54:

Relationship Between the Number of Years the Auditing Firm were
the Auditors and the Time Period the Irregularity w·as Committed.

Number of prior year-audits of client
firm atJim~ of i..;ceularitv
Years

I
2
3

4
5
>5

"

Time .Period for which an irregularity
Wascom itted
Years

%

IS
IS
18
7
16
16
87

17.2
17.2
20.7
8.1
18.4
18.4
100%

N

J2-,

<I
I

~,

..

"

N

"

%

3

7

36.8
23.0
21.8
8.1

4

3
3

3.4
3.4

3
87

3.4
100%

20

',' 2

19

5
5+

19 Pincus (1990) nnd Bernardi (199~11) both reported that fmud dct~ion will increase ll5 nn auditor's prior
\ ·~ -~

"

/)
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Table 54 shows that 55.1% of the irregularities were discovered within the first three
years; i.e., a significant proportion of the irregularities were encountered by the
respondents when auditing new clients. The fourth year of the auditor-client
relationship appears to be a "slack" year as far as auditor-detection vf irregularities is
;',

concerned. lt would not be unreasonable to surmise here that after a spate of
sucC'esses by the external auditor in detecting irregularities, the culprits "lie low",
perhaps perceiving a high risk of being found out. When this dete!l"ent effect of the
auditor's successes decreases enough, perpetrators of such illegal acts within
companies are back in action! Another argument in the literature is that auditors
become comfortable with their clients and start to trust them, possibly too much, so
that 'they don't maintain a proper attitude of professional scepticism and they may
under- audit.

6,0

REPORTING FRAUD

Given the reporting requirements set out in AUS210 (AARF,l995a) the findings
regarding reporting of fraud come as no surprise. Slightly more than half (53%) of
frauds detected were reported to the Board of Directors, 21% to the CEO and 2% to
t~e

audit committee. Considering that 56% of frauds occurred in public companies,

one would have expected more reporting to the audit committec2u; similarly, one
would have expected more reporting to the ASC; in fact, only 2% were reported.

expec!n!lons concerning !he ox!stencc offrnud increase, This wns not directly !oslcd hy tho

p~en!

rcsonrcl!,

li
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Five per cent were reported to the Major Fraud group arul the remainder to other
authorities. Theft of cash was reported mainly to the Board of Directors (53%), or
others (24%), namely financial controller, audit partner and Parliament. Window
dressing was reported predominantly to the Board of Directors (57%) and the CEO
(36%). Payroll fraud was equally reported to the CEO and Board of Directors. The
other bodies to which auditors reported were the partner in charge, anti-corruption

branch, in one incident the auditor confronted the perpetrator who admitted to it.

7.0

USE OF FRAUD AUDITORS AND FORENSIC ACCOUNTANTS

In view of the difficulty in and importance of detecting fraud, the use made of fraud
/'

auditors and forensic accountants is an interesting issue. Forty-five per cent of the

respondents stated that their finn provided services by forensic and fraud auditors.
Regarding the experience and qualifications held by these specialists, they were:
Forensic accountants, mainly: chartered accountants (33%), chartered accountants
and lawyers (13%), and registered company auditors and chartered accountants
(33%). Fraud auditors were: chartered accountants (45%), chartered accountants and
registered company auditors (43%) and, finally, some had experience as
psychologists or criminologists -5% in each field.

20 How~ver nat all componiC!I have on audit committee.
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The forensic accountants and fraud a·uditol-s whO participated were of the opinion that
had their services been used, fraud could have been prevented or detected earlier. The
other respondents, however, did not share that opinion. As for the number of times a
fraud auditor had been used in the last 12 months, it ranged from one (40%), to two
(33%) whereas for a forensk accountant it was mainly: one (40%), two (10%), three
(10%), ten (20%). These findings suggest that fraud auditors and foreru;ic
accountants are not used very frequently.

8.0

THE ECLECTIC FRAUD DETECTION MODEL REVISITED

The results yielded by the survey of auditors add to the hroad range of informationinputs into effective fraud-detection contained in the eclectic fraud detection model
(see Figure 4) and show the model's applicability, More specifically, the findings
obtained show that:
used on their own, red flags are not particularly useful in alerting auditors to
the existence of material irregularities at the planning stage;
the different high-risk industries (e.g., manufacturing) where the auditor is
likely to encounter different types of irregularities (e.g., management fraud,
employee fraud, and error);
the audit proccdure(s) likely to identifY a particular type of irregularity;
the forms (e.g., theft of cash, window dressing) each type of itregularity is
likely to take;
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which audit areas (cash and provisions) arc high

fraud~risk

ones; and

the lack of an e!Tcctivc internal control system and the absence of a code of
corporate conduct arc significant correlates of an irregularity {including
management fraud, employee fraud and errors) impacting materially on the

accounts.

In support of Albrecht et al. (1995) and Cressey (1986), the findings also stress the
importance of the auditor being alerted to information about individuals within a

company who are high risks of perpetrating an irregularity, including fraud, because
they face a serious financial problem. The financial problem itself is most often due
to a person in a position of trust Jiving beyond their means for one reason or another.

The additional findings not contained in Figure 2 (i.e., particular high·risk audit areas
and patterns in auditors' fraud detection) have been added to Figure 4 (see Chapter 7)
so as to make it more comprehensive. The findings provide empirical support for the
applicability of the eclectic fraud detection model. They do this by confinning the
crucial importance of its various components (the audit firm; the auditor; and fraud·
risk information, including the ROP Fraud model in Figure 3 - see Chapter 7) for
more effective and efficient fraud·deteetion perfonnance by auditors.
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9.0 CONCLUSION

The survey was carried out in an attempt to reduce the gap in our knowledge about
the nature of material irregularities (including management fraud, employee fraud
and error) encountered by auditors in Australia.

The 108 relatively experienced

auditors who participated in the study reported having encountered a total of 768
irregularities in the last five years. This indicat~·s it is relatively rare for auditors to
encounter material irregularities when taking into account an auditor's total number

of engagements.

Part I of the survey found that the three most common types of irregularities
encountered by the respondents during the last five years were: management fraud

(39.7%), employee fraud (24%) and other illegal acts (19%). Differences in the

findings obtained in the present study and those of Loebbecke et al. (1989} and
KPMG (1995a) concerning, for example, management fraud and employee fraud, are
probably due to differences in the sample of respondents used. The results indicate
that there are patterns in fraud-detection with respect to the six types of irregularities
encountered by the auditors (see Table 22). The present study found that: for

ca~h

and every type of irregularity there is at least one high-risk industry; the irregularity
is likely to take one fonn rather than another; and a particular audit procedure is more
likely to alert an auditor to the existence of a particular irregularity. Finally, two
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significant correlates of u material irregularity are the Jack of an effective internal
control system and a code of corporate conduct. The importance of effective internal
contra! system and a code of corporate conduct in fraud prevention is provided for in
the ROP model (opportunity component) constructed and successfully tested in the
MFG study. The significance of the same two factors was emphasised by the KPMG
(l995a) fraud survey,

The irregularities about which the respondents answered questions put to them in
Part I of the survey were not unimportant since 39.7% involved management fraud.
This fmding is of interest in view of the fact that financial statement fraud accounts
for about half the litigation cases against auditors in the U.S. (Palmrose, 1987).
Interestingly, directors were as likely as other management to perpetrate management

fraud. Differences were found between the types of management frauds encountered
by auditors in the Loebbecke et al. (1989) study (assets overvalued or incorrectly
valued) and in the present one (window dressing). Differences were also found
between the two studies regarding the types of industries more frequently involved in
management fraud. However, manufacturing ranked nwnber one in both studies. In
Australia, trusts and fund management and construction appear to be plagued by
management fraud the most. As far as the audit procedure that alerted the auditors to
the irregularities is concerned, management review and/or tests of controls emerge as
the most likely ones to do so while in Loebbecke et al, it was substantive testing.
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Employee fraud, comprised 24% of the total number of irregularities, and it most
often took the fonn of expenses recorded incorrectly and was more frequently
reported in manufacturing. The respondents detected employee fraud largely as a

result of management review and/or tests of controls while in Loebbecke et al. it was
substantive testing. As with management fraud, both the lack of effective internal
controls and a code of conduct were statistically significantly associated with the
employee fraud impacting materia!ly on the accounts, especially in manufacturing,

government administration and defence, and in finance and insurance.

Previous researchers have concerned themselves exclusively with management fraud
and employee fraud. The fact that there has been no previous research into othe!"
illegal acts, other acts, and other illegal misstatements means that no comparisons of
findings are possible, Other illegal acts made up 19% of the irregularities
encountered by the respondents in the last five years. Due to the small number of
cases in other acts and other illegal misstatements, caution is warranted in
interpreting the findings obtained about those two types of irregularities. The most
frequent other illegal acts encountered Were non-compliance with accounting
standards and breach of security and insurance industry regulations. Other illegal acts
were most prevalent in finance and insurance and manufacturing. Substantive testing
and/or statutory record review was the audit procedure most likely to alert auditors to
the existence of other illega1 acts. Once again, the industries that had a high incidence
of other illegal acts were the ones more likely to lack a code of conduct. In those
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cases, the other illegal acts impacted materially on the accounts.

A small proportion (4°/r) of the irregularities encountered by the respondents
involved other acts which occurred mainly in the trusts and fund management
sectors. Auditors were alerted to the existence of other acts largely as a result of a
review of records. Non-compliance with a trust deed was the one other acts that had a
material impact on the accounts. As in the case of the other irregularities mentioned,
other acts were associated significantly with an ineffective internal control system
and the absence of a code of conduct.

Intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements made up 6.7% of the
irregularities reported. These were likely to occur in the trusts and fund management
sectors. They took the form of the accounts "not adding up" and came to light mainly
following a review of financial statements and/or review of accounting records.
Finally, errors accounted for 6.25 % of the total number of irregularities. Trusts and
fund management and the manufacturing industry had the highest incidence of errors.
The most common type of error detected was financial statement errors. Errors were
largely detected as a result of a review of financial statements. Errors provided
another instance where the absence of a code of conduct and an effective internal
control system correlated significantly with the error impacting materially on the
accounts. In support of Entwistle and Lindsay (1994), it was also found that
manufacturing is also an error~prone industry.
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Summing up the findings obtained by the survey, the following industries are prone
to

the following

irregularities:

management fraud

and

employee

fraud

(manufacturing); employee fraud (government administration and defence); other
illegal acts and other acts (finance and insurance); errors (trusts and fund

management).

In addition, the six irregularities examined tend to take the following forms:
management fraud (window dressing);
employee fraud (wrong expense claims and stealing of cash);
other illegal acts (non-compliance with accounting standards or legislation);
other acts (non-compliance with a trust deed);
other illegal misstatements (accounts not adding up), and

errors (fipancial statement errors).

One of the aims in carrying out the survey was to test Loebbecke et nl.'s (1989)

assessment model. It is for this reason that this chapter discusses at considerable
length, how the results of the present study compare with those of Loebbecke et a!.
In contrast to what Loebbecke eta!. reported, one of the significant findings obtained
in the survey is that red flags are of limited usefulness to auditor.'! in detecting
irregularities, including fraud, In only a minority of cases, the auditors \\r~re alerted
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to the cxi~tcncc of an irregularity, by a red flag indication. This is despite the fact that

the majority of red !lags were both applicable to the engagement and relevant to the
irregularity. The relationship between the applicability and relevance of a red flag
and whether the auditor was alerted to the irregularity depended on the particular
category of red flag indicators.

The utility of red flags at the planning stage was also examined, distinguishing
between management fraud and defalcations, and classifying red flags in tenns of the

three components of Loebbe..-ke et al.'s fraud-risk assessment model, namely
conditions, motives, and attitudes. In comparison to their U.S counterparts,
Australian auditors appear to be less vigilant at the planning stage and too often were
not alerted to the existence of a material irregularity by one or more red flags. It is
not possible, however, to conclude as to the reason(s) for the difference found
between the auditors in the two study surveys. Future research should investigate the
hypothesis that cultural differences impact on auditors' decision making (see
Yamamura, Frakes, Sanders, and Ahn, 1996). In support of Loebbecke et a\. it was
found that dominated decisions is a major indicator of material irregularity. Overal!,
however, the survey results show that fraud-risk assessment utilising red flags is not
effective.

In comparing the findings from the two studies some differences between the
auditors who participated in them need to be borne in mind. Loebbecke et al.'s

I
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auditors were from one finn only and were partners. Compared to the auditors in the
present study, they were significantly older, a factor that explains the fact that they

had twice as much audit experience (in years). The participants in both studies,
however, were included in the research because they wac experienced in detecting
irregularities. Loebbecke et al.'s auditors had an average number of engagements of

3.1 where an irregularity had been encountered and/or had encountered an
irregularity in 1.3% of the total number of engagements they had worked on. By

comparison, the auditors in the present study who came from various firms across the
country and had only been in the position of (predominantly) manager or partner for

three years, had an average of 5.2 engagements where an irregularity had been
e!:.>:ountered and/or had encountered an irregularity in 19% of their total number of
engagements. However, the auditors in the present survey were 4.5 times less likely
than their counterparts in the U.S. study to have encountered an iaegularity
themselves. Often an irregularity would be detected by a combination of audit
procedures, whereas in Loebbecke et al. an irregularity was most often detected by
substantive testing.

It should be noted at this point that substantive testing was the audit procedure used

by the respondents in the present study to detect a material irregularity, encountered
within the last 12 months in Part II of the questionnaire. The same finding was also
obtained for other illegal acts (sec Section J.labove). However, whereas in
Loebbecke et al. (1989) it was substantive testing which detected management and
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employee fraud in the present study it was management review and/or tests of
controls, and management review respectively. ·!be last conflicting finding may be
attributable to the different sample of respondents used or a shift in audit approach by
audit !inns.

The present study found that more than half of the irregularities were detected during
the first three years 21 (and especially in the third year) of an engagement and that
auditors were not likely to discover it. The survey highlights the crucial importance
of auditors not ceasing to be vigilant however long they have been auditing a
company's books. Auditors in the survey reported a material irregularity mainly to
the board of directors and did so especially when it involved theft of cash and
window dressing.

A major weakness in the Loebbecke et a!. fraud risk assessment model is that its
"attitudes" component contains a contradiction between the way it is defined and the
examples given for it.

Therefore, their model does not provide for offenders'

rationalisations- a component for fraud to occur.

The survey findings call into question one of the basic premises of Loebbecke et al.'s
model that all of its three components (conditions, motives and attitudes) of the
assessment model need to be present for management fraud to occur. In addition,

21 Loebbecke ol nl. found !hal most lrrcgulariLies occurred in compru~ies !hoi hod bcon nudil~d for 1·10 years.
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their model has been shown by the survey results to pcrfonn weaker in defalcations
than in management fraud. While the findings from the present survey lend some

support to Locbbccke et al.'s model, they also c!l.St doubt on it. It is argued, therefore,
that the Loebbecke et al. model should be revised in light of a major inherent

weakness with one of its components and the contradictory findings obtained.

Regarding the profile of the perpetrators generated by the auditors' responses, it is
very similar to that constructed in the MFG stud/

2
•

The personality attribute of

"authoritarian", however, is not part of the MFG profile and has been added to Figure
3 because it can be argued to be synonymous with "dominated decisions" which has

been found to be a useful red flag. Management were the main perpetrators of the
material irregularity, were characterised as authoritarian males, were aged 36-45,
married with high school or higher educational qualifications, who lead lifestyles that
seem to lead them to committing such material irregularities as fraud. However, as
already pointed out, the participating auditors' description of the perpetmtors needs to
be viewed with caution.

Finally, the findings reported in this chapter provide empirical support for the
eclectic fraud detection model developed in Chapter 4. The survey emphasises that
audit experience alone is not sufficient to improve the auditors' fraud-detection
performance as they seem to seldom encounter irregularities. In addition, the use of

22 The major fmud offenders in Chapter S were in the ago group 31-45.
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red flags on its own is not enough for effective fraud detection by auditors. By
reporting patterns in the kinds of relationship between different industries, different
irregularities, different ways that alerted the auditors, and different audit procedures
that appear to detect them, the survey of auditors has added new knowledge to fraud
risk assessment. TI1e findings support the general profile of fraud offender
constructed on the basis of the MFG study, but also emphasise the importance of a
person having a vice such as gambling as a good indicator of their being a fraud risk.
The survey also identified having an authoritarian personality as indicative of crimeproneness. The eclectic fraud detection model was borne out by the findings of the
survey. Furthennore, the results of the survey help to revise the model and to make it
even more useful to auditors by showing that fraud-risk assessment has to be
multifaceted if it is to achieve its objective. In the light of the evidence, it can be
concluded that the fraud detection model proposed in Chapter "/ is more likely to be
useful to auditors as it makes good the deficits in Albrecht et al.'s (1995); Cressey's '"·
(1986) and Loebbecke et al.'s (I 989) models.

The results of the survey challenge Loebbecke et al.'s (1989) assertion that all three
of their model's components must be present for fraud to occur, As in the cases of the
profile of the major fraud offender, the proposed fraud detection model weaves
together features and patterns identified at different levels, namely: the economic
environment, the particular industry, the company, particular financial areas within
the company and particular individuals holding positions of financial trust where

,;

i:'
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they cnn effect fraud. Hence, the ROP Fraud model is an essential component of the

revised eclectic fraud detection model (see Figure 4, Chapter 7). The fraud-detection
model depicted in Figure 4 informs auditors that: particular fraud~·P'ronc industries arc
characterised by five different types of irregularities; that particular kinds of audit

procedure are more likely to identify particular kinds of irregularities, as wei! as what
factors alert auditors to different irregu]ariti':S in the different industries. This
additional knowledge enables the model developed in Chapter 4 to be further refined
and makes it more useful to auditors in a more practical way, by providing specific
guidance on what to look out for and how to approach it in planning their audit and

carrying out a fraud risk assessment.

The research findings should benefit auditors as far as fraud indicators are concerned,
and assim them to enhance their audit effectiveness. It is also hoped that the research

results reported below can be used to identify ways of detecting, preventing and
reducing major fraud within companies more effectively and efficiently than at

"
present.

The next chapter describes the refined models of why people commit fraud and of
fraud detection and considers in what sense the present thesis can be said to be
making an original contribution to knowledge in the fields concerned.

'I·'

DISCUSSION OF THE ROI' FRAUD MODEL AND THE FRAUD
DETECTION MODEL

Fraudulent activity such as management and employee fraud arc examples of
irregularities that can have a material impact on the financial statements. Such frauds
are very costly for both the entities defrauded and society at large and are also
significant for the auditing profession. In Australia, the detection and prevention of
irregularities rests with management. This thesis has argued that the ability to detect
fraud is vital to auditors, even though audjtors in Australia do not have a legal duty to
detect irregularities, including fraud, but only to audit with reasonable skill and care.
This is because of: (I) the legal liability auditors can face when they fail to detect
fraud; and (2) the fact that fraud detection is an imp>:~rtant component of the
expectation gap and audit beneficiaries want an expanded role for the auditor as
society's corporate watchdog. Auditors are under increasing pressure to accept
responsibility for detecting material fraud.

Since auditors cannot become experts at fraud detection through audit experience
alone, they need to utilise the relevant knowledge about why people corrunit fraud that
is avail!ible in such other disciplines as psychology, sociology and criminology. The
review of relevant theoretical perspectives and available empirical evidence in those
disciplines identified a number of fraud correlates regarding the oflendcr's personality
&!tributes, thus making it possible to talk in terms of fraud-prone individuals, i.e.,
persons possessing certain personality traits and who are motivated to corrunit fraud.
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'!11e notion of fraud-proncrwss has been lacking in various framl-detcction models put
forward to assist auditors in ass~ssing the risk of fraud when planning their amlit.

Results reported in this thesis show that the existence of an opportunity for, and
financial pressure on, someone to commit fraud arc not enough to account for
individual differences in who docs or does not commit management or employee fraud.
The thesis has also identified and evaluated a significant amount of knowledge
regarding specific ways of improving auditors' ability to detect fraud. This includes
being aware of company-level and financial-area-level correlates of fraud-proneness, as
well as a broad range of approach<!s to fraud detection put forward in recent years. It
needs to be emphasised in this context that different approaches to fraud detection by
auditors are best thought of as supplementing one another.

1.0

A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF THE AETIOLQrv OF FRAUD (ROP
FRAUD MODEL)

The study of 50 major fraud cases prosecuted by the MFG, examined the applicability
of the proposed ROP model ofthc aetiology of fraud (see Chapter 5). The results ofthe
study support the basic premise of the model (see Figure 3) that fraud is generally
committed as a result of a combination of factors, namely the existence of a crimeprone person with a motive (P), an opportunity (0) and the possession by such a
person of rationalisations (R) that make it possible for him/her to commit the crime
once or repeatedly (see Figure 3). TI1e MFG study cast serious doubt on the validity of
the Loebbecke et a\. (1989) model because it fails to take into account one's
rationalisations for committing fraud. The ROP model wns revised in the light of the
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results or the study nnd highlights the importance of both "situational Jilelors" aml
"company characteristics" in operationally defining the "opportunity" component of
ROP. The MFG study results also confinncd that the "person" component of ROP
consists of two inseparable parts, namely "motive" and "crime-prone personality".
Finally, the findings obtained confirm the crucial importance of"mtionalisations" for
fraud to occur.

The profile constructed on the basis of the literatwe discussion and the results of the
MFG study comprises information at two levels: firstly, at a general level, the culprit is
likely to be a male first offender, aged 31-45, occupying a position of trust, who needs
to solve a fmancial problem (or, :;imply, is motivated by greed), often acts alone,
breaches that trust and commits a spate of deception offences defrauding a number of
victims; secondly, the profile incorporates a taxonomy of offenders that comprises a
detailed account of twelve offender typologies. 'The profile is significantly more
detailed than what has been reported by other authors ru1d includes a minority of
offenders who are professional predators (sec the motive component of Figtu·c 3). The
offender profile constructed would be useful to auditors if used in conjunctio;~ with

other relevant knowledge about fraud risk, such ns different industries and financial

areas. The profile constructed ought to be used in combination with (1) the knowledge
concerning the statistically significant inter-relationships found between offence,
offender and victim characteristics; and (2) the eclectic fraud-detection model reported
in Chapter 6 (see Figure 4).
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l11c lindings obtained show that the modus operundi (deceptive action) of serious fi-aud
offenders is very much tlu: same whether they operate in Austrulia or in the U.S. and
that the MFG-prosecuted offenders were very prolific.

1.1

Additional issues addressed by the two studies and incorponttcd in the
ROPmodel

Reflecting on the importance of opportunity, most (94%) of the offenders victimised
someone they knew. The fact that approximately one-third of the offenders had a
criminal record (that was especially the case with managing directors) points to the

importance of careful screening of applicants for positions of financial t.-ust, including
background checks, in order to reduce the risk of fraud victimisation (see "Company
characteristics" in Figure 3).

The finding that about one-third of the offenders had accomplices means that for such
offenders the decision to commit fraud follows a group discussion, a very important
factor not previously discussed by other authors in this area, a factor catered for in the
ROP model (see "Company Characteristics" part of the "Opportunity" component of
Figure 3). In a sense, the availability of one or more other crime ·prone person(s) can
be considered an opportunity to collude in order to perpetrate fraud by, for example,

beating the internal control system.

The findings from the survey of auditors support the geneml profile of a fraud offender
constructed on the basis of the MFG study, but also emphasise the importance of a
person having a vice/motivation, such as gambling, as an indicator of their being a
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fraud risk. The survey also identitied having an authoritarian personality

a~

indicative

of crime-proneness (sec "Crimc-l'ronc Personality"). The results of the survey do not
support L{)ebbeckc ct al.'s (1989) assertion that all three of their model's components
(conditions, motives and attitudes) must be present for management fraud to occur. In
addition, their model has also been shown to be weaker in defalcations than in
management fraud. There is, therefore, a need for the Locbbecke et al. model to be
revised in the light of the doubt cast upon it by the tindings of the research reported in
Chapters 5 and 6. In the light of the evidence, it can be concluded that the ROP model
is more likely to be useful to auditors, as it makes gocxl the def1cits in Loebbeckc ct
al.'s model.

Contrary to what Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) General Theory of Crime predicts,
most major fraud offenders were not immersed in crime in the sense of being recidivist
career offenders. The offenders surveyed can, however, be said to support Gottfredson
and Hirschi's theory to some

ext~nt

in so far as they evidenced low self-control and

exploited opportunities available to them. The MFG study indicates that a diversity of
people commit fraud for a variety of reasons and in different circumstances, and who
the offenders are is not random. In other words, the offenders studied comprise a
number of typologies of major fraud offenders, many of whom experienced situational
pressures (e.g., high personal debts, tinancia! losses) and who rationalised their
offending to make it acceptable to them, and thus to continue to perceive themselves as
successful professionals in their fields. Also, it should not be forgotten that solicitors,
accoW'!tants and bank managers, to name but a few, operate in an occupational culture
that values wealth and corporate success, considers failure quite unacceptable and at
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the same time provides opportunities for major fraud.

The ROP model sets out the difTcrcnt ways in which fraud becomes possible. These
are: when a crime-prone individual under financial pressure or with other motives,
perceives at least one opportunity to commit fraud; when the individual has both the
knowledge to commit the crime (alone or in collusion) and to conceal the fraud; and,
finaHy, the individual possesses the rationalisations needed to justify to him/herself

committing the offence once or repeatedly. The need to locate the three components of
ROP in a broader socioeconomic context is emphasised. Rationalisations constitute by
far the most vital of the three components that make up the psychological process of

infonnation processing and decision making that precedes an act of fraud. The model's

eight assumptions listed in Chapter 4 were borne out by the MFG study.

It is acknowledged earlier on in this thesis that the methodology used in the MFG and

the survey of auditors

ha~

its limitations. These limitations include the fact that the

offenders' rationalisations were studied after the offenders were apprehended by the
police and convicted by the courts. It is therefore, not certain whether the same
rationalisations existed before the offences in question or whether they could be used to
predict fraud. Also the fact that some types of irregularities plagued one type of
industry mther than another may well be due to some industries (e.g., manufacturing)
having more companies.
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Without ignoring the limitutions of the two studies, the findings show that it is no
longer justifiable to tulk about major fraud offenders as a homogeneous population and
cmplmsisc •.he need to desegregate sub-categories of such ofTcndcrs. lbc MFG

offenders surveyed made many decisions, both about their everyday life, their business
activities, about who and how to deceive in order to obtain money and whether to act
alone or with one or more accomplices. More specifically, for the majority of them
who are not profeSllional conmen, there is the original decision to solve their financial
problem by committing fraud, but there is also the decision to continue committing

fraud or to desist.

Whether the sentences imposed by the higher courts on such offenders serve the

purpose of individual and/or general deterrence is impossible to say on the basis of the
studies carried out. However, examination of voluntary statements made to the police
by the offenders concerned indicates the following: a tenn of imprisonment of five
years or less is unlikely to be a deterrent because they fancy their chances of not being
apprehended; if charged, they believe they "can beat the charges" against them and,
even if they are incarcerated, they know they would be unlikely to serve their full
sentence. Without a subjective perception by serious fraud offenders that (I) there is a
high risk of being detected, prosecuted and convicted; and (2) that the likely penalty
upon conviction will be !>evere enough, deterrence becomes a questionable moral
justification at the sentencing stage.
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2.0

ECLECTIC FRAU!) UETECTION MODEL

In support of similar conclusions reached on the basis of the findings from the survey
of auditors reported in Chapter 6, the findings obtained in the Major Fraud Group study
suggest that audito·:S played but a rather limited role in the detection of the frauds
involved. The fraud detection model, which includes the ROP model as one of its
components (see Figure 4}, shows how auditors can improve their fraud detection
ability. Given that most frauds involve financial pressure on an individual and that
factor plays such an important part in contributing to fraud taking place, a simple
income-expenditure assessment of professional people in positions of trust should help
to identify potential/actual major frauds. Future research should also consider fraud in a
variety of officially-known and self-reported offenders in order to identify the factors
that best explain their specific nature and prevalence. There is a need to desegregate
fraud in order to be able to integrate information about individual offenders, their
modus operandi and clues in their "distorted stories", as well as to assist auditors to
narrow their search for major fraud offenders and to dete<:t fraud.

It is not claimed that anned with the criminal profiling results obtained auditors can

identity an offender and significantly increase their_ fraud-detection efficiency. This is
simply because, on the basis of existing knowledge in this area, it is just not possible to
predict accurately who in a company will commit or has been committing fraud. What
the ROP model can do is to increase an auditor's sensitivity to fraud-risk and focus
his/her attention on persons who are potential fraud risks.
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llte survey of Austmlian auditors' experience in detecting material irregularities
including fmud fowtd that for auditors encountering material irregularities is a rare
event and that the use of red nags is not particularly helpful on its own. l"bercfore,

<',,

'(

auditOrs c:hlnot rely on red nags or audit experience alone in their endeavours to
improve their fraud detection effectiveness. It is hoped that the eclectic fraud detection
model constructed will go some way towards enhancing auditors' fraud-detection
ability.

The irregularities about which the respondents answered questions put to them were
important, since 39.7% involved management fraud, the kind of fraud most likely to
land auditors in costly litigation suits in the courts. The survey of auditors has added a
new dimension to fraud-risk assessment by: (1) reporting patterns in statically
significant relationships between different industries, different irregularities, different
ways auditors were alerted, and different audit procedures that appear to detect such
irregularities; and (2) identifYing two significant correlates (absence of an effective
system of internal control and a code of conduct) of an irregularity having a material
impact on the financial accounts of a company. Furthennore, the research reported in
Chapter 6 is the first time such issues have been addressed with reference to four kinds
of irregularities, namely other illegal acts, other acts, intentional non-fraudulent
misstatements and errors.

~\

"

The eclectic fraud detection model was supported by the fmdings of the survey. The
results of the survey were used to revise the model and make it even more useful to
auditors by showing that fraud-risk assessment has to be multifaceted if it is to achieve
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its objective. As in the cases of the profile of the major fraud offender, the fraud·
detection model weaves together features and patterns identified at different levels.
These levels are: the economic environment, the particular industry, the company,
particular financial areas within the company and particular individuals holding
positions of financial trust where they can effect fraud. Hence, the ROP model is an
essr.ntial component of the fraud detee;tion model. The survey of auditors indicates that,
unlike their counterparts in the U.S., auditors in Australia appear to be less vigilant at
the planning stage and too often fail to be alerted by one or more red flags to the
existence of a material irregularity. The survey findings also highlight the crucial
importance of auditors not ceasing to be vigilant however long they have been auditing
a company's books.

Th"e fraud detection model constructed also highlights the importance of having a
competent, ethically-minded auditor, who is well versed in the aetiology of fraud, in
management deception strategies and counter deception strategies, and who enjoys the
fiill support of hisll:er finn as far as fraud detection is concerned. Additionally, an
auditor should: have a good bird's eye view of the company's environment and ·~'l.temal
control system, be alert to infonnation about both individuals within the company who

' are high risks of potential fraud and the company's relationship with outside parties.
Finally, the auditor should be aware of and guard, against his/her own unintentional
biases in carrying out the audit.
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Wilhout ignoring its limitations, what the research reported in Chaptcrs.,5 and 6 can do
is to increase the fraud awareness of auditors. Together with empirically obtained
knowledge about other sets of red flags pointing to vulnerable types of
industriesl~nmpanies

as well as vulnerable areas within particular types of

industries/companies, the red flags inherent in the ROP model provided above can at
best be used to alert an auditor to a greater likelihood of fraud and thus negate an

auditor's sense of complacency.

3.0

FUTURE RESEARCH

Future research should, explore further the patterns identified between offence,
offender, victim and criminal justice characteristics with a larger sample of such

offenders, including self-reported (as opposed to officially-known) fraud offenders, in
order to replicate the two:component criminal profile of a fraud offender reported

above. It could also examine the applicability of the two models with a larger and more
representative sample of management and employee fraud cases and auditors
respectively and test experimentally the use by auditors of red flags contained in the
(!

fraud-detection model ptoposed in Chapter 6. This could help ascertain the actual
usefulness of the two proposed models to auditoro in detecting fraud. Another approach
would be to utilise interviews with fraud offenders to shed some light on the various

'
\

'

decisions that are necessary for fraud to occur. Finally, there is a need to replicate the
MFG findings by measuring fraud offenders' level of self control using the instrument
developed by Grasmick et al, (1993).
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No single thesis can nsk all the relevant questions, let alone provide satisfactory

answers to them. The author hopes the resenrch contained in this thesis provides some

much-needed answers to two basic but important contemporary issues/questions for
·auditors, namely why people commit management and employee fraud and h~w

auditors can become better at detecting such fi'audulent activity.
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Appemlix I

16 September 1995
Surveys by KPMG 1995) and Deakin Australia (1994) have found that the cost of fraud by
persons in positions of trust in our society is astronomical. Auditors are often sued for
negligence to the tune of billions of dollars as a result of failing to detect material irregularities.

Despite the importance of fraud, researchers in Australia have paid scant attention to it.
In an effort to increase our understanding of fraud I am carrying out a national questionnaire
survey of auditors' duties to detect and report irregularities. The purpose of the survey is to

better understand the various types of iiTegularities that are being committed in Australia by
white-collar crime offenders and, in the context of AUP16 (AUS210) to identifY the type of
indicators present in an audit that should alert the auditor to the existence of irregularities. It is
estimated that the questionnaire will take approximately twenty minutes to complete. The
survey results will be made available to all respondents who wish to receive them, together with
a token of appreciation to recompense the participants for the time spent to complete the
questionnaire.
Please rest assured that all data collected will be analysed anonymously and treated as strictly
confidential. Respondents' details will be detached from the questionnaire as soon as it is
I'Q:ived so as to maintain the confidentiality of the participants.
I would greatly appreciate both your endorsement of the survey and advising your finn's
auditors (those who have completed their PY or are at the Senior level) and fraud auditors or
forensic accountants if there are any. If your firm consents to participate you will be sent the
questionnaire through the mail at the end of October.
Finally, please note that Commander A. Bowles, of the Major Fmud Group, Victoria Police, is
endorsing the questionnaire and a letter to that effect will be sent with the questionnaire.
I shall be contacting you by phone within the next two weeks regarding this letter.
Thanking you in anticipation.
Yours Sincerely,
Maria Kapardis (ACA), M. Bus.
Senior Lecturer in Accounting.
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26 October 1995
Dear participant,
I am a Senior Lecturer in Accounting, and I am currently conducting research into

Auditor.;' duty to detect, deter and report management fraud.
Part of the research utilises a structured questionnaire to be filled in by pmctising
It is
auditors/fraud auditors/forensic accountants/internal auditors in Australia.
estimated it will take one about twenty minutes to complete the questionnaire. I would
be grateful for your participation.
As you know, the cost to society of such irregularities as fraud is astronomical, and
there is a controversy surrounding the role of the auditor in detecting and reporting
such offences. It is also evident that audit firms are sued for exorbitant damages for
alleged failure to detect and report irregularities. Interestingly, auditing research has
paid scant attention to fraud and auditors.
The suiVey consists of three parts:

Part I: Summary infonnation about each of the irregularities with which you
have had experience, during the last five years. This infonnation is needed to
assist in the understanding of auditors' experience with material and immaterial
irregularities, in terms of frequency of occurrence, nature, and impact on the
financial statements of the clients involved.
Part II: Detailed infonnation about one material irregularity selected by you is
required. The purposes of gathering this information are:
(a) to contribute to the understanding of irregularities at a detailed level, and
(b) to determine the presence of irtdic11tors ava(lablc to the auditor before the
irregularity was discovered (in terms ofthe AUP16 (AUS210) factors).
Part III: Demographic data about you and your experience.
It is hoped the research will benefit you personally in terms of identifying fraud
indicators, and gaining knowledge that should assist you to enhance your audit
effectiveness. Society in geoeral will also benefit because the research conccmcd will
identifY ways of detecting, preventing and reducing such white-collar crime as fraud.
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Jf you arc interested in receiving an executive summary of the results and a gili
voucher as a token of appreciation to recompense you /Or the time spent to complete
the questionnaire please fill in your details in the n~xt page. I would greatly appreciate
it if you rettml the completed questionnaire by 30 November, 1995.

Rest l!llsured that your response will remain anonymous as your details will be detached
from your response when it is first received and will be treated as strictly confidential.
Furthennorc, in order for the research to comply with the requirements of the
University's Ethics Committee the statement in the next page would need to be filled
in by you.

Any questions concerning this project can be directed to Ms. Maria Kapardis of
Victoria University of Technology, Department of Accountancy and Law on (03) 9365
2549, fax (03)9365 2525.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Yours Sincerely,

Maria Kapardis (ACA), B. Ec., M. Bus.
Senior Lecturer in Accounting

fia""""""'"'a&a
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cc--:--;-------c--.;:=c-::::c:c.o= have read the information on the previous
page and any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to
participate in this activity, realising I may withdraw at any time.
I agree that the research data gathered for this study may be published provided I am
not identifiable.

Participant or authorised representative

Date

M.KAPARDIS

26.10.1995

Investigator

Date

If you would like to receive a copy of the executive summary together with a gift
voucher as a token of appreciation to recomperu;e you for the time spent to complete
the questionnaire please fill in the details below. Please return the questionnaire by 30
November.

Name:

Finn:
Address:

Major Fraud Group
2nd Floor
549 St. Kilda Road
MELBOURNE :l004
16 October 1995

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
I write to strongly support Mrs Maria KAPARDIS applied research into fraud

detection and prevention.
The research has the formal approval of the Victoria Police and the full cooperation of the Major Fraud Group.
I am of the view that the results of Mrs. KAPARDIS' research will make an
original and substantial contribution to lmowledge and will be of practical use
to both the accounting profession in general and auditors in particular as well
as to law enforcement agencies. I therefore urge you to participate in this
study.

A.J. BOW!:ES, LL.B.
Commander
Major Fraud Group
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QUESTIONNAIRE

PARTJ
If as an auditor you have encountered any irregularities during the last 5 years please
provide summary infonnation about each type of material and immaterial irregularity
experienced:
lrrcgu/arilies comprise; jra11d. mlwr illeKal <I<'IJ. <!Iher a<·t.•, intentional hill notfrcmd;!/onl or all1•r
illegal mlss/aiM!Mis, and errors.

How many times have you come across material and immaterial irregularities
in your experience as auditor?

1.

material _ _ _ _ __

2.

immaterial ...- - - - - -

Please provide swnmary information about each material and immaterial
irregularity encow1tered by filling in tables A-F below.
A code ofconductlethicslpracllce Jla/cs where people In an organimlion stand ill relation to eor:h
other and to the orgfmisatioll ilse!f and il ~xpresses a moral dimen.sion to the activities of 1/ie
business. It should co>·er areas /Ike disciplinary oct ion.•, whislleb/m,ing etc.

A.

•

Management Fraud {i.e., an act whkh involves the use of deception to oblllin an illegal advrnnage by
management) e.g., e.>~pense account, conflict of interest, kickbacks, purchase for personal use, theft
of invcnlmyfplant, lapping and kiting, information, false financial slalemcn15, phantom vendors,
urchase diversion of sales roduct substitution alent infrin cmen other
unnccess

O.:scribc the
irregularity

#Times
encountered

Industry
the client
operated

'"
I

2

3

4

what
alencd

'"

effective
internal
controls

code of
conduct
existed

material
financial
impact on

''"

""

account.;

~.

'"

352

Employee frnud {311 act wh'ch involves the U>~ of deception 10 obtain an illegal advl!lllagc by an
employee) e.g., chc<[UC forgery, expense u~:count, conflict uf interest, kickbacks, purcha<c for
pcrsonnl usc, theft of invcnlorylplalll, petty ca1h fraud, lapping and kiting, information, patent
m rm cmcnt ol cr.

B.

r·

'

Describe the

irregularity

•

//Times
cncountel"l'd

Industry
the client
opcmtcd

'"

what
alerted

'""

effective

internal
controls
y/o

code of
conduct

malcr;ul
financial

exi~ted

impact on

ylo

the

accounts
y/o

I

2

3

4

'
C.

Diller Illegal Acts {i.e. acts which involve non-comp!\auce with laws and regulations which may, or
moy not, result in misstatements including omissions of amounts or other disclosures from an entity's
accountin records or financial rc

'

Describe the
irregularity

·~

#Times

Industry

what

encounl~red

th~dient

alerted

opemted

''"

'"
I

2

3

4

c!Jcdivc
internal
controls

code of
conduct
exi1ted

y/o

y/o

material
financial
impact on
the
accounlS
y/o

I
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D.

Other nels which contrnvcnc the cotlslitution of un entity including non-compliance with tru•t deed<
. ICS 0 f (l'-'!ICmliOir
or memomn durn an d III!IC

'

Describe the
irregulnrity

II Times
cncuumcrcd

lndumy
the client
operated

in

what
ulcrtcd

'""

cffcc1ivc
internal
controls

code or

material

conduct
existed

linandal

''"

''"

impact nn
the
account;
yfn

I

2

3

4

E.

Intentional, but not fraudulent ot' other illegal misstalcmcniS which include omissions ofamouniS or
other disclosures from an enti s accountin records or financial re

'

Describe the

#Times

irrcgulwity

encountered

Industry
the client
operated

'"
I

2

3

4

"'·

what

effective

code of

material

alerted

internal
controls

conduct
existed

tinanciul
impact on

''"

''"

accounts

you

<ho

''"
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F.

Errors which nrc unintentional mistakes in. or umissiuns of umounts or nthcr di<clnsurcs from,
linnncialre orK

"

Describe the
irregularity

II Times
encountered

Industry
the client

whm
ulc11cd

cfli:ctivc

opcrntcd
in

'""

controls

code of
conduct
existed

'"

''"

internal

I

2

3

4

PARTII
Please provide detailed information about ONE material irregularity
(i) detected by youD,
(ii) or your finn 0,
(iii) or one that you have worked on D (please tick as appropriate.

1.

Please

describe

how

the

irregularity

was

committed

material

financial
imp1cton
the
accounts

'"
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2.

Who was involved in the irregularity (please tick)
Director(s)
Shareholder
Middle management
Others below management

3.

D
D
0
0

Other top management
CEO
CFO
Chief Accountant

D
D

Please tick tbe appropriate industry and status of the client.
Public Company

D

Private Company

No industry designation
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Mining
Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
Construction
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants
Transport and Storage
Communication Services
Finance and Insurance
Property and Business Services
Government Administration and Defence
Education
Health and Community Services
Cultural and Recreational Services
Personal and Other Services
4,

D
D

D

D
0
0

0
0
0

0
0

0
D
D
D
0
0
0
0

0
D

Audit Areas affected by this irregularity (please tick more than one box, if
applicable):

Cru;h
Receivables

D
D

Inves!ments

D

Property, plant and equipment D
Intangibles
0
D
Other Non-Current Assets
Creditors and borrowings
0
Provisions
D
0
Other Current Liabilities
Non-Current Liabilities
0

Inventories
D
Other Current Assets
D
Share Capital
D
0
Reserves
Retained profits or accumulated lossesO
Related Party transactions
0
Other (please s p e c i f y ) - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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5.

How long luul your firm been the auditor of that client when the
irregularity was di~covcrcd'!

6.

Over what time period had this m:1tcrial irregularity been committed (e.g.,
3 months, or 5 years).

7.

Please tick the audit procedures first indicating the irregularity.
D

Not discovered by auditor
Preliminary analytical review
Study/evaluation of internal control
Analytical tests of specific accounts
Substantive tests of details
Use of the checklist in AUPI6
No procedure designation

8.

D
D

D
D

D
D

Who detected the irregularity concerned (please w~.k).

Assistant
D
Senior D
Supervisor
0
Manager
D
Partner D
Fraud auditor 0
Other(please s p e c i f y • ) - - - - - - - - - - - -

9.

If a "fraud auditor" had been part of the audit team do you think the
irregularity would have been discovered earlier.
A fraud audiiOr Is $Omcone other than t/le jillllndal m1dl/or wha Is i11va/ved /11 delecling a11d

preventing fraud.

Yes
10.

0

No

0

Profiling of the Perpetrator
A Sex

M

D

F

D

B. Approximate Age ___

C. Educational Standard:
High School

D

Tertiary

D

Professional

D

Other D
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D. Marital Status:
Married
Divorced

0

Single

0

0

Separated

0

E. Vices of the perpetrator:
Gambling
0
Greed
0
Drugs/Alcohol D
Lifestyle
D
Personal Financial Pressures
0
Other (please s p e c i f y ) - - - - - - - - F. Please provide a brief description of the perpetrator's main personality

characteristics (e.g., authoritarian, introvert, loner, etc)

G. Please outline other impressions you have of the perpetrator

H. Number of accomplices:

0

Two

0

>ThreeD

NIA

0

One

Three D

11. Once detected to whom was the irregularity reported ? (you may tick more than
one box)
CEO
0
DPP
Board of Directors
D
Audit Committee
ASC
D
Major Fraud Group
Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

D
0

0

I

Please indicate which of the following "Red Flags"(fraud indic:ttors) cxislctl with
respect to the matcrinl irregularity discussed in the pn'Vious section.

Pfease llote:Only lick ifyour tmswer is yes and you might have more than one tick
Btuiness Environment

Nature of the business is susceptible to
misappropriation

Unduly influential circumsL1nccs
Pressure to meet forecasts
Weak management integrity

Ineffective/ non-cKistcnt regulation by external
parties
Survival of company dependant on irregularity(ies).
Ineffective or non-existent code of conduct
Tnmsactions with related parties not at arm's length

Unusual trnnsactions with compaJJics registered in
tax havens

Liquidity pressure

(lied Flug)

(Red Flag)

Applicable lo
tlw
engage me II/

1/e/ewwl/o

,,,

Irregularity

(Red Plug)
Alorlod me
d"ring the

plannin;:
phu.m
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fill~ mal C<llrtro/ S1n1~11m:

(lledi'1aW
Appft<'Uhfe lo

' '"

""!:"l!"lllellf

(fledHa/i)
1/e/cvollllo
tlte
irregularity

(!led Nul:)
Alerted me
during the
plunning
phase

(Red Flag)
Relevant to

(Red Flag)
Alerted me
during the
plilllning
phase

Orgnnisation is decentrnliscd without adequate
monitoring
MEI11ngement override
Ineffective management
Luck of segregation of duti<:.<
Weak internal controls
Excessive authority vested in a senior officer
Poor systems
Ineffective internal audit

Integrity/Competence of Management

Domineering management
Complex corpomtc structure
Continuing failure to correct internal control
weaknesses
High executive staff hi mover
Significant/prolonged understaffing of the
accounting department
Frequent changes ofla1o,yers
The client has engaged in opinion shopping
The auditors experience wHit management indicates
a degree of dishonesty
Internal audit is improperly staffed

'
(Red Flag)
Applicable to
lhe
engagement

••

irregularity
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Unusunll'rcssures wilhin un en!i!y

lnndequatc working capital
DctcriorJ!ing quality of crunings
A need for a rising profit
A significant investment in an industry noted for
rnpid change
Entity heavily dependent on a prn:luct or a customer
Management displays an overly aggre,ssive altitude
toward financial reporting and forecasts
Pressure e~erted on accounting personnel to
complete financial reports in unusually short periods

(l(cd Flag)
llpJrlicabJe !o
!he
cngagcmcll!

(J(cd Flag)
!o
!he
irregularity

l~clcv~n!

(Red Flag)
lllencd me
during !he
planning
pha1c
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Unuslml Occurrcnccsfrrnns.1ction>

(Red Flag)
Applicable to
the
engagement

(Red !'lag)
RcJcvaJl\ to
the
lncgularity

(Red Flag)
Alerted me
during the
piWlning
phase

Unusual bal:utce date trnnsa>lions
Payments for services that appear exccs~ivc in
to services provided

~~ntion

Payments for goods which appear to be above/below
market price
Evidence offillsified documents
Large Cash payments
Payments made to local or overseas officials
Problems with regulatory aulhorities
Ignored advice by legal adviser
Evidence ofunduly lavish styles by officm or
employees
lnvesligations by police

Unsatisfactory Rccardsf!>roblem.l in Obtaining
Sufficient Appropriate Audit Evidence

.,

(Red Flag)
Applicable to
engagement

Inadequate accounting n:cords
Inadequate d(tCUmentation
Excessive number of differences between a~counting
records and third party confirmations
Evasive, unreasonable or unsatisfactory n:sponscs by
management to inquiric!
New client without sufficient infonnatfon from
predecessor auditor.
Conflicting audit evidence ond inexplicable changes
in operating ratios.
Signilicanlly fewer responses to confimmtion
requests than expected

(Red Flag)
Relevant to
lite
irregularity

(Rerl Flag)
Alerted me
during the
planning
phase

362
Markel Pressures

(!ted Flag)
Applicnblc ln
the
engagement

(Red Fl3g)
Rclcvuot to
the
irregularity

(Hcd FJ"g)

Alerted nw
during the
plilllniog
phase

Declining industty
lnduslly subject to complex legislation
Volatile industry with numerous corpornte take·ovcrs

363

Factors Relevant to an EOP Environment

Minimal plannh1g for tile installation of new
hardware
Inadequate computer skills amongst relevant entity
staff
Inappropriate hardware or software to pcrfonn
important functions
Poor physical or logical a~cess controls
lnadcquntc or inappropriate file ac~css hierarchy
Lack of clear audittrnil and lnlnsaction log
Hardware failures, including excessive amounts of
'down-time' and resultant input backlogs
Software failures
Failure to restrict access to software and
documentation to authorised personnel
Progrnm changes that arc not docun1cntcd, approved
and tested
Inappropriate data and program storage media
Inadequate detection proccdarcs for system viruses.
Inadequate ovcrnll baiB.Ilcing of computer
transactions and data bases to the financial accounts
Shared or non-specific ownership of data

(lied Flag)
llpplkable to
the
engagement

(fled Flag)
Relevant to

""

irregularity

(!ted Flag)
Alerted me
during the
plannin~

phase
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!'ART II)/"

DEM~),GRAPI-llC DETAILS

TO BE COMPLETED BY ALL RESPONDENTS
State residing
ACTDQLDDNSWD

NTD SAD TASD VICD WAD

(2)

Male D

Female

D

(3)

Current Position:
Financial Auditor
Forensic Accountant
Public Sector Auditor

D
D

Fraud Auditor
Internal Auditor

(I)

,·.

,,
'·

i!

!I

D
D

D

(4)

Number of Years of experience as an auditor------

(5)

Position in the Partnership (e.g., senior, supervisor e t c ) - - - - -

(6)

Number of Years in current position _ _ _ _ __

(7)

Approximate number of engagements worked o n - - - - - -

(8)

Industry speciali.~ation as an auditor (YOU MAY TICK MORE THAN I)

No industry designation
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Mining
Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
Construction
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants

D
D

Transport and Storage

0

Communication Services
Finance and Insurance
Property and Business Services
Government Administration and Defence
Education
Health and Community Services
Cultural and Recreational Services
Persona! and Other Services

D
D
D
D
D
D
D

D
D
D

D
D
D
D

D
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(9)

Ty11C of nudit firm you work in.
Big6
Small finn

(10)

D
D

Medium Ti~r
Not Applicable

Tick if your prncticc pTovidcs,
Fraud auditor D
Forensic accountant
If no then plcnsc go to question 13.

(11)

D

D

D

Qualifications of fraud auditor
Chartered Accountant D
Company Auditor
Psychologist
D
Criminologist
Other (please s p e c i f y ) - - - - - - - - - - -

(12)

D
D

Qualifications offorcnsic Accountant
Foremic Accoull/ani/I one who is /n\'0/ved ill !he in;oesligaiioJJ ~11d ll•e gatheri"g of evidence foro claim ar
court uctlon.

Chartered Accountant D
Company Auditor
Psychologist
D
Criminologist
Lawyer
D
Other(plcase s p e c i f y ) - - - - - - - - - - (13)

D
D

Times in the last 12 m1i.~ths you/ your clients required the seTViccs of a fraud
auditor
rOI-ensic accountant ______

,,,,

i,'

Appendix II

RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS AND BACKGROUND
INFORMATION

State residing Victoria {40%), Queensland {17%), NSW (15%), South Australia
(15%), Western Australia {8%), ACT (3%) and Tasmania (2%). 11Jc participants were
predominately males (85%) holding manager position (39%), partner (28%), senior
(13%), supervisors (12%), Assistant managers (8%).

i.

Current Position:

%

ii.

as an auditor

Financial auditor

experience as an auditor:
Years

%

58

82

3-10

Public Sector auditor

7

11-15

17

Fraud auditor

7

16-25

17

4

>25

Internal auditor

iii.

Number of years

Number of years in

iv.

in current position:

8

Approximate Number of
engagements worked on

Years

%

No. of engagements

%

1-3

62

10-50

48

4-8

24

51-100

27

>100

25

9-15

7

>15

7

____I
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Most seniors were ut that position !Or one ycnr mainly (94%), similnrly for man:~gcrs
who had been at that position !Or twelve months (60%), or tW() years (35%). The
partners who responded had a spread of number of years at that position, 30% lOr the
first year, 27% for two years, 18% for the third year and 25% for the fourth year.

v.

Industry specialisation:

vi.

Type ofnudit firm participant
worked in.
Big Six

73

19

Medium Tier

16

67

Small Firm

4
6

No industry
designation
>3 industries
Finance and Insurance

6

Public Sector

Manufacturing

4

Internal Auditor

Mining

2

Public sector

2
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Appendix Ill
Coding Guide Used for the MFG Study.
Gender;

'',',

ii.

marital status;

iii.

age in years;

iv.

ethnicity;

_;?

v.

occupation;

i(

vL

main types of fraud committed;

vii.

number of non fraud offences charged;

viii.

type of non fraud charges;

ix.

fraud charges summary;

x.

under what law fraud charges;

xi.

number of fraud charges;

xii.

number of victims;

xiii.

relationship with victims;

xiv.

number of accomplices;

xv.

who suspected the fraud;

xvi.

versatility of offender;

xvii.

how many months did it take to prosecute;

xviii.

motivation;

xix,

type of plea;

xx.

pre-trial status;

xxi.

legt~lly

xxii.

type oflegal representation;

xxiii.

court of first instance;

xxiv.

main sentence imposed;

XXV.

severity of sentence;

xxvi.

prior offence;

xxvii.

amount involved.

represented or not;

